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Social workers engaged in child care planning and legal proceedings have a significant 
role in decisions which are not only complex but have far reaching and often 
permanent consequences for the lives of children and their families. These decisions 
are inherently ethically charged. However, practitioners’ awareness of some of the 
ethical dimensions may vary from a sharply felt to a limited or tacit level. The 
emotional aspects of this work may also have a significant impact on the practitioner 
and on the nature and direction of the decision making process itself. The role 
practitioners undertake is also inseparable from the embodied nature of their work, 
their relationships with the children, families and legal professionals, the court 
processes, and influences of the broader social, legal, economic, policy and 
organisational context.  
 
Traditionally, ethical decision making has been viewed as a rational analytic process 
in which emotion plays a negative and distracting role, serving only to ‘bias’ the 
decision maker. However, an increasing body of research indicates a much more 
complex and nuanced interplay between emotions and cognitive processes in 
decision making. There is a gap in research that brings together an exploration of 
both emotions and ethics in social work decision making and experience of care 
proceedings.  
 
This study explores in detail how social workers perceive and experience the 
emotional and ethical dimensions of decision making in care proceedings. A 
secondary aim is to understand how they can most effectively be supported in this 
challenging area of practice. Qualitative analysis was undertaken on data from 
nineteen individual interviews and two focus groups involving social workers, senior 
practitioners and team managers. 
 
The study found that ethics and emotions were inseparably connected for 
practitioners throughout the care proceedings process. There was found to be a 
complex dialogical relationship between emotions, ethical thinking and judgement, 
impacting on each other in a range of ways. Emotions could also lead practice to 
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become more ethical through their significant role in empathy, compassion, 
recognition, relationship building and the ethics of care, and in creating new or 
deeper understanding. Emotional discomfort and dissonance were also important in 
leading to questioning and seeking dialogue with others, which would then provide 
access to different perspectives. The study additionally sheds light on practitioners’ 
experience of the interface between the court world and the social work world. 
Participants highly valued informal team support and discussion, and the findings also 
underline the importance of spaces, whether temporal, physical, reflective or 
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1 Chapter 1: Background to the Study 
1.1  Introduction 
This study arose out of my interest in and previous experience of care proceedings 
work as a social worker and senior practitioner in local authority practice, prior to 
moving into an academic post. Undertaking care proceedings work had epitomised 
for me the most conflicting and painfully sad aspects of child and family social work, 
but also the possibility for positive and exciting moments. At times, care proceedings 
seemed to create a space where change could happen. Difficulties might be resolved 
and parents regain the care of their children. But sometimes the outcome for the 
child might be at the expense of unbearable pain and loss for a parent. 
There seemed to me to be significant ethical dimensions involved in care 
proceedings, not only in the nature of the decisions themselves, which may lead to 
permanent separation of child and parent and the impacts of this, but also in the 
ways in which social workers carry out their interactions with children and families, 
and write statements of evidence about them.  
Ethical dimensions seemed to be linked with emotion. I had noticed the spread of 
emotions arising in the process and the intensity of these, not only the joy and 
sadness mentioned above, but also anxieties about making the right decision, and 
feelings of having let a child down when sought after orders were not made by 
courts. Around me, practitioners’ awareness of the ethical dimensions seemed to 
vary from a sharply felt to a limited or tacit level. I was struck by the way some 
practitioners seemed to feel comparatively little discomfort about parents if they felt 
the outcome was ‘right for the child’, while others might feel deeply sad. 
Organisationally there seemed a mixture of recognition, wariness and ambivalence 
around the impact of emotions. I also wondered how far social workers’ emotions 
and values might make a difference to the decisions being made. 
These were the seeds of a growing interest for me in gaining more understanding of 
how practitioners perceive and experience the ethical and emotional dimensions of 
care proceedings and the decisions involved; also how emotions and ethical thinking 
might interact during the process, and whether this interplay was helpful or harmful.  
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1.2   Background and rationale for the study 
This is a qualitative study into how social workers perceive and experience the ethical 
and emotional dimensions of decision making in care proceedings. A variety of 
factors relating to the nature of child and family social work and the current context 
for practice have come together to provide a clear rationale for the study at this time. 
These are outlined briefly below. 
A number of serious case reviews, inquiries and Ofsted inspections have noted 
concerns about the quality of professional practice, judgement and decision making 
in safeguarding and protecting children (eg Laming 2003, 2009; Ofsted 2010; Brandon 
et al 2009). Recent years have also seen Government-commissioned reviews and 
reports aimed at improving analysis and professional judgement (Kirkman and 
Melrose 2014; Barlow et al 2012; Tupper et al 2017), and the Munro (2011) review of 
the child protection system. In this review, Munro points out the difficult nature of 
decisions about whether parents can be helped to keep their children safe or 
whether a child needs to be removed. These decisions are made in conditions of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. Concern with managing uncertainty and eliminating 
mistakes has led to a growth in procedural and defensive practice in child protection. 
However, the emphasis on procedural and technological tools to assess and manage 
risk does not take sufficient account of complexity and unpredictability (Littlechild 
2008), the role of skilled professional judgement (Gillingham 2006; Gillingham and 
Humphreys 2010), the multiple rationalities involved in real-world social work 
decision making or the social and relational aspects of practice (Broadhurst et al 
2010b). It is also seen by Munro (2011) as having pushed practitioners away from a 
focus on the child and working with families to promote change. 
There is also an increasing interest in the interaction of intuitive and analytical 
thinking in decision making. This focuses on the potential drawbacks of intuitive 
thinking that are associated with heuristics and bias, or its strengths such as enabling 
pattern recognition, and the relative appropriateness of intuitive or analytical 
thinking in different contexts (eg Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and  Klein 2009; 
Hammond et al 1987; Munro 2008). Studies have explored the ways in which 
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intuition and analysis are used by child and family social workers in practice (Hackett 
and Taylor 2014; Whittaker 2015, 2018; Nyathi 2018).  
The emotional dimensions of child and family social work practice have also been the 
subject of attention in recent years. A range of social work literature recognises the 
essential (and often positive) role of emotion in many areas such as relationships, 
reflection, skills and emotional intelligence (Ingram 2015a). The potentially powerful 
impacts of emotions in practice have also been explored. For example, Ferguson 
(2005, 2011, 2017 among others) has brought prominence to the embodied nature 
and emotional impact on practitioners of home visiting and working with parents, 
which can combine with bureaucratic pressures to divert their attention from the 
child to the point that children may become ‘invisible’. Writers have also suggested 
that the emotional impact of contact with abuse and suffering may be so powerful 
that practitioners may not be able to see signs of abuse in front of their own eyes 
(Cooper 2005; Ingram 2013; Ferguson 2005). Working with abused children, trauma 
and suffering is painful and can cause distress to workers (Dwyer 2007; McFadden, 
Campbell & Taylor 2015), and threats and hostility may lead to fear and anxiety (eg 
Ferguson 2005; Stanford 2010).  Any of these aspects, as well as time pressures and 
other demands, may cause stress and burnout (Leeson 2010; Zapf 2002). The Munro 
Review (2011: 91) cautions that ‘the emotional dimension of working with children 
and families plays a significant part in how social workers reason and act. If it is not 
explicitly discussed and addressed then its impact can be harmful’. 
However, there is a relative silence around the role of emotions in social work 
decision making, other than attention to their potential dangers or biasing effects. 
The Government’s Knowledge and skills statement for child and family social work 
(DfE 2014) links the impact of emotion with personal triggers that may affect the 
quality of analysis. Although Munro (2011) does identify that emotion is important in 
intuitive understanding, she also sees it as important for social workers to ‘manage 
their emotions to reduce the risk of distorted reasoning’ (p84). The positive role of 
emotion in decision making is under-theorised in social work literature and there 
seems an underlying ideal view that judgement and decision making can be clear 




Concerns have also been raised about the levels of poverty and inequality affecting 
families subject to social work intervention (eg Bywaters et al 2016) and the current 
trend towards a more authoritative child protection practice, in which parents are 
expected to change their behaviour or face the threat of having their children 
removed, described by Featherstone et al (2014) as ‘muscular authoritarianism’ 
towards multiply deprived families. This approach involves a focus on children’s 
needs in isolation from their families, and viewing parents instrumentally, in terms 
only of how far they are able to meet their children’s needs. Rogowski (2015) argues 
that this shift in social work is part of a neoliberal emphasis on self-responsibility and 
the narrowing of concern to focus on child protection and risk rather than family 
support or social justice. At the same time, numbers of referrals to children’s services 
have risen, together with growing pressures on local authorities from cuts to their 
funding and increasing levels of poverty and deprivation (Ofsted 2014).  
These are all inherently ethical issues, involving questions of harm, best interests, 
power, social justice and the value of human beings. They cut to the heart of the role 
of social work in society, illustrating that ethical dimensions are ‘deeply embedded in 
the construction of social work as an occupation, its location within state systems of 
welfare and the everyday practice of its members’ (Banks 2012: 19). Social work’s link 
to social welfare systems means it is closely affected by economic trends and 
government social and economic policies (Banks 2012), with the result that the 
impact of neoliberalism and growth of a risk society places social work in the role of 
regulating ‘risky’ populations (Webb 2006). This runs counter to the global definition 
of social work (IFSW 2014) with its emphasis on the promotion of social change and 
development, empowerment, liberation of people, social justice and human rights. 
There is thus an ambivalence for social work between ‘its instrumental rationality, as 
complicity with calculating and regulatory practices’ and ‘its substantive rationality, in 
securing personal identity through its dialogic and expressive face work’ (Webb 2006: 
5-6).   
These tensions are brought into sharp focus in care proceedings. This is the arena 
where the conflict between ‘two deeply embedded societal values’ is played out, ‘on 
the one hand the belief that children are sacrosanct and should be protected against 
harm, on the other, the belief that outsiders should not intrude into family 
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relationships’ (Beckett and Dickens 2014: 379). These are high risk judgements and 
decisions, made in uncertain situations but with significant and life-changing 
consequences. In addition, in recent years the timescale for these decisions in care 
proceedings has been reduced to 26 weeks through the Children and Families Act 
2014. A number of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judgments (most notably the 
Re: B and Re: B-S judgments of 2013) have also had an impact on decision making in 
care proceedings.  
There are therefore compelling reasons to examine social workers’ perceptions and 
experiences of both the ethical and the emotional dimensions of this decision making 
at this time, not only to illuminate our understanding of the processes involved, but 
also to identify how social workers can best be supported in this work.  
A gap in current research also exists in this area. Social workers’ experience of care 
proceedings decision making, including emotional aspects, has been explored by 
Beckett et al (2007), Taylor et al (2008) and Dickens (2006), but not recently or with a 
specific focus on ethical dimensions. A number of studies have also examined 
decision making in child protection work, some including emotional aspects, for 
example Hackett and Taylor (2014), O’Connor and Leonard (2014) and Helm (2016, 
2017). Other studies have focused primarily on ethics, such as Banks (2016) and 
Banks and Williams (2005). Further literature addresses the emotional dimensions of 
child protection practice, such as the work of Ferguson (2011, 2017), Howe (2010) 
and Ruch (2014). None of these, however, have a dual focus on emotional and ethical 
dimensions. Also, an increasing body of research, particularly in the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology, indicates a complex and nuanced interplay between 
emotions and cognitive processes in decision making and ethical judgement. 
However, although Keinemans (2015) has reviewed some of this literature and 
discussed its relevance to social work, there remains a gap in social work research 
with a specific focus on the interaction of emotions and ethics in decision making and 
care proceedings. This study therefore covers new ground in bringing together 
emotions, ethics and decision making in social work research, as well as specifically in 
the area of care proceedings. 
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1.3   The research questions 
The questions this study aims to answer are as follows: 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the ethical dimensions of decision 
making in care proceedings? 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the emotional dimensions of this? 
• How do they experience the interplay between emotions and ethical thinking in 
the process of coming to judgements and decisions in care proceedings? 
• How can social workers be best supported in these processes? 
To this end, nineteen individual interviews and two focus group discussions of social 
work practitioners were undertaken to generate the data for the study. Full details of 
the method and rationale for using interviews can be found in chapter 5.  
1.4   Terminology and the scope of the study 
1.4.1  Defining ethics and morality 
The term ‘ethics’ is used in various ways in literature and common parlance, 
sometimes to denote moral norms or standards, or more broadly, as moral 
philosophy, which includes critical thinking about the nature of morality and what is 
right or good, as well as formulating answers to specific questions about the right 
course of action in a particular situation, and studies about people’s moral opinions 
and beliefs (Banks 2012). Some writers distinguish between ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ or 
‘morality’. For example, Webb (2006) regards morality as involving rule following and 
narrower than ethics. Witkin (2017: 33), however, follows Bauman’s (2000) view that 
as we are social beings, ethics is the existential condition of humans, but we become 
moral beings ‘when we take responsibility for our ethical existence, specifically for 
the Other’. Many writers use the terms almost interchangeably. As pointed out by 
Banks (2012), among others, the word ‘morals’ derives from Latin (mores) and ‘ethics’ 
from Greek (ethos) which have the similar meaning of customs or habits. In this thesis 
I will use both terms ethical and moral in their broadest sense, but when referring to 
literature will keep to the terminology and specific meaning used by the writer. 
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As implied in the earlier discussion, ethical issues and tensions are inherent in the 
nature of social work and the context in which it takes place. This study therefore is 
based on a view of ethical dimensions of social work decisions in care proceedings 
that extends much further than a narrow focus on ethical reasoning or the resolution 
of dilemmas. As Witkin (2017: 47) observes: 
All social work is an exercise in ethics. Our understandings, practices, and the 
social contexts in which our work is carried out express moral judgements that 
have ethical implications. While treating ethics as a discrete area may allow 
for focused study, such separation constructs practice as something to which 
ethics is applied rather than an ethical expression. This has the effect of 
reducing the scope of ethics and focusing on discrete topics such as ethical 
dilemmas. At the same time, broader moral issues that impact practice such 
as neoliberalism are rendered invisible. 
1.4.2  Emotion 
There is also a lack of consensus across different disciplines over how to define 
emotion. Distinct concepts such as emotion, feelings, affect and mood are sometimes 
used interchangeably in literature (Keinemans 2015; Trevithick 2014). Neuroscientists 
such as Damasio (2006) and LeDoux (1998) make a distinction between ‘feeling’ as a 
conscious process and ‘emotion’ which involves significant unconscious elements as 
well as the senses, bodily responses and cognitive appraisals. Many studies focus 
solely on one specific emotion, and there is no universal agreement about what 
constitutes individual emotions such as, for example, how far fear and anxiety may be 
distinguished (Trevithick 2014). What individuals mean by different emotions may 
vary and may also be socially and culturally constructed (Heelas 2007). Again, I will 
follow the terminology used by specific authors when referring to literature. I am also 
aware that there may be differences between participants’ use of words and my 
interpretations of their meanings.  
1.4.3  Decisions and judgements 
Taylor (2017a) points out that the terms ‘judgement’ and ‘decision’ are often used 
interchangeably, but in his view judgement involves assessing alternatives while a 
decision focuses on choosing between alternatives. He defines a decision as: 
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…the selection of a course of action as a result of a deliberate process by one 
or more people. Sometimes, judgements and decisions merge into each other; 
in other situations they are more distinct. A decision may be made by one 
person or it may be the result of a decision process involving a number of 
people (Taylor 2017a: 21, italics in the original). 
Inherent in this definition is an implication that decisions are, or should be, made as a 
result of conscious deliberation. However, a growing body of literature over the last 
few decades in fields such as neuroscience and psychology has drawn attention to 
the unconscious and intuitive processes that are involved in decision making, in 
particular their role in preceding conscious thought. Some of these processes are 
outlined briefly in chapter 2, but research examining the interplay between emotion 
and ethical judgement will also be explored in more detail in chapter 4.  
Also relevant to consider is at what point the process becomes a decision. Describing 
decision making as a ‘core professional activity at the heart of social work’ O’Sullivan 
(2011: 1) points out that all the processes social workers carry out, such as referrals, 
enquiries, allocation, assessment, planning, implementation, reviewing and closing 
cases, involve the making of decisions. Although clear decision points may occur 
(such as review meetings), it is often unclear at what point the decision making starts 
and finishes, and it is ‘appropriate to think in terms of chains or sequences of 
decisions taken over time, each feeding into the next’ (O’Sullivan 2011: 3). It would 
be inadequate and potentially misleading only to focus on an end-point decision, 
ignoring the processes that have led to it. Earlier minor judgements and plans may 
help set a course towards a particular outcome. These earlier judgements may be 
linked with the embodied day to day interactions between social workers and 
families. While the focus of this research is on decision making in care proceedings, it 
will also take into account the processes and influences that lead to and shape these 
decisions. 
Significant decisions in care proceedings include not only whether or not a child 
should be removed from a parent but also if removed, with whom the child should be 
placed (such as with another family member, foster carers or placed for adoption), 
and whether or not siblings should be placed together. Such decisions are not taken 
by a social worker alone but involve managers, legal advice and a series of checks and 
balances (Taylor 2017a). However, the social worker plays an important role in the 
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final decision as well as the preceding ‘chain’ of judgements and decisions influencing 
the direction of the case. 
1.5   Theoretical frameworks  
I am not using one specific theoretical lens through which to analyse the data. 
However, the study is strongly influenced by relationship based practice and its 
broader implications, especially when combined with an orientation towards social 
justice.  
Relationship based practice has previously been associated with the approach to 
social work practice of the 1980s in which the professional was seen as the expert, 
and there was a tendency to pathologise service users and individualise their 
problems, without regard to the impact of poverty, structural inequalities and 
discrimination. However, contemporary relationship based practice holds anti-
oppressive practice, empowerment and partnership working as central (Ruch 2010a). 
Informed by psychodynamic approaches, relationship based practice views the 
professional relationship as integral to professional intervention. The complexity of 
human behaviour and its conscious and unconscious dimensions are recognised, as 
well as the importance and connection of the individual’s internal and external 
worlds, and the uniqueness of each social work encounter. A collaborative 
relationship based on respect, empowerment and inclusion is also emphasised (Ruch 
2010a). Relationship based practice involves understanding the impact of anxiety and 
stress, and enabling service users to feel accepted, understood, safe and contained, 
which also requires the worker to be emotionally self-aware (Howe 2008). Ruch 
(2013: 60) also identifies two particular skills: ‘the capacity to observe and engage 
with intimate and uncomfortable physical and emotional experiences (their own as 
well as those of others)’ and an ‘ability to think emotionally and to feel thoughtfully’. 
This includes a capacity to hold a ‘not knowing’ stance and to tolerate our own 
vulnerability, as well as that of others. Reflection, reflexivity and reflective practice 
are therefore essential, and practitioners need to be supported within relationship-
based organisational contexts. 
With its holistic view of the individual I believe a relationship based approach is also 
compatible with a structural perspective. Lonne et al (2016) point out that a 
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relational approach to practice involves attention to people’s families and social 
networks, and embraces the twin priorities of respect for persons and social justice. 
It can also link with a social constructionist approach. For example, Witkin (2017) 
argues against the customary individualist view of the strengths perspective, with its 
realist elements, in which strengths are seen as individual attributes of service users 
that can be identified and mobilised. In contrast he considers strengths as 
‘relationally generated and variable across contexts’ (p112), and that it is within 
relationships that the strengths perspective can be realised. Witkin also explains that 
one focus of social constructionism is on language, its role in constituting reality, 
rather than reflecting it, and how meanings are generated and maintained. 
Transformative change involves intellectual change, such as a change in the 
assumptions underlying practice or how problems are conceptualised, and in ways of 
knowing, being and relating. Fook (2012) sees critical reflection as an approach which 
can assist us to uncover and analyse dominant ways of thinking and assumptions that 
support particular practices and systems, and how language is used in these 
processes. As with the impact of emotion considered above in relation to relationship 
based practice, critical reflection involves an openness to bringing to conscious 
awareness aspects that may have been unconscious, a process that may cause 
discomfort, and would need to be supported within the organisational context. 
The dual focus on emotional and ethical dimensions in this study enables attention to 
be given to a number of ethical theories and approaches, ranging from the more 
reason-based approaches of deontology and consequentialism to the relational focus 
of the ethics of care, recognition, narrative and dialogical approaches, as discussed in 
chapter 3. My approach to the data has therefore also been informed by these 
ethical theories, as well as relationship based practice and the social constructionist 
insights mentioned above. 
1.6   Structure of the thesis 
The next three chapters (2-4) together form the literature review for the thesis. 
Chapter 2 starts by considering the multiple intersecting contexts for significant 
decisions in care proceedings and the impact of these contexts on practice and 
decision making, followed by literature relevant to decision making processes, the 
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role of analysis and intuition, and existing studies of social work decision making in 
child protection and care proceedings. The focus of chapter 3 is on the relevance of 
ethical theories and perspectives to social work decision making with children and 
families, and how these may also relate to emotional and relational aspects of the 
work, as well as considering studies of how social workers in this field use ethical 
perspectives in practice. In chapter 4 the emotional dimensions of child and family 
social work and decision making are examined, followed by research from a range of 
disciplines of the interaction of emotions and ethics in decision making. This 
literature illustrates that emotions have an important role in the decision making 
process itself, as well as the surrounding work with families and the organisational 
environment.  
Chapter 5 outlines and discusses the methods of the study and ethical considerations. 
This is followed by three findings chapters: chapter 6 focusing on participants’ 
perceptions and experiences of the decision journey and landscape; chapter 7 
focusing on their perceptions and experiences of the ethical dimensions; and chapter 
8 the emotional dimensions. Finally, discussion and conclusion chapters draw out and 
discuss the key findings of the study in relation to the research questions as well as a 




2 Chapter 2: Literature Review (1): Decision Making 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of literature and research relating to decision 
making processes in child and family social work and care proceedings. Social work 
decision making does not take place in a vacuum, but within a number of intersecting 
contexts. These include societal, policy, legal, professional, service user, 
interprofessional and organisational contexts, which will each have an impact on the 
social worker and the nature of the decisions being made (O’Sullivan 2011). The 
influences of these contexts, which may be in tension with each other and also 
subject to constant change, are discussed in this chapter. Associated ethical 
dimensions of care proceedings decision making are also outlined. This is followed by 
sections on decision making processes, the interplay of analysis and intuitive thinking, 
the role of groups and teams, and the use of models. Relevant studies of social work 
decision making are then discussed. 
2.2   The contexts for social work decision making in care proceedings 
The following outline will focus on some relevant aspects of the societal, policy, legal, 
service user and organisational contexts of child and family social work practice, and 
will illustrate that these various contexts not only have a significant influence on 
social work decision making, but may also produce additional conflicts and tensions 
in the pressures they exert on social workers. Key issues are the impact of 
neoliberalism, social work’s ambivalent role in society as mentioned in chapter 1, the 
role of austerity and poverty, and the impact in recent years of legal developments 
and judgments.  
2.2.1  Societal context 
Carey and Green (2013: 4) point out that social workers ‘overwhelmingly work with 
stigmatised, disempowered, marginalised, vulnerable and sometimes challenging 
individuals who often exist at the peripheries of society’. A decade of austerity has 
led to rising child poverty (CPAG 2017).  Research shows that the experience of 
poverty ‘permeates every facet of children’s lives from economic and material 
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disadvantages, through social and relational constraints and exclusions, to the 
personal and more hidden aspects of poverty associated with shame, sadness and 
the fear of difference and stigma’ (Ridge 2009). In addition, Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2009, cited in Jack and Donellan 2013) argue from comparative statistics that the 
level of inequality in a society is also an important factor, and that health and social 
problems are worse in more unequal societies. Recent research by Bywaters and 
others (eg CWIP 2017) found that deprivation was the largest contributing factor in 
children’s chances of being looked after, with children in the most deprived 10% of 
small neighbourhoods being over ten times more likely to be looked after or on child 
protection plans than those in the least deprived 10%.  
However, despite this, the CWIP (2017) report also found practitioners showed 
limited unprompted awareness of the impact of poverty on families, and supporting 
families in dealing with financial problems was not seen as part of their role. This is 
consistent with earlier observations of Jack and Gill (2003, cited in Helm and Roesch-
Marsh 2017) that practitioners’ assessments of children’s needs did not pay sufficient 
attention to analysing the impact of social and environmental factors.  
A contributory factor to this may be the findings of Fenton (2015, 2016) that younger, 
less experienced social workers were more comfortable with neoliberal and 
managerial developments in social work than were older, more experienced workers, 
and she suggests that many come into the profession already holding neoliberal 
viewpoints.  
2.2.2  Policy context 
Questions of the role of the state and its relationship to families and individuals, the 
role and nature of families, and perspectives on children and childhood, are linked 
with various philosophical and value positions influencing state welfare in the UK. Fox 
Harding (1997) identifies four ‘ideal types’ as value positions underlying child welfare 
policy. The first, laissez faire and the patriarchal family, believes state intervention 
should be minimal, except if required in cases of serious maltreatment in which case 
the child should be removed and placed in alternative care. In the second 
perspective, state paternalism and child protection, there is a greater focus on the 
vulnerability of children, and the legitimacy of state intervention to protect children 
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at risk of harm or where parents’ care is inadequate (Kirton 2009; Smith 2005). The 
modern defence of the birth family supports parental rights and the promotion of 
children’s upbringing within their families. Within this are two distinct strands: those 
who emphasise promoting the rights of families, and those who focus on the 
importance of state provision of welfare services to support children in their families 
(Smith 2005). These first three perspectives are all paternalistic in their emphasis on 
protection of children rather than children’s voice or participation. In contrast, 
children’s rights and child liberation focuses on the oppressed position of children. 
While advocacy for children to have the same rights as adults may have been limited 
in its influence, there has been a discernible increase in the participation of children 
in planning and decision making (Kirton 2009). A central tension in child welfare has 
been that between philosophies of ‘child rescue’ and ‘family support’ (Kirton 2009).  
Shifting value positions can be seen in Parton’s (2012) outline of the development of 
child protection and safeguarding policies in England. The narrow forensic child 
protection focus on high risk cases in the 1980s was followed by the ‘refocusing 
debate’ of the 1990s. This generated greater emphasis on partnership, participation, 
prevention and family support, ‘protection’ being replaced by ‘safeguarding’, and the 
holistic approach of the new Assessment Framework (DH 2000) and Every Child 
Matters: Change for Children (DfES 2004) emphasising early intervention and 
prevention together with a focus on improving outcomes for all children. The death 
of Baby Peter in 2007 then led to a renewed focus on child protection as well as early 
intervention.  
An increased focus on risk, coinciding with the decline in trust in workers’ expertise 
and decision-making, has led to a growing reliance on increasingly complex systems 
of audit, monitoring and control (Parton 1996). When human error is seen as the key 
problem in leading to tragedies, the strategy is to ‘reduce the role of individual 
human reasoning as much as possible, formalising where possible with increasingly 
precise prescriptions to frontline workers’, with a corresponding need to ‘increase 
the monitoring of practice to ensure compliance with instructions’ (Munro 2008: 
126). Thus, ‘confidence in systems’ has replaced ‘trust in individual professionals’ 




The assumption of the possibility and desirability of certainty associated with 
procedural practice also has a poor fit with the complex and multi-layered nature of 
situations coming into care proceedings.  As Carey and Green (2013: 4) point out, 
problems social workers address relating to poverty and neglect ‘tend to be powerful, 
nuanced and multifaceted’, and not easily solved through ‘procedures, techniques or 
‘evidence-based’ treatments or services’. Pathologising parents also does not give 
attention to broader factors such as the impact of deprivation or societal values that 
may lead to power imbalances between men, women and children or processes that 
may lead adults to harm children (Gilligan 2006).  
Positivistic models and actuarial risk assessment methods also cannot take into 
account the complexity of interacting factors which may influence how a particular 
person will respond on a particular day to a particular situation (Littlechild 2008). 
They will not overcome, and may mask, the selective use of information and are 
dependent on the capacities of the practitioner (Gillingham 2006).This area of work is 
‘uncertain terrain’ where social workers may be beset by ‘competing versions and 
interpretations of events’, and the ‘often unreliable testimony of various partial 
witnesses’ and absence of forensic or conventional scientific evidence (Taylor and 
White 2006: 938). Munro (2008: 40) is clear that as ‘risk assessment is, by definition, 
making judgements under conditions of uncertainty, there is an unavoidable chance 
of error’ and infallible judgements are impossible. Some false positives and false 
negatives are inevitable wherever thresholds are set. Munro also shows how 
thresholds for intervention are influenced by society’s changing views on the 
acceptability of each type of error, reflecting prevailing views on child abuse and 
expectations of professionals. 
Guidance and tools can be used by employers as a defensive strategy. Hood et al 
(2000, cited in Munro 2008: 130) refer to ‘protocolisation’, which occurs when, in 
order to protect itself from blame, the organisation introduces an increasing number 
of formal procedures and guidance with clear audit trails. Thus, defending the agency 
can take on more importance than the protection of children.  
Rogwoski (2015) argues that these developments are bound up with the move from 
post-war social democracy to the present neo-liberal consensus. Reduced public 
expenditure on welfare, rationing of resources and a focus on managing risk rather 
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than meeting need have contributed to a more authoritarian role for social work.  
Support to children and families has reduced in favour of an emphasis that they 
should change their behaviours and take responsibility for their own lives.  
Over recent years the ‘Signs of Safety’ framework (developed by Turnell and Edwards 
1999) has been introduced in a number of Children’s Services departments including 
the one in the present study, where it is embedded throughout the referral, 
assessment, intervention and review process. As a strengths-based framework this 
has been widely welcomed as useful with neglect and child protection situations, in 
creating good partnership-working with parents, being effective in identifying risk 
and planning, encouraging practitioners to be clear and specific, and being more 
likely to lead to change than other approaches (Bunn 2013), and it has been 
evaluated positively in ten pilot sites (Baginsky et al 2017). 
However, Devine (2015) notes that in the Signs of Safety framework there is still a 
lack of separation between welfare and policing aspects of social work involvement, 
as is also found in the use of services under section 17, CA1989. Moreover, 
Gillingham (2006) points out that an emphasis on safety factors in assessment shifts 
the focus away from factors that place children at risk of harm. For example, a focus 
on mothers as responsible for protecting their children in situations of domestic 
abuse is in danger of monitoring their behaviours rather than engaging with men and 
addressing the reasons for the abuse, as well as failing to give attention to structural 
and social factors that may also significantly contribute to abuse and neglect of 
children.  Strengths perspectives in general are shown by Gray (2011) and Witkin 
(2017) to use the language of social justice and empowerment but still sit within the 
neoliberal emphasis on individual responsibility, self-help and families finding their 
own solutions, rather than addressing structural causes of problems.  
2.2.3  Service user context 
Recent decades have seen an increased focus on the child’s rights and voice in 
legislation and policy. However, McLeod (2010) found that standards of practice in 
professionals listening to children were still weak overall, and Pinkney (2011) 
explores the emotional challenges of listening to children and enabling their 
participation. Serious case reviews have highlighted that professionals involved did 
27 
 
not see the child frequently enough, or ask the child about their views and feelings, 
and also that practitioners focused ‘too much on the needs of the parents, especially 
on vulnerable parents, and overlooked the implications for the child’ (Ofsted 2011). 
Chapter 4 will also discuss literature suggesting that children can become in effect 
‘invisible’ through the emotional and organisational impacts on practitioners of work 
with children and families. 
There is also a tension between promotion of a child’s autonomy and rights and the 
more protective, paternalistic approach of the Children Act 1989 regarding making 
decisions in the child’s ‘best interests’ in child protection (Holt and Kelly 2015). In 
addition, in care proceedings, decision making for children’s long-term future may be 
prioritised at the expense of their needs in the here and now, leading them to be 
subject to additional moves and assessment processes (Beckett and McKeigue 2010). 
Where there is a view of children as inherently vulnerable, passive and in need of 
protection, this may also be at the expense of recognising their agency, strengths and 
resilience, as Daniel (2010: 237) points out:  
….’concern’ about children as a group in need of specific attention because of 
their unique vulnerability can simultaneously signal a recognition that children 
should be accorded state protection but potentially de-humanise them and 
deny their role as active citizens in their own right. 
A number of writers also express concern about the level of partnership working with 
parents and reduction in family support (Holt & Kelly 2016). There is concern that 
children are presented as being unable to wait for their parents to change, and 
parents are seen instrumentally, only in terms of how they meet the needs of their 
children, rather than worthy of concern in their own right (Holt and Kelly 2016; 
Featherstone et al 2014). For example, social workers in a study by Broadhurst et al 
(2011, cited in Holt and Kelly 2016) did not feel they should be advocates for parents, 
and some viewed their only advocacy role as being with regard to children.  
2.2.4  Legal context 
A number of developments in the legal context in England and Wales in recent years 
have had a profound impact on local authorities and the experience of case-holding 
social workers in care proceedings.  
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By the time of the Family Justice Review in 2011 there had been longstanding 
concerns about the length of care proceedings and delays in achieving the final 
outcome, which had persisted despite numerous reviews and changes in procedure, 
such as the introduction of the Protocol in 2003, and the Public Law Outline (PLO)  in 
2008, revised in 2010 (Masson 2015).   
One reason for delay was the wait for outcomes of further assessments of parenting 
capacity and progress in the hope that parents would overcame their difficulties 
(Brown & Ward 2013), in line with the underlying principle of the Children Act 1989 
that it is best for children to be brought up by their own families. Care proceedings 
could provide a ‘protected space’ in which change could take place (Brophy 2006: 
94), so lengthy proceedings could also provide more opportunity for parents to 
resolve difficulties (Masson 2015). Pearce et al (2011: 52) also refer to a shared ethos 
valuing ‘getting cases right above getting them quick’.  
The courts had also been relying on commissioning multiple expert reports, and in 
effect cases would ‘come to decide themselves through the accumulation of expert 
evidence’ (Pearce et al 2011: 59). Beckett et al (2007: 62) also make the point that 
where such difficult decisions need to be made there may be a tendency to rely on 
expert evidence in the search for certainty and irrational belief that ‘given enough 
information and expertise, a ‘right’ answer will emerge’. 
But there was also a growing body of research highlighting harmful effects on 
children of such delays, from remaining in circumstances of long-term physical and 
emotional neglect, or from experiencing instability, delay and further moves once in 
the care system, while awaiting permanence plans to be formulated – suggesting that 
proactive decision making and planning needs to take place at an earlier intervention 
stage (eg Davies and Ward 2012; Farmer and Lutman 2012). Brown and Ward’s 
(2013) review, incorporating insights from developmental neuroscience, suggests 
that there is only a short window of opportunity for decisive action, after which 
children are less able to benefit from specialist interventions and placement away 
from their families. In a subsequent article Brown and Ward (2014: 265) argue on the 
basis of this review and a longitudinal study of 57 babies that ‘there is a gross 
mismatch between timeframes for early childhood development and professional 
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responses to abuse and neglect in the early years’ through delays in professionals 
taking ‘appropriate and effective action’.  
However, concerns have been expressed about the quality of the research underlying 
these conclusions, as well as its influence in policy making and that it is leading to a 
focus on early removals of children rather than supporting families and giving 
attention to the impact of poverty and inequality (White and Wastell 2013; Bywaters 
2015). 
The Family Justice Review (2011) identified that at that time cases were taking on 
average 56 weeks (61 weeks in care centres), and the draconian nature of the 
decisions that courts need to make had led to an ethos in courts which meant ‘cases 
took as long as needed to ensure that every possibility to avoid local authority care 
had been explored’ (p104), and ‘the right of the parents to a fair hearing has come 
too often to override the paramount welfare of the child’ (p14). The Review 
recommended that a time limit of six months should be set for the completion of 
care and supervision proceedings, and subsequently a 26 week time limit on care 
proceedings has been imposed by the Children and Families Act 20141 .  
Use of expert witnesses in proceedings has also been restricted in line with the 
Review’s recommendations, in order to reduce delay, with the implication that more 
weight would be given to social workers’ assessments (Masson 2015). However, this 
was also a time when the government was promoting adoption, and concern was 
expressed in some quarters that the restriction on expert assessments and reduction 
in case duration would disadvantage parents and leave fewer opportunities for 
parents’ lawyers to challenge the local authority’s case (Masson 2017). 
In contrast to previous attempts to reform the system, this development appears to 
have succeeded in reducing the length of proceedings, though an evaluation by 
Beckett et al (2014) of the Tri-borough pilot shows that a reduction to 27 weeks was 
also linked to a high level of effort and commitment, leadership and cultural change. 
However, increasing numbers of care applications in recent years have exerted added 
pressure: Cafcass data show the number of care applications has been increasing at a 
 
1 Interviews in the present study took place with social workers working within the current 26 week 
framework, but also included discussion with some participants about earlier cases of longer duration. 
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higher rate since 2015 compared to much more gradual increases between 2011 and 
late 20152.  No clear explanation has been identified yet for the increase after 2015, 
but Doughty (2015) suggests potential explanations might include the increased 
structural inequality arising from government cuts, and the impact of neuroscientific 
research making the case for early intervention. Lord Justice McFarlane (2017) has 
also suggested that lack of resources is a significant factor leading to high numbers of 
cases of persistent low to medium level neglect coming before the court, with local 
authorities transferring the risk to the courts by issuing proceedings; he sees this as 
moving down ‘the lack of resources tunnel’ (p615). 
A significant added factor in the mix has been the profound impact on both the 
courts and social work practice caused by the Re B, Re B-S and other related 
judgments of 2013. In Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] UKSC33 the 
Supreme Court dismissed a mother’s appeal against an adoption order, but in the 
judgment emphasised that ‘adoption of a child against her parent’s wishes should 
only be contemplated as a last resort – when all else fails’. Within weeks this was 
referred to in a number of appeals, including regarding long-term fostering as well as 
adoption decisions (Sloan 2015). 
Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 involved an unsuccessful appeal by a mother 
against the decision to refuse her leave to oppose the adoption of her two children. 
However, Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division used the judgment to set 
out strongly worded and detailed requirements to be followed in court judgements 
and evidence. He stated that ‘sloppy practice must stop’ and a ‘balance sheet 
approach’ should be used, and evidence ‘must address all the options which are 
realistically possible and…..contain an analysis of the arguments for and against each 
option’ (Sloan 2015). 
Masson (2017) sees Re B-S as a ‘disruptive judgment’, and unnecessary in the sense 
that Munby had upheld the previous court’s decision. She argues that it was 
deliberately used as a means of changing practice, and ‘to swing the family justice 
pendulum in favour of parents at a point when the impending restrictions on experts 
and case duration was seen as disadvantaging them’ (p405). In focusing on the form 
 




of evidence and judgments rather than the merits of the case, Re B-S made it easier 
for decisions to be challenged, taking the focus away from the needs of the child and 
the nature of the parent’s parenting. This use of judgments to change practice 
reflects the judiciary’s lack of trust in the effectiveness of the family justice system. 
Achieving systemic practice change through interdisciplinary work and agreement is 
time-consuming and should involve a consultation process (as do changes in 
statutory guidance); in contrast, in these cases judges have used their position 
deliberately to force change quickly through judgments (Masson 2017). Re B-S also 
represents a ‘philosophical gulf’ between the government’s promotion of adoption at 
the time and the view of senior judiciary that it should be a ‘last resort – when all else 
fails’ (Bainham and Markham 2014: 1002). 
Following Re B-S numerous cases were sent for rehearing, there was a reduction in 
care and placement orders, and the Court of Appeal received far more appeals than it 
could hear, resulting in delays, and where cases were re-heard a further delay would 
occur in deciding the child’s future (Masson 2017) – somewhat ironically, in light of 
the aims of the family justice reforms (Holt and Kelly 2015). Widespread confusion 
resulted, although clarifying comments were made by Munby and others in later 
judgments to correct some misinterpretations. A document published by the National 
Adoption Leadership Board (2014) to clarify ‘what the judgments do and do not say’, 
was aimed at myth busting and stated that Re B and Re B-S did not alter the legal 
basis for making care and placement orders.  
These judgments have, however, had a significant impact on social work practice, not 
only in that evidence and care plans needed to be made Re B-S compliant, but with 
local authority lawyers advising against applications for care or placement orders in 
anticipation of how they expected courts to respond. Social workers have found 
themselves having to complete multiple assessments of family members, some 
ordered during proceedings, all in a limited timescale. DfE statistics cited in Masson 
(2017) show the number of placement orders refused went up from an average of 50 
a year from 2009 to 2012, to 240 a year in 2014 and 2016, while the number of 
Special Guardianship Orders (SGOs) increased. This included a higher proportion 
made with supervision orders, from 11% in 2010-11 to 29% in 2014-15.   
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Concern about the standard and riskiness of some decisions led the government to 
commission a Special Guardianship Review (DfE 2015) and to strengthen special 
guardianship assessments through regulations in the Children and Social Work Act 
2017. However, Harwin and Alrouh (2017) point out that the risk of return for both 
SGOs and SGOs with a Supervision Order remains low. 
On a more optimistic note, Gupta and Lloyd-Jones (2016) suggest that Re B-S can be 
seen as reflecting a ‘more family support/pro-birth family ties value perspective’, 
although improvement in family support will not be achievable without more 
resources.  
Another feature of the care proceedings system in England and Wales is its primarily 
adversarial model, which may create a very challenging and stressful environment for 
social workers giving evidence, as well as for parents and children. Social workers, 
who may have been working to support the family prior to proceedings, now take on 
an oppositional role and have to establish the occurrence or likelihood of significant 
harm, as the burden of proof rests with them as initiators of the proceedings 
(Wellbourne 2016).  
2.2.5  Organisational context 
In many ways the organisational context for social work decision making is a product 
of all the preceding contexts above. Writers have already been cited in the sections 
above who have drawn attention to the current climate of practice shaped by 
government policy and years of austerity measures, pushing practitioners towards a 
risk-averse, ‘child rescue’ culture. Rogowski (2011: 157) sees the rise of 
managerialism as contributing to the ‘deformation of social work as a profession’, in 
which achievement of targets has become the yardstick for measuring success in 
practice.  
There have been drivers for more relationship-based and less procedurally 
dominated practice such as the Munro Review (2011) but despite this, as indicated 
above, concerns remain about instrumental approaches to parents in child protection 
and ‘muscular authoritarianism’ towards deprived families (Featherstone et al 2014; 
Rogowski 2011).  
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Another consideration is the level of autonomy and discretion experienced by 
practitioners within the organisation. Wastell et al (2010) found an intrusive level of 
managerial control in the statutory child and family teams studied. However, there is 
some evidence from White et al (2007) and Evans and Harris (2004) that social 
workers were able to use a level of discretion creatively and could still practise 
Lipsky’s (1980) ‘street level bureaucracy’. Stanford (2008; 2010) has also identified 
that practitioners found ways of ‘speaking back’ to the fears caused by risk, taking 
risks if necessary in their determination to do right. Social workers may undertake 
both overt and covert actions to promote social justice, or prevent injustice (Fine and 
Teram 2013), employing ‘quiet challenges’ to maximise support for service users, for 
example through manipulating information, bending rules, advocating for, and 
interacting in empowering and relationship-based ways with service users (Rogowski 
2012).   
2.3   Ethical dimensions of social work decision making 
The above sections illustrate some of the ethical dimensions of care proceedings 
decision making. The Family Justice Review (2011) and judgments such as Re: B and 
Re: B-S draw attention to the draconian nature of decisions that may lead to a 
permanent separation of parent and child. There are increasing and conflicting 
pressures to speed up decision making for children experiencing abuse and neglect 
and place children for adoption, but at the same time to support families to keep 
children out of care and avoid adoption unless all other options have been 
considered, all within a reduced timescale for proceedings (Dickens and Masson 
2016). The uncertain nature of the outcomes of such decisions in social work means 
that there is always a possibility of loss or harm to result (Taylor 2017a). Many of 
these judgements are finely balanced, involving prediction of an unknown future, 
where decisions will have far-reaching consequences but it is unclear which option is 
‘right’. These decisions may thus involve ethical dilemmas, involving ‘a choice 
between two equally unwelcome alternatives, which may involve a conflict of ethical 
values, and it is not clear which choice will be the right one’ (Banks 2012:20). Once 
the choice is made, the dilemma still has an impact, as ‘even the least unwelcome 
alternative is still unwelcome’ (Banks 2012: 12). Dilemmas often involve a choice 
between two or more conflicting values or ethical principles which the social worker 
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holds as important. Therefore the choice will still result in ‘some other important 
moral failing (such as failing some duty, failing to avoid some bad outcome or failing 
to honour an important commitment or relationship’ (Bowles et al 2006: 52). A 
residue is often left for the worker of regret, guilt, blame or anxiety. As McAuliffe and 
Sudbery (2005: 23) point out, ethical dilemmas can result in workers feeling 
‘uncertain about decisions, responsible for outcomes, self-doubting of their 
professional capabilities and reluctant to face the next challenge.’  
Conceptions of benefit or harm will also vary according to organisational culture and 
the underlying value base of the worker. For example, there may be very different 
viewpoints on how the best interests of a child should be met, and whether within 
the family or outside it, illustrated by concerns expressed about the contemporary 
focus on ‘child protection’ intervention rather than supporting families (eg 
Featherstone et al 2014; Lonne et al 2016). Social workers also vary in how far they 
see decisions as ‘ethical’, or merely based on technical assessment or 
implementation of the law. However, laws themselves reflect prevailing values and 
norms in society, and our values will also influence how we interpret the law, or the 
way we determine whether or not someone will receive a service (Banks 2012). 
Social workers also often experience role conflicts, such as the tension between 
supporting and judging parents. Parents often need proactive support from the social 
worker in order to remain working in partnership, at the same time as the social 
worker may need to focus on gathering evidence to convince the court that the child 
should not return home (Clifford and Burke 2004). Social workers have been criticised 
for trying too hard to work in partnership with parents and for displaying insufficient 
‘healthy scepticism’ (Laming 2003). 
Clashes between their duty to a service user and accountability towards their 
employer, for example in restricting costs, may lead them to experience ‘double 
agentry’ (O’Brien 2004). Employer expectations may conflict with practitioners’ 
personal and professional judgement of what is best for the child with regard to 
family or alternative permanent care (Shdaimah 2010). Situations where a 
practitioner knows the right course of action but is unable to pursue it, can cause 
‘moral distress’ (Banks 2012; Lynch and Forde 2016) or ‘moral injury’ (Haight et al 
2017). However, Lynch and Forde (2016, also citing Gray and Gibbons 2007) point out 
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that social work’s social justice values mean that social workers should ‘rock the boat’ 
and challenge oppressive institutional structures when they are harmful to people.  
A significant ethical dimension of child care decision making is the presence of 
complex and pervasive power relationships, enacted through legislative duties and 
powers, organisational policies, cultural understandings and the individual practice of 
social workers (Keddell 2011).  The power dynamic is compounded by the nature of 
the issues that social workers work with and the position of social work service users 
in society, as discussed earlier. Social work involvement may thus be forced onto 
people who are already powerless and disadvantaged (Carey and Green 2013). 
Indeed, in the area of protecting children, Social workers are increasingly finding 
themselves in a role of moral regulation, or on ‘the front lines of governing 
marginalised populations’ (Pollack 2010, cited in Carey and Green 2013: 5). Webb 
(2006) points out that after the welfare state, and with the development of the ‘risk 
society’, social workers have become decisively involved in managing ‘micro-sectors’ 
of society such as ‘anti-social behaviours, multiple problem families, ‘at-risk’ 
populations, attachment disorders, asylum seekers, [and] emotional illiteracy’ (p6). 
Featherstone et al (2014) call for ‘muscular authoritarianism’ in child protection, to 
be replaced by a more humane, compassionate and relational approach focused on 
supporting families.  
There is thus a conflict between social work’s controlling role on behalf of the state 
and its role as an agent of change and social reform (Jones 2014), as mentioned in 
chapter 1. But there is also a level of conflict and ambivalence in societal expectations 
of the role that social work exercises on behalf of the state. If they are seen as failing 
in this role (for example if a child is unprotected) they are seen as morally 
responsible. This blame not only reflects ambivalence about the role social workers 
undertake but also societal views about the contested role of the welfare state itself; 
therefore ‘social workers’ vilification by the press and public is partly due to their role 
as welfare professionals in a society that is ambivalent about state welfare’ (Banks 
2012: 31). This ambivalence about state welfare is, as Warner (2015) demonstrates, 
tied in with political and public concerns about the moral threat posed by an 
underclass of people living in poverty, the ‘undeserving poor’, and the conditions 
they live in, arousing powerful public emotions of contempt, condemnation and 
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disgust. In its involvement with people in poverty, social work is also ‘caught up in the 
delineation between deserving and undeserving’ (p65). At the same time there are 
‘collective anxieties about social work’s capacity – both imagined and real – to 
recognise and regulate particular groups’ (p45).  
Power relationships also affect how actions of service users may be constructed as 
abusive or problematic, or positive and beneficial, and how these constructions 
influence judgements and become the basis for interventions. Parents’ level of co-
operativeness or anger can impact on social work assessments of their capacity 
(Bainham & Markham 2014). Clifford and Burke (2004) also show how assessments of 
the parenting skills of those with fewer verbal or relationship skills, or parents with 
learning disabilities, may be affected by their difficulty in engaging actively in 
partnership, which may in turn lead them to be assessed as unco-operative.  
Dominant constructions are also reflected in and established through the use of 
language in social welfare to ‘define, categorise, empower and disempower’ (Keddell 
2011: 1253).  
Terms and definitions are constructed, shaped and reshaped by those in power, 
reflecting their ideological, social and historical context. Negative labels stigmatise, 
exclude, objectify, shame and assign blame to people and in turn affect their self-
perception. Language that ‘others’ people and implies individual blame then ‘lessens 
the community’s ownership of the problem and its obligation to fully respond’ (Vojak 
2009: 943). Urek (2005) also shows how social work accounts can use language to 
construct service users as morally unsuitable in order to justify intervention. 
The above discussion indicates not only that complex ethical dimensions permeate 
practice in child and family social work, but also that there may be ethical and 
ideological disagreement about what may be seen as right or beneficial or a justified 
basis for intervention, and therefore how decisions should be framed.  
2.4   Decision making processes 




2.4.1  Framing and sense-making 
Both Taylor (2017a) and O’Sullivan (2011) identify that a key process involved in 
coming to judgements and decisions is ‘framing’: the construction of mental or verbal 
representations of the decision situation and the factors that need to be taken 
account of in making sense of it. Factors to be taken into account in framing include 
the nature of the problem; what decisions are being faced by whom; roles of those 
involved; aims of intervention; needs, issues and strengths; the impact or significance 
of others involved in the situation, laws and procedures, organisational functions, 
resources and services available; and a range of knowledge, including historical 
information about the case and theoretical and research knowledge (Taylor 2017a).  
O’Sullivan (2011) points out that the information collected then needs to be 
interpreted and analysed, a process which involves numerous micro-decisions, both 
conscious and unconscious, in the selection of information and weighing of its 
significance, and in identifying and making sense of key issues. These micro-decisions 
will be influenced by the decision maker’s own values and social understandings, and 
those who hold more power in a situation are able to determine what knowledge 
counts as relevant and how information is interpreted. A social constructionist 
approach would therefore highlight the socially constructed nature of decision 
frames and the way they will be shaped by dominant discourses and cultural 
meanings, embedded in language (O’Sullivan 2011).  
Identifying options and coming to conclusions might then include collaborative 
processes such as supervision, consultation, and potentially involve teams and multi-
professional groups (Taylor 2017a; O’Sullivan 2011). All these framing, sense-making 
and analysing processes involve the interplay of analysis and intuition.  
2.4.2  Analysis and intuition 
Analysis may be defined as ‘a step-by-step, conscious, logically defensible process’ 
(Hammond 1996, cited in O’Sullivan 2011: 91). Analysis of a situation involves 
breaking it down into elements; key factors, goals and options are identified and 
carefully considered in a precise and systematic way to arrive at a decision. As a 
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conscious process analysis can be opened up to scrutiny. On the other hand it takes 
time and may become overly complex.  
In contrast, intuition is a much faster process, using tacit knowledge and perceptions 
from the environment, rapidly identifying relevant cues, making connections and 
associations and sensing feelings (O’Sullivan 2011). Traditionally, conscious 
deliberative analysis has been prized over intuition, for example Munro’s (2008: 96) 
view of ‘the conscious mind acting as a good secretary or personal trainer seeking to 
minimise the known biases and omissions of intuitive reasoning’.  
Kahneman (2011: 20-21) uses the idea of two systems in the mind: system 1 is 
intuitive, operating ‘automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control’, while system 2 involves effortful attention, is needed for complex 
computations, and is ‘often associated with the subjective experience of agency, 
choice and concentration’. Kahneman points out that we tend to view ourselves as 
using conscious reasoning and making choices (system 2), but system 1 is the 
originator of impressions and feelings that feed into the beliefs and choices of system 
2, although system 2 can be used to override system 1. 
Hammond’s (1987; 1996) idea of a continuum of judgement with intuition and 
analysis at opposite ends is cited by Hollows (2003). Hammond, a psychologist, found 
that clinicians tended to follow an approach falling between the two, using both 
analysis and intuition, and that their approach depended on the nature of the task, 
how structured or unstructured it was, and the time available. He suggested intuitive 
judgement was suited to situations that presented high levels of visual information 
and limited time, and also that expertise involves an ability to recognise the 
judgement task and match this with an appropriate judgement style. Hammond also 
identified that intuition is more appropriately used in situations where there are 
multiple fallible indicators, while analysis can be used in situations involving infallible 
indicators. Thus Hollows suggests that early judgements in a case may be intuitive, 
but the increasing availability of information then enables analytical approaches to be 
used.  
One feature of intuitive (or system 1) thinking is pattern recognition (Kahneman and 
Klein 2009). Through intuition a decision maker quickly sees similarities to known 
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cases (‘feature matching’) and synthesises the features of the situation into a causal 
explanation or ‘story’ to make sense of the situation (‘story building’). Possible 
actions and outcomes of different options might be considered. Both prior 
experience and imagination play an important part in this process (Munro 2008, 
drawing on Klein 2000). To develop skilled intuition Kahneman and Klein (2009) argue 
that individuals need to have sufficient experience of environments where there are 
stable relationships between identifiable cues and subsequent events or outcomes, 
and adequate opportunities for learning through practice and feedback.  
Practitioner expertise has been associated with the ability to use intuition based on 
experience, as in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) stages of progression from novice to 
expert. However, while the benefits of skilled intuition are recognised, there is also a 
range of literature examining the potential dangers of intuition, associated with the 
operation of heuristics and bias. 
2.4.3  Heuristics and bias 
One tendency commonly noted in the literature is ‘confirmation bias’, when 
individuals are drawn to search for or interpret information that confirms their initial 
interpretations and to ignore evidence that might disconfirm their view (O’Sullivan 
2011; Rutter and Brown 2012). For example, the study of child protection tragedies 
by Reder et al (1993, cited in Taylor and White 2006) identified that having made a 
positive judgement about a care-giver, there was a tendency for social workers in 
these cases to treat information selectively, either ignoring contrary evidence, or 
interpreting it in a way that did not allow it to undermine their original view. 
‘Pervasive belief systems’ may also affect practitioners’ judgements and encourage 
them to stick to a particular view, such as the belief that a child is better off with their 
birth family, or beliefs about mothers and fathers as caregivers (Taylor and White 
2006). 
A number of other tendencies which might affect and distort decisions are listed by 
Rutter and Brown (2012: 6): the ‘anchoring effect’, a tendency to rely too heavily or 
‘anchor’ on one trait or piece of information when making decisions; the ‘bandwagon 
effect’, when decision makers do or believe something because others do; and the 
‘pseudo-certainty effect’ when individuals tend to make risk-averse choices if the 
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expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative 
outcomes. Taylor (2017: 98) additionally identifies the ‘availability heuristic’ and 
‘recall bias’, where an individual is influenced by how easy it may be to imagine a 
problem or situation, or recall one happening in the team or the media; ‘compression 
bias’, where the likelihood of rare but serious events are overestimated while 
underestimating the frequency of common undesirable events; ‘credibility bias’, 
being more likely to accept views of someone we like; ‘repetition bias’, a tendency to 
believe what we have been told most often and by a greater number of sources; 
‘optimism bias’; ‘prejudice’; and ‘wariness of lurking conflict’, when staff are affected 
by anxiety about potential violence and aggression, or complaints and blame. These 
tendencies reflect a range and combination of conscious and unconscious processes.  
Popular and inadequate understandings of child development and attachment theory 
may also shape either positive or negative judgements about parenting capacity, 
creating an illusion of certainty, especially when it confirms existing hypotheses, and 
accords with group norms and understandings (Taylor and White 2006; White 2011). 
Judgements and decisions may also be distorted by ethnocentrism or other 
oppressive beliefs, stereotyping or a lack of understanding when working across 
dimensions of difference such as ethnicity, gender, age, sexuality, disability religion, 
or class (O’Sullivan 2011). 
Another limiting factor affecting the quality of decision making may be ‘bounded 
rationality’ (Simon 1955, cited in Munro 2008), the recognition that there is a limit to 
the capacity of the human brain to process information and solve complex problems. 
Individuals may simplify the process of decision making by resorting to ‘satisficing’ 
(Simon 1957, cited in Munro 2008: 96), whereby once an option that appears 
satisfactory or good enough is found, the individual stops searching for further and 
potentially better options. However, as Bowles et al (2006) point out, practitioners 
are also bounded by the complex context of practice with its many conflicting 
demands to be negotiated and reconciled. Therefore, satisficing may be a realistic 
response to achieve ‘the best in the circumstances’, an alternative to worker burn-
out in a perpetual search for the perfect solution. In addition, as time constraints may 
require an individual to make a quick decision, intuitive processes may be relied upon 
more heavily because of their speediness in contrast to conscious analytical thought. 
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Helm’s (2016) research (referred to below) supports this in its finding that workers 
made sense of information in relation to their roles and responsibilities and the need 
to construct a response, and stopped searching for information once a threshold for 
action had been reached.  
Hackett and Taylor (2014) found that analysis was used as a check or back up for 
experiential and intuitive decision making. However, the social intuitionist model 
(Haidt 2001, 2010) argues that initial judgements are made intuitively, and then 
conscious reasoning is more often used to back them up rather than challenge them. 
This social intuitionist model (Haidt 2010) comprises four main links and two further 
links: 
• The intuitive judgement link – moral judgement appears effortlessly in 
consciousness (judgements may be based on quick impressions involving 
associations and stereotypes). 
• The post hoc reasoning link – moral reasoning is an effortful process after the 
judgement is made, involving a search for arguments that support the 
judgement that has already been made.  
• The reasoned persuasion link – moral reasoning is used to persuade others, 
and others are persuaded by the affective responses that are triggered in 
them rather than by the logical argument.   
• The social persuasion link – people are highly attuned to group norms so are 
influenced by the fact that friends, allies and acquaintances have made the 
judgement.  
The model hypothesises that people rarely use private reasoning to override their 
initial intuitive judgement because ‘reasoning is rarely used to question one’s own 
attitudes or beliefs’ (p348). However, it is possible for private reasoning or reflection 
to override or amend initial judgements, so the full social intuitionist model includes 
2 ways in which private reasoning can shape moral judgements: 
• The reasoned judgement link – people may occasionally reason their way to a 
judgement overriding their initial intuition, through logic, though this is seen 
as rare. If a reasoned judgement conflicts with a strong intuitive judgement a 
‘dual attitude’ may occur where the reasoned judgement is expressed while 
the intuitive judgement continues to exist under the surface.  
• The private reflection link – during reflection a person may spontaneously 
activate a new intuition. For example this could happen through empathising 
with another, leading to feeling pain, sympathy or other emotion and coming 
to see an issue from more than one perspective.  
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This model places importance on social interaction as part of the process, and Haidt 
argues that moral reasoning is usually carried out interpersonally (links 3 and 4) 
rather than in private. 
2.4.4  Collaborative decision-making: the role of groups and teams 
It may be assumed that collaborative decision making, either in consultation with 
another colleague or manager or as part of a group, would be more reliable. 
However, literature suggests this may be subject to the same biases and limiting 
factors set out earlier as individual decision making (Gambrill 2005, cited in Roesch-
Marsh 2012); it may also be more complex because of the social skills required for 
effective engagement (Roesch-Marsh 2012); and communication issues may be a 
barrier (Reder and Duncan 2003).  Power hierarchies are also influential.  For 
instance, serious case reviews show that in child protection conferences input from 
professionals from other agencies may not be given the same weight in decision 
making as the views of Children’s Social Care (scie 2016). Moreover, groups and 
teams may be a microcosm of divisions in society, influenced by and reinforcing 
dominant social and power structures (O’Sullivan 2011). 
Helm (2017) also suggests that while informal discussion is important in practitioners’ 
sense-making and aiding their reflexivity, individuals may seek out those who are 
similar, and be influenced by group norms. White (2011) observes that limited 
argument takes place when professionals’ moral judgements are congruent with 
group norms. Janis’ (1982) notion of ‘groupthink’ is relevant, as a means by which 
groups avoid conflict: ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive group, when members’ striving for unanimity overrides 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ (quoted in 
Munro 2008: 148). Groups tend to make consensus decisions, and group consensus 
can lead to extreme rather than middle of the road decisions – either very cautious or 
very risky. Processes include over-estimating the group (feeling invulnerable and not 
questioning their own morality), closed-mindedness (for example holding negative 
stereotypes of adversaries), and pressures towards conformity – for example 
pressure being directed at a dissenting member, members avoiding disagreement 
with others and a shared illusion of unanimity (Janis 1982, cited in Munro 2008). 
Some processes of groupthink were identified in child protection case conferences in 
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research by Kelly and Milner (1996), who suggest that polarisation and groupthink 
processes led case conference decisions to be inherently more risky than individual 
professional decisions. Prince et al (2005) also found agreement that some 
individuals dominated child protection conferences while others were quiescent. 
Addressing some of these issues, and on the basis of her study of decision making 
about secure placements in residential child care, Roesch-Marsh (2012) suggests that 
group decision making could be improved through considering the membership of 
the group; clarity of roles in the group; regular discussion about differing 
perspectives; identification and critical reflection about group norms; and attention 
to power relations within the group. Helm (2017) also suggests creating diversity in 
supervision and room occupancy in social work offices. 
2.4.5  Use of decision making models 
Decision making models abound in fields beyond social work such as computing, 
economics, medicine, operations research and psychology, but their use in social 
work decision making is less developed (Taylor 2012; 2017b). Available models range 
from those which are more explicitly mathematical, analytical and rational (for 
example calculations of the utility of different options based on their assigned value 
multiplied by probability), to those which are more intuitive and descriptive, 
generally developed from empirical evidence (Taylor 2012).  
Models specifically of ethical decision making have also been reviewed and discussed 
by Clark (2011), Bowles et al (2006), and McAuliffe (2010). Bowles et al (2006) are 
clear that none of the prescriptive approaches on its own is comprehensive enough 
or sufficient for effective ethical decision making. Banks and Gallagher (2009: 94) also 
suggest analytical decision making models may be seen as ‘artificial and contrived’, 
and ‘are no substitute for the development of the professional wisdom that comes 
from experience and from practising the virtues’, but also acknowledge that these 
models may help facilitate systematic thinking to aid decision making.   
On the basis of their systematic review Barlow et al (2012) recommend moving 
towards ‘structured professional judgement’ in social work, using tools alongside 
professional judgement.  They identify potential benefits of a range of standardised 
44 
 
assessment tools, risk/safety assessment tools, and strengths and needs assessment 
tools, at different points of the assessment and intervention process. They caution 
that adoption of such tools should be based on infrastructure factors being in place 
including adequate training and supervision, and only used as part of a broader 
‘partnership’ approach with children and families.  
However, in practice, structured decision making tools may not be able to deal with 
the complexity of actual child protection situations (Gillingham and Humphries 2010), 
and Kirkman and Melrose (2014) found existing tools themselves are complex, 
leading to their underuse. Their recommendations include the development of ‘fast 
and frugal trees’, checklists and integrating heuristics into reporting tools. Taylor 
(2016) discusses the possibilities of such heuristic models, recognising that it is not 
possible for human beings to process vast amounts of information at the same time 
as statistical weightings.  He argues that heuristic models can be used and adapted in 
relation to the context, and take account of the psycho-social environment of the 
decision as well as the cognitive processes of the decision maker and learning from 
experience, feedback and reflection – forming a ‘psycho-social rationality’ rather than 
a rationality based purely on statistics and logic.   
The systemic and ecological nature of judgement is highlighted by Helm and Roesch-
Marsh (2017), who develop a visual representation of the ‘ecology of social work 
judgement’, to facilitate mapping the interaction of individual judgement and 
decision making with the involvement of teams and groups, and the context of 
organisational systems. Rather than on the ‘facts’ involved, the emphasis of the 
model is on reflecting on factors influencing judgement, including the way the social 
worker frames the problem and interprets the data.  It is based on recognising the 
complexities and uncertainties of social work practice, together with the ‘situated, 
dynamic and subjective’ nature of judgement and the importance of critical 
reflexivity. 
2.5   Studies of social work decision making processes 
To date there are no other studies available which explicitly examine the interaction 
of emotions and ethical thinking in care proceedings decision making. A number of 
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studies focus on processes and experiences of social workers in decision making in 
child protection and related work.  
Kirkman and Melrose (2014) found practitioners’ decision making was affected by 
time and workload pressures, behavioural biases and heuristics, ‘decision fatigue’ as 
a result of the number of sequential decisions to be made in the course of a day, and 
the limited quality of information provided in referrals. In their review of studies 
relevant to threshold decision making Platt and Turney (2014) suggest that in 
pressured, uncertain environments social workers appear to reduce the decision 
making process by applying manageable sense-making strategies involving pattern 
recognition and heuristics. This is also reflected in Saltiel’s (2016) observations of 
child protection decision making in a social work office, in which pattern recognition, 
story building and discussion with colleagues were important in sense-making. 
The interaction of intuitive thinking and analysis is also explored by Hackett and 
Taylor (2014) in their analysis of ninety-eight core assessments from four local 
authorities, and subsequent interviews with the fifty social workers involved. They 
found that decision making was primarily experiential (based on the practitioner’s 
previous experience and intuition). The most frequent experiential aspects were 
using the family’s response to intervention as a guide to decision making, using prior 
experience of a family, and then comparison to other cases. However, analytical 
cognition was also used in all cases, often as a check or back up to experiential 
decision making. Analytic processes increased with rising levels of perceived risk, 
amount of historical information, need for evidence such as in legal proceedings, the 
stakes in a case, the amount of action/feedback loops, and where the dynamic 
environment kept changing or became more uncertain, or where more information 
became available. Where cases were familiar with little uncertainty or high stakes or 
action/feedback loops, the use of intuition predominated.  
Whittaker’s (2014, 2018) ethnographic study also found that practitioners used a 
dynamic interplay of intuitive and analytical processes in their reasoning, with the 
primary driver being emotionally-informed intuitive processes. Practitioners’ length 
of experience made a difference in that they used increasingly sophisticated pattern 
recognition and story building. O’Connor and Leonard (2014), analysing perspectives 
from focus groups of practitioners and students, also found that emotions had a role 
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in child and family decision making, as well as progression in levels of experience, 
confidence and professional identity. 
An ethnographic study of judgements in a social work office by Helm (2016; 2017) 
highlights that sense-making is also a shared process between individuals and 
sometimes across teams. When workers discussed a situation their opening 
statements provided an initial frame, indicating aspects they wished to emphasise as 
most significant in their view of the situation. These frames were important in 
establishing and sharing meaning in the dialogue that followed. Some of these initial 
frames involved the emotion of the worker, such as a statement that a situation is 
‘worrying’. The initial frame would arise from the individual’s preceding sense-
making, but the process of sense-making was also shared, with the respondent 
deciding how to respond to the cue, and this could involve focusing on different 
aspects of the situation. Helm’s findings indicate the importance of emotions and 
relationships and also emotional intelligence in the process of coming to judgements 
(Helm 2016). Helm (2017), writing about the same study, also highlights that 
practitioners tended to move around the office spaces, having informal discussions 
and using others to help think through issues in more depth, with a focus on curiosity 
and hypothesis generation rather than identifying solutions. Physical proximity and 
office layout were also important in enabling informal discussion. 
Child protection social workers’ sense-making and reasoning processes are examined 
by Keddell (2011), in particular their views of positive examples of practice, within a 
New Zealand NGO which espoused values of empowerment and respect. The way 
workers assigned meaning and actively constructed cases in non-blaming and 
sympathetic terms was significant in affecting the case process, enabling 
relationships with clients to be maintained as well as balancing risk. 
The experience of local authority social workers coming to a decision in care 
proceedings is examined by Beckett et al (2007) through focus groups. A number of 
factors arose as affecting the experience of social workers and the quality of decision 
making, such as the ‘game-like’ aspects associated with the adversarial system in care 
proceedings; complexities of weighing different types of evidence; pressures from 
managers, Guardians and the expectation to work in partnership with parents at the 
same time as being a ‘witness for the prosecution’; concern that the child can be lost 
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when people are focusing too much on the adults; and a concern that courts gave too 
much weight to the views of expert witnesses and children’s guardians, even if these 
were based on more limited evidence, discounting long term patterns in favour of 
new assessments – sometimes because those observing long-term patterns may be 
of relatively low status. Some of these points were also echoed in a study by Burns et 
al (2018) in Ireland, in particular the impact of the adversarial model, and the lower 
level of respect given to social workers’ views in comparison with other expert 
witnesses – this latter point also featuring in O’Connor and Leonard’s (2014) study. 
Using data from the same study as Beckett et al (2007), Taylor et al (2008) focus in 
more detail on the feelings expressed by the social workers during the study, and the 
way they defended against the high levels of anxiety involved, drawing from Menzies’ 
(1960) study of defences against anxiety in organisations.  
Dickens (2006) examines dilemmas faced by social workers in care proceedings in 
managing the tensions between care, control and change, focusing on the 
interactions between social workers, their managers and lawyers. The study 
highlights how stressful the experience of care proceedings can be for social workers 
and how much they looked to lawyers for support, but also the stresses and 
dilemmas brought by the involvement of lawyers. The relationships between lawyers 
and social workers are also studied by Vandervort et al (2008) through focus groups, 
which again revealed the highly stressful nature of these proceedings in contributing 
to social worker burn out. They conclude the need for social workers to be better 
prepared and understand legal ethics and lawyers.  
A study by Munro and Ward (2008) examines decision making in the context of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 articles 3, 6 and 8, in relation to balancing the rights of 
parents with those of very young children in care proceedings. The study found there 
were multiple interpretations of how the rights of each should be protected. Delay 
resulted from decisions being postponed – partly because of the ‘low status afforded 
to social workers and perceptions of their lack of expertise in the court arena’ 
(p.233), and the authors conclude that rights of parents might be prioritised over the 
needs and rights of the child. On the other hand, Holt and Kelly (2014) suggest that 
there is an imbalance of power against parents in the pre-proceedings process, 
compounded by public sector cuts in resources to support families. 
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Although none of the above studies have specifically focused on the impact and 
interaction of both emotion and ethical thinking in decision making in care 
proceedings, a number of themes have arisen that are relevant to the present study, 
such as the interaction of analysis and intuition in sense-making and that sense-
making is carried out collaboratively; the role of emotion; organisational defences 
against anxiety; framing; how individuals are constructed; potential tensions between 
rights of children and parents and different interpretations of how these may be 
resolved; and the impact of the context in which the decision making takes place.  
2.6   Conclusion 
Literature reviewed in this chapter has demonstrated that decisions during or leading 
to care proceedings cannot be seen in isolation from the broader social, economic, 
political, legal and organisational contexts which drive and shape them. Care 
proceedings decisions are also highly complex and indeterminate, inherently ethical, 
and subject to competing values and ideologies.  At their heart are tensions between 
safeguarding children and rights of families, and between the roles of social work in 
supporting families or regulating risk.  
The decision making process has also been shown to involve a complex mix of 
intuitive and analytical thinking. Intuitive thinking is associated with experience and 
expertise but also potential inaccuracy and bias. Rational analytical thinking is also 
subject to limitations, and may follow intuition rather than controlling it.  
Studies of social work decision making have illustrated the challenging nature and 
complex contexts of these decisions, their ethical dimensions, and the interplay of 
analysis and intuitive thinking involved. 
The next chapter will survey literature relating to ethical perspectives and theories 
and their relevance to care proceedings decision making. Following that, the third 
literature review chapter will consider the emotional dimensions of decision making 
and associated work with children and their families.   
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3 Chapter 3: Literature Review (2): Ethical perspectives 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 sets out how ethics and values are being defined and considered in this 
study. Chapters 1 and 2 also explain the context of social work and how all aspects of 
social work, its role and judgements and decisions, can be seen as having ethical 
dimensions. Discussions of ethical decision making in literature are often focused on 
the resolution of ethical dilemmas. However, such an approach would be too narrow 
to capture the nature of ethical decision making in social work. In their everyday 
practice social workers are constantly judging, deciding and acting, including in 
situations where there are no dilemmas (Keinemans 2015).  
This chapter surveys literature on ethical theories and perspectives and the ways in 
which they may inform, influence or reflect action and decision making in child and 
family social work. Studies of how social workers use ethical theories in practice are 
then considered. 
3.2  Ethical theories and social work 
The landscape of ethical theories is complex and detailed. Each has different 
historical roots and encompasses varying and developing strands. An explanation 
confined to the relation of ethical theories to social work, let alone in general, would 
require a level of detail inappropriate to the space constraints here. Therefore, the 
purpose of this account is not to provide a detailed explication of each theoretical 
approach, but to set out a brief selective outline and discussion of features relevant 
to action and decision making in child and family social work, referring mainly to 
social work literature and some additional texts. 
Discussions of ethical theories in the social work literature generally feature 
deontological, consequentialist and, increasingly, virtue-based ethics, as well as 
identifying a growing range of other relevant approaches such as radical, anti-
oppressive, discourse, feminist, dialogical and collectivist perspectives. However, 
these approaches are all more wide-ranging and complex than the place they hold in 
social work; and as Banks (2012) points out, when writers on social work ethics refer 
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to the influence of approaches such as utilitarianism or Kantian deontology, they are 
identifying connections with some of the basic orientations rather than the whole of 
each of these approaches.  
While considering literature on the various ethical approaches, it is also relevant to 
bear in mind Alasdair Macintyre’s (2007) criticism of a tendency to abstract the moral 
philosophers of the past from their historical, social and cultural contexts and to treat 
them as ‘contributors to a single debate’ as if they are ‘contemporaries both of 
ourselves and of each other’ (p11). He also points out that although rival arguments 
are logically valid in themselves they may also be conceptually incommensurable and 
that ‘we possess no rational way of weighing up the claims of one as against another’ 
in order to resolve and terminate the debates (p8). He notes that moral pluralism is 
commonly regarded as one answer to the ‘wide and heterogeneous’ variety of moral 
sources we have inherited, but warns of the danger of this being ‘an unharmonious 
melange of ill-assorted fragments’ rather than ‘an ordered dialogue of intersecting 
viewpoints’ (p10).  
I have chosen to map the landscape of a wide range of perspectives because they all 
feature in literature as relevant to social work or other helping professions, or in 
decision making. I recognise that these perspectives arise from different traditions 
and none was developed specifically for social work. The aim of this section is partly 
to show that each has elements that are relevant, although each also has limitations 
in its application to social work practice and decision making in care proceedings. 
The range to be covered reflects my view that consideration of decision making 
cannot be confined to rational and intellectual processes but is also closely connected 
with the embodied and relational aspects of practice. Decision making thus involves 
both processes and relationships, two strands that can be traced, to a greater or 
lesser extent, through the ethical theories to be referred to here. I will take into 
consideration how far the approaches link with relationship-based practice and social 
justice principles, and how closely they are relevant to statutory child protection and 
care proceedings decision making. This discussion will identify Recognition theory as 
potentially offering the most useful overall framework for understanding and practice 
in this area, with some qualifications. 
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3.2.1  Deontology 
Deontological approaches are based on duty (deriving from deon the Greek word for 
duty, and logos, the study of). Choices are judged according to how far they conform 
to moral laws, rather than whether they will result in good or desirable 
consequences.  The ‘rightness’ of an action takes priority over bringing about ‘the 
Good’ (that is, an intrinsically valuable state of affairs), so some choices will be 
morally forbidden even if they will bring about good consequences. This contrasts 
with the consequentialist approach which prioritises increasing ‘the Good’ as a basis 
for action (Alexander and Moore 2012). 
A central figure in deontology is Kant (1724-1804) who believed morality is based on 
reason, which should be exercised freely and democratically to examine everything. 
Within the tradition of Western Enlightenment thought Kant saw human beings as 
free rational agents who make choices and are capable of acting on moral reasons, 
not only from selfish desires, physical causes or predetermined choices. Individuals 
should be motivated not by fear or reward but by a good will, a will to do the right 
action because it is right (Stevenson and Haberman 2004). Thus the intention behind 
the action is key, rather than the consequences, so the end does not justify the 
means. For Kant, all actions must also be undertaken out of a sense of duty to moral 
law, consistent with the principle of ‘respect for persons’, and ‘universality’ in that 
the action would be ethical in any context and could be universalised (Pullen-
Sansfacon and Cowden 2012). One of Kant’s categorical imperatives was ‘So act as to 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of any other, never solely as a 
means but always also as an end’ (Kant 1785, cited in Banks 2012: 43). 
The influence of Kant’s principle of ‘respect for persons’ can be seen in the priority 
given by social workers to duties of respect for individuals, their dignity and self-
determination, and the nature of the social work relationship, traditionally expressed 
by Biestek (1961) in his list of seven casework principles (Banks 2012). Kant’s 
categorical imperative, that humanity should never be treated as a means to an end, 
can also be linked to notions of social justice in social work in the sense that no group 
should be treated as a minority that does not matter (Johns 2016).  An instrumental 
approach to working with parents in child protection cases, if parents are only 
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considered in relation to their impact on the child rather than as persons in their own 
right, can be seen as treating them as means rather than ends (Lonne et al 2016). 
3.2.2  Consequentialism 
Under a consequentialist approach, on the other hand, the moral rightness of an act 
is judged according to the act’s consequences (Sinott-Armstrong 2012). A range of 
consequentialist theories exists, differing widely in how they define ‘the good’ 
(Alexander & Moore 2012). Classic utilitarianism (eg Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart 
Mill, Henry Sidgwick) holds that to be morally right an act needs to maximise the 
good, and more specifically for Bentham the act needs to cause ‘the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number’ (Sinott-Armstrong 2012).  
Consequentialist theories generally distinguish between actual and expected or 
intended consequences (as the actual consequences may be unforeseen or beyond 
the individual’s control). The focus is on outcomes that can be reasonably foreseen, 
so a person acting recklessly could be held accountable for results they should have 
realised would happen, whereas a negative outcome that no-one could reasonably 
expect could be put down to ‘moral bad luck’ (Bowles et al 2006). 
Consequentialism has been criticised for its apparent permitting of harm to 
individuals in order to bring about greater good for others (Alexander & Moore 
2012). Critics have also pointed to the potential conflict for consequentialists 
between the principles of utility (produce as much good as possible) and justice 
(distribute this as widely as possible) as different decisions might be indicated by 
each principle (Banks 2012). 
Consequentialist approaches are often used in social work decision making to balance 
the level of harm against the level of benefit to individuals and groups in the course 
of considering different options. In the current context of social work practice, they 
also play a significant role in deciding how limited resources should be distributed. 
Social workers may also experience conflicts between deontological and 
consequentialist sets of principles in certain contexts: for example their duties to the 
individual service user may come into conflict with the need to ration resources 
(Banks 2012: 65).  
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Both deontology and consequentialism are categorised by Banks (2012) as principle-
based approaches that have tended to dominate professional social work ethics. 
However, both may be criticised as being based on assumptions of human beings as 
freely acting individuals, able to make choices and take moral responsibility for their 
actions, and thus reflecting the individualistic values of western capitalist societies. 
3.2.3  Critical and radical approaches 
Since the 1970s, social work has also been significantly influenced by critical and 
radical perspectives, criticising an individualistic focus, recognising the role of 
structural inequalities in society which may constrain individual freedom, and 
concerned with anti-oppressive practice and values such as equality, community and 
social justice (Banks 2012). Underlying these views is the interplay of agency and 
structure, concerning how far human action is either free or constrained (Giddens 
1991, cited in Hugman 2005).  Morley and Macfarlane (2014: 342) argue that critical 
social work associates ethical social work practice with the promotion of ‘democracy, 
equity, human rights and social justice within a critique of the existing sociopolitical, 
economic, cultural, historical and gendered structures’. They suggest that critical 
reflective approaches, such as that of Fook (2012), combine the interrogation of 
implicit values and assumptions with identification of how these may support 
dominant power relations and structures, and thus help provide resistance to the 
powerful impact of neoliberalism on social work.  
Banks (2012) points out that social work tends to combine radical principles with 
Kantian and utilitarian approaches to produce a set of key principles respecting the 
dignity, worth and self-determination of human beings, promoting welfare and social 
justice for service users and in society generally.  
3.2.4  Limitations of principle-based ethics 
Principle-based approaches to professional ethics have been subject to criticism, 
often as a basis for arguing the merits of virtue ethics and other more recent 
approaches (see below). A key issue is that the direct application of principle-based 
ethics to everyday complex situations is far from straightforward. Theoretical 
discussions may involve a level of clarity or certainty not reflected in actual practice 
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situations (Hugman 2005), and the principles are limited in offering solutions when 
there are conflicting considerations (Statman 1997, cited in Banks & Gallagher 2009: 
32). Principle-based approaches also focus on rationality and cognition and dismiss 
the role of emotions or view them negatively and to be suppressed; and they tend to 
be excessively formal, focusing on analysis and argument, and dealing with decisions 
as separate from consideration of an individual’s narrative or character (Louden 
1998, cited in Banks and Gallagher 2009: 32). They also ignore the contexts in which 
judgements are made, including the role of different cultures, and particular 
commitments and relationships people may have (Banks 2012). For postmodernists 
and feminists the universalist and transcendent principles and reason-based, gender-
neutral approaches of deontology and consequentialism are problematic (Gray 2010).  
In contemporary harsh risk-averse social work practice environments there is also ‘an 
‘anti-ethical’ tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate 
practitioner behaviour since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive 
approach with little space for professional autonomy (Gray 2010: 1796). 
3.2.5  Virtue Ethics  
Virtue ethics may be seen as providing a partial answer to these limitations. In 
contrast to deontology and consequentialism, under virtue ethics the goodness of an 
act relates to the character of the actor, and is not measured by its outcomes or 
conformity to rules of duty. Banks and Gallagher (2009) trace the development of 
virtue ethics from its origins in the classical period, most notably from the work of 
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) who emphasised the importance of aspiring to be good, and 
the connections between virtue, happiness and flourishing. From the late 20th 
century onwards there has been a resurgence in virtue ethics, influenced by 
Anscombe’s (1958) paper Modern Moral Philosophy, and MacIntyre’s (1985) After 
Virtue.  
A number of virtues relevant to social work are identified; for example, Banks (2012) 
and Banks and Gallagher (2009) name professional wisdom, courage, respectfulness, 
care, trustworthiness, justice, and professional integrity. However, alternative lists 
are put forward by other writers, including, for example, open-mindedness and 
practical reasoning (Bowles et al 2006), and moral standards may include both 
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general and context-sensitive values (Clark 2006). There is therefore a lack of 
consensus about which attributes, dispositions and skills should be regarded as 
important social work virtues (Pullen-Sansfaçon and Cowden 2016), and a problem of 
how these virtues are to be defined (Houston 2003). Banks (2012: 76) also argues 
that ‘lists of virtues can be criticised in the same way as lists of values or ethical 
principles, as being abstract and unhelpful in making everyday ethical decisions’, and 
there is a danger that virtue ethics could be ‘subsumed into principle based ethics’.  
Also relevant in virtue ethics are Aristotle’s precepts of the need for practical 
wisdom, or phronesis, which is developed through instruction and experience; and 
the ‘golden mean’ in the sense of avoiding extremes of too little or too much of any 
virtue: for example, a virtue of friendliness, as a golden mean, would have on the one 
hand cantankerousness as a deficit, or obsequiousness as an excess (Webb 2010).  
Virtue ethics is not confined to the individual sphere. Critical of many aspects of 
modern liberal capitalism, Macintyre (2007) argues the benefits of the ancient 
Athenian polis, or city-state, at the time of Aristotle, where the good life included 
acting for the good of society (also strongly rejecting many aspects of the polis such 
as slavery, the treatment of women and its elitism).  Webb (2010) suggests Aristotle’s 
focus on the position of the Greek citizen within the Greek city state, and the relation 
between individual character, morality and public life, is relevant to considerations of 
‘how right moral relations can exist between state agencies, such as social workers 
and clients in terms of the character and ‘excellence’ of the practitioner, the nature 
of the social care agency and the response of the client’ (Webb 2010: 110). McBeath 
and Webb (2002) demonstrate the relevance of virtue ethics to a social work aim of 
promoting human flourishing as a community enterprise, within a holistic ecological 
approach.  
McBeath and Webb also see conscience, reflection and self-understanding as 
important, and that the ‘virtuous worker must learn to bring together strength of 
mind, judgement, perception of situation and action in a highly analytical way’ 
(p.1033). These qualities are not fixed but develop through training, experience and 
reflection, and are used variably according to the situation. The virtuous social 
worker is one who strives to do her/his best, and also strives ‘to reach goals which 
are done for their own sake, that is, due to conscious commitment and not only 
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because someone said so’ (Webb 2010: 116). Therefore, as McBeath and Webb 
(2002) show, a virtue ethics approach may be appropriate within the increasingly 
complex and indeterminate environment of social work practice and decision making 
with children and families (where principle-based approaches may fail to provide 
sufficient guidance); it also runs counter to the prevailing organisational expectations 
of procedural, rule-based, risk-averse practice. 
3.2.6  Habermas’ ideal speech situation 
Houston (2003) argues that it is insufficient to base moral judgements on reflection 
and personal judgement or even consultation with others; instead they should be 
made in full dialogue with others, such as through Habermas’ rules of communication 
and intersubjective engagement. Here everyone is allowed to speak and participate 
openly and freely and the interests and needs of all stakeholders are balanced: this 
‘ideal speech situation’ provides a process for ethical decision making based on 
‘communicative action’ (Habermas 1990 and 1991, cited in Houston 2010: 97). 
Elements of this may be seen in the court process which seeks to give all parties an 
equal voice. Houston also links Habermas’ rules to Mead’s ‘ideal role taking’, in that 
‘we can only develop a rounded view of the self (and its perspectives) by putting 
ourselves into the position of others’ (Houston 2003: 822). Thus for Houston a moral 
decision must be based on dialogue, in which communication is open and impartial 
and the voice of the service user not only heard, but the communication also involves 
the hermeneutic principle that we strive to understand their point of view. 
Lovat and Gray (2008) show how Habermasian perspectives can be brought together 
with virtue ethics to produce a ‘proportionist’ ethics that could transcend both 
deontological absolutes and utilitarian situationist ethics. This would involve a 
compassionate, other-centred, hermeneutic social worker who connects ‘use of self’, 
‘right judgement’ and critically reflective self-knowledge in dialogical engagement 
and practical action. 
Habermas’s theory and its proponents, however, have been criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to the political and economic context of neo-liberalism, 
organisational structures and power differentials which could undermine his 
discourse ethics (Garrett 2009). Feminists such as Nancy Fraser also critique 
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Habermas’s perspectives for ignoring gender and presenting an overly positive view 
of the family (Garrett 2009). While discussing the positive contribution of discourse 
ethics of shared dialogue and consensus-building communication to enable 
individuals and groups to be heard, listened to and recognised, Hugman (2005) also 
points to its limitation when individuals or groups are not seeking agreement. There 
may be material and structural limitations to participation, and there is a danger of 
an oppressive imposition of unity over different perspectives (Hugman 2005). 
Individuals who cannot participate communicatively are excluded from the ideal 
speech situation unless they have appropriate advocacy (Houston 2010). These 
limitations could feature in child protection and court processes. In Smithson and 
Gibson’s (2017) study of parents’ experiences of the child protection system parents 
felt they ‘were not afforded the same rights as a participant, as a decision-maker or 
as a partner’ (p572), and some felt silenced, coerced and treated as ‘less than 
human’. Family Group Conferences are seen by Hayes and Houston (2007) as a 
positive process that can bring together the ‘system’ and the ‘lifeworld’ in a 
collaborative dialogue as advocated by Habermas, but this dialogue can also be 
affected by both professional ideologies and power relations between family 
members. To address this issue, Houston (2009), though mindful of the dangers of 
syncretism, suggests a tentative alignment of discourse ethics with Honneth’s 
theoretical insights on recognition.  
3.2.7  Recognition 
Honneth (1995), drawing from writings of both Hegel and G.H.Mead, argues that 
three types of recognition from others are necessary for an individual’s self-
realisation and identity formation:  
(i) love or care in primary relationships, which leads to the development of basic 
self-confidence 
(ii) being given rights and dignity, leading to self-respect, and  
(iii) being valued within a community as having a positive contribution, leading to 
self-esteem.  
Recognition may be denied, for example through acts of physical maltreatment, 
denigration, exclusion from equal rights, social disrespect and devaluation, causing 
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humiliation and shame. These will have a significant effect on an individual’s self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth 1995). Charles Taylor (1992: 25) 
also argues that recognition of one’s identity from others is a vital human need, and 
that a person’s identity is partly shaped by recognition, or misrecognition, by others, 
so that ‘a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves’.  
Recognition as a model would appear to have many applications in social work. It 
draws attention to the intersubjective nature of identity development and the 
connection between the ‘personal’ and the ‘political’ (Houston 2016). It sheds light 
on the many significant impacts that ‘misrecognition’ and shame may have on 
individuals, and it could also be seen as providing a framework for social work 
practice.  
Experiences of misrecognition in all three of the patterns of recognition are 
commonly reflected in the lives of families in child protection and care proceedings.  
They may have experienced abuse and neglect rather than the meeting of their needs 
for love and care. Rights and dignity may be denied both in primary relationships and 
through the impact of social exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination, either as 
an individual or being part of an excluded group. Gupta et al (2018) emphasise the 
relevance of poverty and inequality to child protection, and their multi-dimensional 
nature in which material hardship combines with experiences of powerlessness, 
marginalisation and absence of social and political participation, compounded by 
state policies which demonise poor parents while reducing supportive services and 
encouraging an authoritarian approach in child protection. Families in this situation 
will also experience negative social attitudes, stigma and ‘othering’, with emphasis on 
their deficits rather than their positive contribution. 
When people experience these kinds of misrecognition, there is a serious impact on 
their self-confidence, self-worth, and, crucially, their experience of shame with its 
many powerful effects. Drawing from attachment theory and psychoanalytic theory, 
Walker (2011) discusses the significance of shame as an emotional reaction to a loss 
of attunement with a caregiver, a ‘rupture without repair’ (p457) especially where 
this experience is chronic or traumatic. An infant in this situation feels emotionally 
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overwhelmed and alone with anger, fear and shame.  In a position of total 
dependence on a parent’s care it is safer for a child to view her/himself as ‘bad’ 
rather than the parent, leading to the internalisation of a deep sense of shame. 
Parents subject to child protection processes may have had many life experiences 
which lead to shame, within both intimate relationships and the broader social forms 
of misrecognition discussed above. Walker identifies a number of possible impacts of 
shame. It may lead individuals to withdraw, freeze or hide through fear of exposure, 
or to dissociate from painful and frightening feelings and memories, leading to 
absence of insight into the self and empathy for others. Shame may also lead to rage, 
which can also involve a wish (conscious or unconscious) for revenge. Individuals may 
become aggressively self-reliant and avoid asking for help, have difficulties with 
honest and open communication, and defend against shame through lying, or the 
denial of behaviour or events. Shame leads individuals to believe they are not 
loveable, and thus interferes with their capacity to love and trust. Shame may also 
lead to child abuse and neglect, for example when a parent’s unsuccessful attempts 
to comfort a persistently crying baby may trigger previous experiences of shame and 
worthlessness, leading to responses of aggression or withdrawal.  Forrester et al 
(2012) give the example of a substance misusing parent increasing rather than 
decreasing her substance misuse when faced with care proceedings, responding to 
feelings of despair and what appeared as a confirmation of her failure. 
Thus, awareness of the impact of misrecognition and shame is important for social 
workers when understanding parents’ responses to their children and to social work 
intervention. Parental hostility and avoidant responses which are often characterised 
as resistance or non-engagement with social workers may result from misrecognition 
and shame arising either from their previous experiences, or from elements of the 
current situation or the power dimensions and nature of interactions between 
professionals and service users (Forrester et al 2012; Ward et al 2014). The care 
proceedings process itself could be seen as the epitome of condemnation for a 
mother, involving public exposure and shame. 
Recognition theory also offers a framework for ethical practice.  Houston (2016) 
develops a conceptual framework for critical social work from Honneth’s model of 
the three types of recognition – identifying for each type the sources and outcomes 
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of recognition, forms and outcomes of misrecognition, and related social work 
approaches (such relationship-based, strengths-based, community social work, 
ecological social work, and rights based, political and structural social work).  Houston 
also counters Honneth’s view that misrecognition provides the impetus for 
individuals to challenge their oppression, identifying instead the destructive impacts 
of shame on self-confidence, as indicated above. This leads him to advocate the 
following six-step process for shame-sensitive social work:  (i) developing a 
therapeutic alliance with the service user through acts of recognition; (ii) identifying 
shame as a product of misrecognition; (iii) exploring the impact of shame; (iv) 
managing shame; (v) restoring pride through recognition; and (vi) empowering 
service users to challenge misrecognition. 
Additional complexities are involved in applying recognition theory to child 
protection work, as an empathetic shame-sensitive approach to parents may need to 
be combined with acknowledgement that parents may be deceptive or manipulative, 
and it may be imperative for them to change their behaviour in a short timescale. In 
his work on shame Walker (2011) helpfully identifies that work should aim to enable 
an individual to move from shame to guilt. While shame acts as a barrier to empathy 
and the taking of responsibility for one’s actions, guilt includes empathy. When 
individuals move from shame to guilt their capacity to accept responsibility for their 
behaviour and develop empathy increases. 
The contribution of recognition theory to relationship based practice with 
‘involuntary clients’, as in the child protection sphere, is also discussed by Turney 
(2012).  An approach based on recognition, respect and reciprocity supports an 
effective engagement with service users that values them as individuals, ‘as an ‘end 
in themselves’ rather than simply as a means to the end of protecting their children 
from harm’ (p150). Turney acknowledges the tensions and challenges inherent in 
statutory work with involuntary clients where there may be hostility and ambivalence 
and ‘it may be hard to know what information is reliable, whose ‘story’ to trust’ 
(p154). However, this approach, which needs to involve an open-minded and a ‘not-
knowing’ stance, also helps avoid the ‘misrecognition’ of service users that can 
contribute to ambivalence and non-engagement.  
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Waterhouse and McGhee (2015) discuss the relevance to child protection social work 
of Judith Butler’s theory of recognition, in particular in Giving an account of oneself 
(2005). Basic to this is that the self is constituted and reconstituted within social 
relations, and we give an account of ourselves when asked by the ‘you’. Thus, giving 
an account is ‘. . . a kind of showing of oneself, a showing for the purpose of testing 
whether the account seems right, whether it is understandable by the other, who 
“receives” the account through one set of norms or another’ (Butler 2005: 131, cited 
in Waterhouse and McGhee 2015: 246). But this account should not be in the context 
of fear or accusation and should be on one’s own terms. They argue that in child 
protection situations mothers are in effect asked to give an account of themselves in 
a situation of fear and threat, defending against an accusation of causing or failing to 
prevent harm to their child. Mothers are evaluated in relation to their ability to care 
for their child, put the child first and protect the child, including from the father or 
male partner. A recognition approach would involve addressing mothers ‘as women 
in their own right and as reflexive self-narrating beings’ (p248), and in their own 
terms, which for instance may be as a woman struggling to survive in difficult social 
and economic circumstances.  Otherwise there is the potential for ethical harm 
through not respecting a woman’s personhood. They suggest the question ‘Who are 
you?’ should be the starting point for practitioner-mother relations.   
However, recognition theory has been challenged for ‘psychologization’ of what are 
fundamentally social and economic issues, with the view put forward that 
redistribution is important as well as recognition (Fraser 2003, cited by Garrett 2009), 
although Garrett adds that Fraser under-theorises the state’s role in sustaining 
‘othering’ and misrecognition. Turney (2012) takes up these points but argues that 
they do not negate the usefulness of recognition theory for social work as this can 
incorporate considerations of power and oppression and broader societal 
relationships.   
Focusing on the role of poverty and social exclusion in child protection, Gupta et al 
(2018) argue the relevance of Lister’s (2013) theory of ‘the politics of 
recognition&respect’ an approach which emphasises human rights, respect and 
participation for those in poverty, alongside redistribution.  Gupta et al call for a 
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poverty-aware social work practice that challenges othering discourses and promotes 
social justice and human rights. 
Thus, although recognition theory lacks a specific focus on challenging structural 
inequality, it can still encompass social justice and anti-oppressive practice in both 
the individual and structural dimensions of social work, and combine this with 
relationship based practice. 
However, it may still be seen as incomplete in decision making. Houston (2009) 
suggests that recognition theory encourages an empathetic, strengths-based 
approach, but in itself will not automatically lead to resolving issues. As indicated 
earlier, he suggests that recognition theory can be complemented by Habermas’s 
discourse ethics, thus arguing that ‘egalitarian communication and the principle of 
inclusive recognition are the two foundation stones of moral decision making in social 
work’ (Houston 2009: 1276) 
Another potential criticism of recognition theory is that there is also a danger that in 
recognising the other we are using our own frames of meaning to understand the 
other, accommodating her or him into our own existing frames. It could be argued 
there is inadequate acknowledgement of what is unknown and beyond our 
recognition (Stark 2014). This raises questions for social work, such as how far we 
recognise another’s account of her/himself if it is unacceptable to us; where there are 
conflicts, how do we decide whose claims for recognition are to be prioritised? 
However, social workers are professionally obligated to assess and judge, and present 
an account of service users in reports. This may involve presenting a negative view of 
a parent in order to convince the court to make an order. In response to these 
tensions I will next consider the potential contribution of Levinas, then Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, Buber’s I and Thou, and finally the Ethics of Care. 
3.2.8  Levinas 
Levinas argues that ethics should come first before knowledge. Ethics are initiated by 
‘the face’ of the other, to which we must respond and accept responsibility, and not 
by our knowledge and understanding. For Levinas we can never fully know or 
represent the other: our representations of others are always inadequate, and there 
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is always something beyond our knowledge and comprehension. If we try to 
conceptualise the other person it is to treat her/him as an extension of our own 
categories, and in attempting to represent and understand people we violate their 
own irreducible singularity (Rossiter 2011). Levinasian ethics therefore raises radical 
questions for social work’s claim to special knowledge of people, and professional 
responsibility to ‘know’ the other (Rossiter 2011). Tsang (2017) also argues that it 
challenges assumptions about the place of empathy in social work, and the emphasis 
on understanding the service user as a basis of relationship building and intervention. 
Social workers therefore need to combine the search to understand and empathise 
with awareness that their knowledge is partial and fallible, thus holding ‘a ‘both and’ 
stance of ‘understanding and not understanding’ that regards service users as people 
who can both be known and unknowable’ (Tsang 2017: 316). This ‘not knowing’ 
stance towards the other, involving humility and openness (rather than an emphasis 
on ‘cultural competence’) is also favoured by Ben-Ari and Strier (2010) as a 
framework for working with difference and diversity.  
Rossiter (2011), however, goes on to point out the inherent ‘razor’s edge’ tension in a 
social work concerned with social justice, given that seeking justice for service users 
requires representation, but under Levinasian ethics representing the other is a form 
of violence. As a form of critical social work she puts forward a view of ‘unsettled 
practice’, which accepts the impossibility of resolving this tension and is committed 
to working consciously with it. Thus, ‘social work can situate itself in justice-oriented 
representations, but it can also interpret its chronic discomfort as unsettled social 
work, which values its discomfort as a practice that fully acknowledges that the 
violence of representation exists in inescapable tension with the need for justice that 
requires it’ (Rossiter 2011:  994).  
However, for Garrett (2017) this view of critical social work has become ‘untethered 
from economic and sociological moorings’ (p11), the role of the state and impact of 
neoliberalism. Moreover, Garrett raises that the ‘Other’, for whom we have 
responsibility, tends to be depicted by Levinas as a needy, passive, vulnerable figure – 
‘the widow, the orphan, the stranger and the beggar’ – rather than someone who 
may be rebellious or resistant.  
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This interesting point is perhaps also reflected more generally in social work 
literature, where there appears some hesitation to discuss the ‘other’ who may have 
some responsibility for harm or neglect or have morally unacceptable attitudes and 
actions, for example abusive, cruel or discriminatory behaviour, without constructing 
the individual differently, for example as a victim with limited agency. Also, as argued 
above, the social work assessment role may come into conflict with both recognition 
theory and Levinasian ethics. Three further approaches may be useful in illuminating 
how these tensions could be worked with: narrative, hermeneutics and dialogue. 
3.2.9  Narrative 
Wilks (2005) shows how a narrative approach can bring together different and 
disparate threads of social work values and ethics and service user perspectives, and 
can incorporate dissonance and competing ethical considerations. It may also include 
consideration of damaging and oppressive wider social structures and cultural 
influences on people’s lives, and in doing so will reveal the relationship between the 
two (Krumer-Nevo and Sidi 2012). 
Baldwin and Estey-Burtt (2012) assert that a narrative approach to ethics means 
thinking ‘ethically about how we construct narratives about, with, and for individual 
service users while remaining attentive to wider concerns of social justice’ (p1), also 
paying attention to facilitating narratives of people for whom telling their story may 
be more difficult, such as people with dementia or learning difficulties. Language 
used will convey particular views or impressions of the people involved. Narratives 
are therefore representations and constructions, which can take on moral overtones, 
for example presenting a parent as uncaring, a foster family as dedicated, and so on 
(Urek 2005, cited in Baldwin and Estey-Burtt); they can also resist ‘othering’ (Krumer-
Nevo and Sidi 2012); and can employ strengths based and solution focused 
approaches (Bunting and Lazenbatt 2016).  
Baldwin and Estey-Burtt argue that a narrative approach is a step towards Rossiter’s 
‘unsettled social work’ as it does not privilege social work understandings or assume 
complete comprehension is possible, or attempt ‘to subsume the Other into pre-
existing categories’ but is oriented towards the other and giving of one’s self over to 
the other (p14). The ‘informed not knowing’ approach, in which the practitioner 
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combines empathy with a belief in the expert knowledge of parents and children 
from their own experience, may also enable individuals to reveal and share more of 
their painful and private thoughts and feelings than they would otherwise (Shapiro 
2012). 
Narrative theory could contribute to a recognition based approach, with its focus on 
the detail of enabling the other to tell their story, and understanding the way 
narratives are constructed, reducing the danger that we may impose our own frames 
of meaning on the other. However, bearing in mind the impacts of misrecognition 
and shame on a person’s self-concept, as indicated above, individuals may have 
difficulty viewing and presenting themselves fairly, and have difficulty with accepting 
responsibility for their actions – so a shame-sensitive approach is important. 
In terms of decision making, narrative approaches are open to criticism for being 
relativistic (Wilks 2005) and being based on an open-ended and undefined 
responsibility to the other (Baldwin and Estey-Burtt 2012). Wilks (2005) suggests the 
approach provides a path to the decision rather than guiding the decision itself. 
The role of dialogue and relationship in leading to change, and therefore potentially 
different decisions and outcomes, is also worth considering further. The accounts of 
narrative approaches above place emphasis on the voice and story of the other, and 
the importance of our openness to this. However, I would argue that missing here is a 
corresponding attention to what we ourselves, or social workers themselves, bring to 
the encounter – that is, attention to the social, cultural and historical location and 
preconceptions of the worker which may influence how the other is perceived. 
Alongside the question posed by Waterhouse and McGhee (2015) ‘Who are you?’ we 
could equally ask ‘Who am I?’ Another important aspect to consider is the idea of 
mutuality and change – the possibility that both sides can be changed through the 
encounter. The work of Gadamer (2004, 1977) is relevant here.  
3.2.10  Gadamer and hermeneutics 
Fundamental to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics are recognition of both the 
situatedness and embeddedness of the interpreter, and also the reciprocal dialogical 
nature of understanding, based on an equal and mutual relationship with the other 
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(Gill 2015). Gadamer believed that rather than closing us off, our prejudices, or pre-
judgements, may be what opens us to what is to be understood (Malpas 2015). He 
viewed understanding and interpretation as always taking place within a historically-
determined, situated ‘horizon’. This horizon is always subject to change, not only 
through the changes taking place in history, but also through our own revisions. The 
horizon can change through openness, encounter and dialogue in which the other 
can challenge our perspectives and enable us to become aware of our own 
situatedness and preconceptions, and what needs to change. As this takes place, our 
perspectives broaden, and a ‘fusion of horizons’ may occur with formation of a new 
context of meaning. However, understanding is continuous and necessarily 
incomplete, as it is not possible for our historical and hermeneutic situation ever to 
become completely transparent. Rather than seeing dialogue as a way of balancing 
different viewpoints or assimilating one perspective into another, Gadamer 
emphasises openness and attentiveness to the other as a pre-requisite, and the to-
and-fro nature of dialogue between the familiar and the alien, in which neither side 
remains unaffected (Malpas 2015; Gill 2015). Thus for Gadamer, a fusion of horizons 
does not mean a destroying of difference to become the same, but ‘an ongoing, 
open-ended movement between two things different from each other’ (Vilhauer 
2009: 361).  
Rather than a method, Gadamer views hermeneutics as a mode of being-in-the-
world. Language is fundamental, as we encounter ourselves and others through 
language. In hermeneutics the other is not treated as a means to an end. The 
dialogue becomes a shared inquiry in which the other is a partner, co-subject and co-
interpreter, new meanings are created from the interplay between horizons, and 
‘[t]hrough every dialogue something different comes to be’ (Gadamer 1977, cited in 
Gill 2015: 20).  
This point about the creation of new meanings through dialogue is significant for this 
research study, in which dialogue and relationship appear to have key roles in the 
creation of understandings – including self-understandings – and knowledge and 
changed perceptions. This idea is also articulated by Parton (2003: 3), discussing the 
role of talk and language in enabling service users to make sense of their experiences: 
it is ‘by language that the individual self is formed’, and it is ‘the opportunity to 
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engage in an active conversation about oneself that brings about understanding and 
change’. At the core of child protection social work are the embodied interactions 
with families in home visits and meetings, focused on assessing, negotiating, 
persuading and encouraging change. The value of a hermeneutic approach can be 
seen here, with its emphasis on reciprocity, dialogue and mutual change. Gadamer’s 
idea of the two horizons is useful to consider as a process, for example through which 
the divergent horizons of a worker and parent can be brought closer together 
through dialogue and consequent development on both sides in self-understanding 
and understanding of the other’s perspective. 
Despite its focus on partnership and reciprocity within the dialogic encounter, the 
hermeneutic approach can also be criticised for paying insufficient attention to the 
surrounding social, political, economic and organisational contexts that define and 
constrain encounters between people with unequal power, and its lack of focus on 
trying to change these structures. However, Gill (2015) points out that Gadamer 
recognised the limitations of dialogue in dealing with domination and the problems 
of political life, and that he also suggested that dialogic encounters can take place at 
a macro level with larger communities and nations.  
Clark (2011) makes a case for a hermeneutic approach to professional ethical 
decision making, involving three main principles drawn from Gadamer’s work: first, a 
recognition that all understanding is historically conditioned and situated, and this 
includes awareness of the individual worker’s own unique self, shaped out of her 
lived experience; second, we should acknowledge that we understand the other 
through our own fore-understandings, but these need to be continually replaced as 
we deepen our understanding of the person in their situation – and that to 
understand the other we also need to understand ourselves and be willing to change; 
third, the importance of dialogue as the process through which the understanding is 
sought (p130).  
3.2.11  Buber 
The quality of the relationship and interaction between the practitioner and the 
other is therefore significant. Martin Buber (1937/1970) describes two basic ways of 
encountering others: either as objects, things to be used, described and experienced, 
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(the ‘I-It’ encounter), or in a relationship, the ‘I-You’ (or ‘I-Thou’), which involves the 
whole human being relating to another human being as a whole, based on 
reciprocity, participation, and on being ‘all present’ to the other. It involves knowing 
someone ‘not as a mere sum of qualities, aspirations and inhibitions’ but to 
‘apprehend him, and affirm him, as a whole’ (p178). A dialogical encounter is also an 
embodied one, involving bodily senses and feelings, with the sensitively attuned 
worker sensing and responding to the feelings expressed in the bodily movements 
and facial expressions of the other person (Shotter 2015).  
However, the authentically dialogical ‘I-Thou’ way of relating is difficult and costly, 
and does not easily fit within a boundaried professional relationship, especially in 
statutory child protection situations. Social workers may only be able to experience 
fleeting moments of breaking from the ‘It’ world into the ‘Thou’ world. For Buber, 
‘the choice of dialogical relation is one that involves a powerful and continuous 
existential struggle between the ‘I-Thou’ and the ‘I-It’ modes of relation’ (Lederman 
Daniely 2015: 71). Indeed, the social work professional relationship and role will 
often require practitioners to manage or hide their feelings through deep or surface 
acting, which they may experience as existential conflict, as will be considered in a 
discussion of ‘emotional labour’ in the next chapter. 
This approach may be more relevant to counselling situations than care proceedings 
social work. However, I have included it for its relevance to a relational approach and 
communication skills with its emphasis on presence, openness to the other as a 
whole person, attunement and responsiveness, albeit within the constraints of 
statutory practice.  
In the perspectives considered so far there is perhaps a missing element in relation to 
the level and nature of care and commitment to the other and the range and depth 
of emotion involved in the helping relationship and realities of embodied practice 
with children and families. Finally it is important to consider the body of theory 
relating to the ethics of care. 
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3.2.12  Ethics of Care 
Early developments in the ethics of care can be traced back to Gilligan’s (1982) 
critique of Kohlberg’s positioning of the ability to identify complex moral issues and 
apply ethical principles as the highest stage of moral development. Gilligan’s own 
research with young women found that for them the values of relating and caring for 
others predominated, although these were only at the middle stages in Kohlberg’s 
hierarchy. Gilligan argued for a feminist view of ethics in which women’s perspectives 
are valued in their own right (Hugman 2005). Her view was that men operated within 
an ethic of justice, stressing rights and rules, while women’s emphasis was on 
relationships and responsibilities within an ethic of care (Featherstone 2010). 
However, Gilligan’s views have been criticised for being essentialist and anti-feminist, 
and also for setting up an unhelpful binary between justice and care (Featherstone 
2010). 
Noddings’ (2013) account of the ethics of care also rejects the primacy of reason and 
rules and focuses on the mutuality of natural caring relationships, caring and being 
cared for, as in the relationship between a mother and child. Natural caring is 
motivated by love or inclination. Where this fails, ethical caring will take its place, and 
this requires effort that is not needed in natural caring. But both are focused on 
preserving the caring relation to the other (so for example, when having to deny 
someone’s expressed need, this is done within a caring relationship, focused on 
keeping communications open).  Four elements of care are identified by Tronto 
(1993: 127): ‘caring about, noticing the need to care in the first place; taking care of, 
assuming responsibility for care; care giving, the actual work of care that needs to be 
done; and care-receiving, the response of that which is cared for to the care’. From 
these will arise four ‘ethical elements’ of care: ‘attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness’. Tronto emphasises that practising care is more 
than good intentions. Rather, it ‘requires a deep and thoughtful knowledge of the 
situation, and all of the actors’ situations, needs and competencies’. It also involves 
making judgements ‘about needs, strategies for achieving ends, the responsiveness 
of care-receivers, and so forth’ (p136-7). 
There is also a ‘dark side’ of care: critical social work literature points out oppressive, 
paternalist, patronising and marginalising aspects of care and its association with 
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welfare, dependency, and expectation that those on the receiving end should be 
grateful (Meagher and Parton 2004). Care may include ‘surveillance’ and control, 
involving moral judgements about need and competency, and decisions to reduce 
risk may lead to denying people agency and self-determination (Orme 2002).  
Tronto (1993: 117) also points out that care is ‘devalued conceptually through a 
connection with privacy, with emotion, and with the needy’ as society values 
‘accomplishment, rationality and autonomy’. Drawing from object relations 
psychology Tronto suggests that our desire not to be needy, dependent and 
powerless leads to the ‘othering’ of care givers and those who need care, all of whom 
might be treated with disdain and disgust, with dependency treated as weakness. 
This point may be relevant here, both to considering how parents and family 
members with needs may be judged, and also to how social workers, in terms of their 
caring role, may be perceived by society.  
Further potential negative consequences of a commitment to concrete and particular 
situations of care identified by Tronto (1993) are ‘parochialism’ and partiality, leading 
to a failure to address broader needs and concerns for care. However, Nordhaug and 
Nortvedt (2011) point out that some degree of partiality and relational proximity is 
important to giving attentive nursing care, rather than this being merely an 
instrumental interaction around performing necessary tasks. 
Both Tronto (1993) and Sevenhuijsen (1998) incorporate a political perspective on 
caring, highlighting inequality in care relationships in society in terms of the level of 
value accorded to those who are cared for and those who do caring work. Tronto 
(1993: 167) suggests that the ‘qualities of attentiveness, of responsibility, of 
competence, or responsiveness, need not be restricted to the immediate objects of 
our care, but can also inform our practices as citizens’. The absence of attentiveness 
to a particular group in society can then become an issue for public debate. A 
challenge then for practitioners is to move beyond private compassion and empathy 
to an understanding of the structural conditions of inequality and injustice that 
promote suffering (Singleton and Mee 2017). 
Meagher and Parton (2004) also point out that a politically oriented ethics of care 
approach is compatible with a psychodynamically influenced relationship-based 
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practice, but goes beyond this in its attention to broader social structures and 
relationships such as the dominance of managerial approaches in social work. Thus it 
can ‘provide a ‘values bridge’ between psychodynamic or relationship-based practice 
ideas and the more socially-oriented critical social work approach’ (p 20). In crossing 
the divide between rationality and emotion they see the ethics of care as offering a 
different kind of moral decision-making, in which experience, relationships and 
context are central. Held (2006) also points out that the ethics of care recognises the 
contribution of emotions in understanding what we ought to do, and that, for 
example, empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness may be better guides than highly 
abstract rules and universal principles. This point links to the role of emotion in 
ethical thinking and decision making, which will be explored in the next chapter.  
There is a potential tension between care and justice. Orme (2002) argues for a 
dialogical approach to justice which challenges the binary view of care and justice, 
hears multiple voices and resists categorising people. However, hearing all voices 
would include those who dominate, oppress and abuse, which may feel problematic. 
Orme mentions the example of those responsible for the death of Victoria Climbié, 
who were demonised, but who ‘could have been constructed not as demons but as 
needy people, displaying symptoms of mental ill health and experiencing social 
isolation, stereotyping and racism’. There could be an implication here that it is 
necessary to construct individuals sympathetically and with reference to mitigating 
circumstances in order to be able to care for them. However, Orme makes an 
important point that caring does not mean that people are not held responsible for 
their actions, and uses this example to illustrate the relationship between care and 
justice. 
Featherstone et al (2014: 48) also draw attention to the impact of suffering, and the 
embodied nature of suffering: ‘social suffering is inscribed on the body: the low self-
esteem, low status, lack of social capital and lack of power to direct one’s own life are 
written on the body and manifest in health inequalities and also self-destructive 
behaviours’.  It may be difficult to feel compassion for those who ‘do not present 
themselves as innocent victims, but as aggressive, resentful or suspicious people 
whose hurt and loss is directed at others rather than themselves’ (Frost and Hoggett 
2008: 454, cited in Featherstone et al 2014: 48). It may also be difficult to empathise 
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with victims of harm, who may elicit disgust or a need to turn away from seeing their 
suffering, as highlighted by Ferguson (2011). This area will be explored further in the 
next chapter in relation to the emotional dimensions of social work, but in terms of 
ethical approaches there remains a tension which I think could be explored further, in 
relation to committed, empathic and compassionate caring, including recognition, of 
individuals who may elicit disgust and rejection, or who may be perpetrators and 
unrepentant, without the need to construct them differently as a victim, vulnerable 
or needy and somehow more ‘acceptable’.  
Tensions cause discomfort, and it is possible that we explain, reduce, excuse or avoid 
because it is too uncomfortable to hold together care, suffering and justice in 
tension. We could draw from Levinas’ view that constructing and understanding the 
other is to cause violence to his or her irreducible singularity and alterity, and Buber’s 
I-Thou relation, in which there is no judgement or explanation involved. However, as 
part of their role social workers are required to understand, describe and make 
judgements to inform decisions. Narrative approaches could therefore contribute in 
their potential to allow for dissonance, and multiple identities rather than an 
essential self being discovered, thus enabling the potential holding together of two 
contradictory identities, for example one who is both a responsible perpetrator and 
also a human being in need of empathy, compassion and care. In addition, narrative 
approaches, and also hermeneutic and dialogical approaches, can incorporate the 
idea of change, and that stories can be constructed and reconstructed through 
dialogue. They can also consider the impact of broader social factors and inequalities. 
Also relevant, as discussed above, are the role of the worker’s own self and history 
and the nature and quality of the relationship between practitioner and service user. 
3.3  Social workers’ use of ethical perspectives in practice 
In comparison to the literature on normative and prescriptive social work ethics there 
is relatively little research on descriptive ethics, that is, how social workers actually 
think about and use ethical approaches in their everyday practice and decision 
making. 
In their study of 62 Israeli social workers and student social workers Osmo and 
Landau (2006) found the large majority based their arguments on either 
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deontological or utilitarian ethical concepts. Less frequent was their use of concepts 
from virtue theory, rights theory and ethics of care. Interestingly, there was a 
difference between their general ranking of ethical principles without referring to a 
practice situation, when deontological principles were most frequent, and their 
ranking when considering specific practice dilemmas, when utilitarian principles were 
most often used. Osmo and Landau note that this supports the view put forward by 
Loewenberg et al (2000) that social workers are deontological in principle but adopt a 
utilitarian approach in practice. The social workers also ranked virtue theory 
significantly higher in their general ranking of their ethical principles (21%) than in 
their ranking in relation to the specific practice situations (10 or 11%). Osmo and 
Landau suggest this may indicate social workers’ image of themselves (in terms of 
virtue theory) matters to them in general, but is less central in specific practice 
situations. The ethics of care was ranked lowest in the general list (7%) but was more 
frequently reflected in relation to two of the three scenarios, especially one involving 
a dilemma in their personal life, rather than professional life, about a pregnant 
adolescent (19%).  
This quantitative study involved the social workers ranking a given list of 12 ethical 
principles in general and then in relation to three scenarios. In contrast, the current 
study involves social workers speaking about their thinking and perceptions of ‘real 
life’ actual cases they have worked with, rather than paper-based vignettes, a 
difference which may also reflect the difference between perceptions arising from 
first hand involvement in embodied social work practice and the drawing of 
judgements from written evidence without relational proximity, as occurs in the 
court processes in care proceedings. 
The ranking of ethical principles is also the focus of a study by Harrington and Dolgoff 
(2008), who collected data on ethical decision making from 114 participants of 
continuing education workshops (it is implied these are social work professionals). 
They found a considerable variety between participants’ individual rankings of seven 
ethical principles3. While noting that ethical decisions will to some extent depend on 
circumstances – as seen in Osmo and Landau’s findings that different hierarchies may 
 
3 These principles were, in summary: (1) autonomy and freedom; (2) equality and inequality; (3) least 
harm; (4) privacy and confidentiality; (5) protection of life; (6) quality of life; (7) truthfulness and full 
disclosure (Harrington and Dolgoff 2008: 189). 
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apply in specific practice scenarios – they argue that the variation noted is significant 
because social workers’ decisions will be influenced by their own prioritisation of 
ethical principles and their individual frameworks and perspectives. As an example 
they cite the ‘four social work paradigms’ identified by Barnes and Hugman (2002: 
278) of how social workers may respond to allegations of child abuse: ‘raisers of 
consciousness’, ‘revolutionaries’, ‘seekers after meaning’ and ‘fixers’ (Harrington and 
Dolgoff 2008: 193). Also relevant to consider here may be Fox-Harding’s (1997) 
framework of the four influential value positions (‘laissez faire’, ‘state paternalism’, 
‘birth family defender’ and ‘children’s rights’), referred to in the previous chapter. 
Smith (2005: 6) makes the point that ‘we are all ‘predisposed’ in some way towards 
the work in front of us. That is, we bring to our specific area of practice, our own sets 
of principles, beliefs and attitudes’. However, personal values and principles have 
their roots in wider social relations. Social structures and power relations and 
associated belief systems may exert a hegemonic influence over individuals’ values 
(Smith 2005).  
Therefore there are limits to the usefulness of a ranking of abstract ethical principles, 
especially where it is separated from a consideration of social workers’ own broader 
value positions such as those identified in the frameworks mentioned above, and the 
influence of policy and other contextual factors such as culture, organisational 
factors, statutory role and legal implications which constrain the individual freedom 
of social workers, as discussed in the previous chapter. Social workers may hold or 
aim to follow particular ethical approaches, but may work within an organisation with 
different values and priorities which exert a powerful influence. Jadwiga Leigh (2016) 
presents an interesting autoethnographical account of a ‘spoiled’ moral identity in 
which, despite her conscious ideals, she becomes known as the ‘PPO queen’4. This 
brings a disconcerting realisation to her that she has become integrated into a risk 
averse culture of practice that she had initially rejected. A dominant organisational 
discourse based on avoiding risk and blame may be very powerful in comparison to 
other stated aims such as the promotion of children’s well-being, and Leigh’s aim is to 
demonstrate ‘just how difficult it can be for social workers to balance the two and 
despite the best of intentions practitioners, like me, can often succumb to the 
dominant organizational discourse without even realizing it’ (p418). Leigh points out 
 
4 A PPO is a Police Protection Order for a child. 
75 
 
that this tension is ever-present in statutory social work practice as social workers 
construct and negotiate their professional identities, and that child protection social 
workers need to be understood ‘as being entrenched within a powerful culture, one 
which is firmly embedded within a system that responds to the needs of the 
government, society and the media’ (p419).  
As indicated by Leigh’s account, there are potentially significant differences between 
practitioners’ explicit awareness and use of ethical approaches and those that are 
operating at a tacit or subconscious level in practice (whether as a result of 
organisational pressures or other influences such as the social or cultural location of 
the worker), akin to the distinction between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories in use’ 
discussed by Argyris and Schon (1974). It is therefore important to bear in mind in the 
current study the potential for differences between the practitioners’ explicitly 
identified ethical dimensions and others that may be playing a role at a tacit or 
unconscious level, and the tensions between conscious aims and ideals and the 
realities of practice. 
In a Netherlands study closer to the current research, Keinemans and Kanne (2013) 
conducted focus groups with social work professionals (frontline and managers) from 
organisations supporting teenage mothers, one area of study being how morality 
became visible and how the social workers dealt with the moral dimensions of their 
work. They found that many of the moral issues identified were extremely complex 
and nuanced, involving conflicting values and options, differences in workers’ 
subjective experiences and perceptions (for example, some might see choices as 
more serious or difficult than others), with added complexity from accumulation of 
issues, involvement of different systems and layers (relationship with client, family, 
community groups, organisations and society), and the impact of ongoing time 
pressures. However, although the social workers faced complex moral questions on a 
daily basis, they did not explicitly label the dilemmas as ‘moral’ or based on 
conflicting values, and there was hardly any explicit use of tools, working aids or the 
professional code in their consideration processes. Moreover a study of Israeli and 
Canadian social workers by Benbenishty et al (2003, cited in Harrington and Dolgoff 
2008) also found that these social workers rarely used values as a basis for arguments 
regarding child welfare decisions. 
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It need not be surprising, however, if practitioners’ accounts of ethically difficult 
situations in practice do not fall into neat textbook-style examples in which ethical 
principles are explicitly identified and applied. Banks and Williams’ (2005) analysis of 
accounts by social welfare practitioners found that when asked to talk about ethical 
dilemmas and problems in their work the practitioners varied in their ‘ethics talk’, 
some using conventionally recognisable ethical terms (such as fairness, rights, 
confidentiality, honesty) while others conveyed moral standards in their descriptions 
of situations without using specific moral terminology. Not all the situations 
described involved the participant making choices or decisions. Banks and Williams 
divided them into three groups: ‘ethical issues’ – situations with ethical dimensions 
but not involving a decision; ‘ethical problems’ – where a decision had to be made 
but did not involve a dilemma as it was clear which action needed to be taken; and 
‘ethical dilemmas’ – where there was a difficult choice between two unwelcome 
alternatives and it was not clear which was the right option.  
Also relevant to this study is an article by Banks (2016) on the ‘ethics work’ carried 
out by social workers in practice, based on her analysis of numerous verbal and 
written accounts from social workers of the ethical dimensions of their practice that 
she had collected for previous research studies. She identifies seven dimensions of 
practitioners’ sense-making and ethical activity:   
• framing work (identifying ethically salient features, locating within political 
and social contexts, constructing frames with others);  
• role work (in relation to roles played and negotiated with others);  
• emotion work (including expressing, managing and responding to emotion);  
• identity work (creating and negotiating one’s professional and ethical 
identity); 
• reason work (involved in making judgements and decisions);  
• relationship work (dialogue and relationships with others); and  
• performance work (including demonstrating accountability).  
These dimensions are also all interconnected. This account by Banks of ethics in 
practice demonstrates (as does the Keinemans and Kanne (2013) study above) not 
only the complexity of ethics in practice, but also the relevance of a situated 
77 
 
approach to ethics, embedded in actual practice situations which are also set within 
their political, social and organisational contexts. It points to the value of seeing 
decision making as part of the embodied everyday practice with individuals and 
families, rather than as a distinct and abstracted rational process.  
3.4  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to forge a path through literature discussing a 
range of ethical approaches, and to identify the relevance of these approaches to 
social work intervention and decision making with children and families. As discussed 
earlier, a consideration of social work decision making should not be confined to the 
specific decision making process itself. Such a narrow approach would assume the 
decision and alternatives being deliberated to be self-evident and given. However, 
decisions take place within multiple intersecting contexts, and are also integral to the 
ongoing intimate and embodied processes of work between practitioners and 
families. Both the contexts and these processes influence, and may even determine, 
the nature of the decisions and potential outcomes under debate in care 
proceedings.   
This discussion has travelled from the more abstract principle-based approaches to 
ethics, in which ethical principles are applied to guide decisions between given 
alternatives, to approaches that focus on the character of the practitioner, or ethical 
dimensions of the interactional processes and relationships between practitioners 
and service users which could lead to different outcomes through the way they 
construct situations or determine the alternatives to be considered and how these 
should be decided. The implications of the discussions above is that each approach in 
itself can only provide a partial answer, and is unable to address all the influences 
and considerations in the ecology of social work decisions. But it could also be argued 
that elements of alI of the above ethical approaches have something to contribute, 
and either are, or could, or should, be present in social work action and decision 
making.   
As indicated in chapter 1, my heart lies with relationship based practice together with 
social justice principles. Considering the ethical perspectives above in relation to their 
connection with these priorities, as well as their relevance to statutory child 
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protection social work and decision making, I suggest that recognition theory 
provides the most clearly useful framework for social work practice in this field, also 
incorporating as it does a clear role for emotions. Each of the three types of 
recognition encompasses relationships and social justice principles at both individual 
and societal levels. Together they form a clear structure which can guide 
understanding as well as a providing a framework for ethical intervention. Links can 
be made to a number of theories and approaches used in social work practice (such 
as attachment, psychodynamic, ecological, strengths-based, rights-based, community 
work and others). While the primary application of recognition theory would be in 
social workers’ work with families, it could also be extended to consider the needs of 
the social workers themselves for all three forms of recognition.  
The research studies considered above of social workers’ use of ethical perspectives 
in practice do not include recognition theory. However, growth in positive attention 
for it as an approach for social work practice has been relatively recent (for example 
Houston 2009; Turney 2012; Houston 2016; Gupta et al 2018).  
Recognition theory does not directly address the making of decisions. Here, 
consequentialist and deontological principles have relevance in the weighing up 
process though limited in themselves, as argued above. Other perspectives can be 
drawn from within a recognition framework to add useful detail to the processes 
involved in decision making. For example, virtue ethics foreground the importance of 
high individual standards of integrity, fairness, moral reasoning and other qualities. 
Radical approaches keep our attention on structural inequalities and Habermas’ rules 
of communication on ways to promote an equal voice for all parties. A narrative 
approach allows for disparate perspectives and contributes relevant detail in relation 
to gaining and presenting an individual’s story and perspective, helping to avoid 
‘misrecognition’. To this end, dialogical approaches focusing on the nature of 
communication and interaction between persons also provide important insights and 
guiding principles. Levinas focuses our attention on our responsibility to the other 
who is different and not to be viewed as an extension of ourselves and our own 
understanding. Buber emphasises presence, reciprocity and connection with the 
other, not distantly as an object, but as a person. In terms of working towards change 
I find helpful Gadamer’s idea of bringing together two horizons, involving dialogue as 
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well as self-understanding of what we bring to the encounter. Finally, the ethics of 
care places emphasis on commitment, compassion and the importance of the caring 
relationship, within the realities of embodied practice with human beings whose 
needs and suffering may lead them to negative or destructive behaviours. All the 
approaches I have included above are broader than their application in social work 
and I have only considered some aspects of each. I have suggested that there are 
elements of these approaches that can complement or usefully intersect with a 
recognition based approach. However, some of the approaches outlined, such as the 
views of Habermas, narrative theorists, Levinas, Gadamer, Buber and the ethics of 
care generally do not feature in social workers’ awareness and thus may appear less 
directly relevant to a study of social work decision making in care proceedings. Their 
relevance to this thesis is more implicit, in their connection with professional 
relationships and communication processes which may be associated with decision 
making.  
Ethical theories may not always easily translate from the ‘high hard ground’ of theory 
into the ‘swampy lowland’ of practice, where ‘situations are confusing “messes” 
incapable of technical solution’ (Schon 1983: 42). However, it is perhaps the fluid and 
indeterminate nature of embodied practice that may allow for disparate elements to 
be brought together. In practice there is a constant shifting, changing and unfolding 
of situations, pivotal moments and to-and-fro movement of views, where 
understandings may be ephemeral, created and realigned in the moment, and 
seemingly contrary positions may be held at the same time in ‘unsettled practice’. 
The existence of tension and dissonance is also significant. Ethical decisions and 
actions will often involve negotiating tensions between different values, options and 
priorities, or different individuals’ needs or rights, or apparently contradictory 
elements such as care and justice, or whether recognition violates a person’s 
singularity, or whether the focus should be on the psychological or the structural. In 
addition, the realities of statutory social work practice within the contemporary 
policy context will conflict with social work’s social justice ideals, potentially causing 
‘moral dissonance’ to practitioners, and possibly ‘moral distress’ (Lynch and Forde 
2016), ‘moral injury’ (Haight et al 2017), or ‘ethical stress’ from ‘disjuncture and 
ontological guilt’ (Fenton 2015). However, it is at such points of tension and 
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dissonance that ethical reasoning may take place. Carey and Green (2013) write of 
the need to find ‘ethical space’ for thinking, questioning, and creating positive 
outcomes for service users and carers. Elsewhere, a concept of ‘ethical space’ 
originating from Roger Poole (1972) has been developed by Ermine (2007) to refer 
specifically to the space between two opposing sets of values or world views when 
they confront and encounter each other. Dialogue and exploration are triggered 
when the contrasting perspectives engage. This is a useful idea, reflecting the 
potential for tension and dissonance to stimulate ethical thinking, and with it the 
potential to create more positive outcomes.  
Emotion has a role in some of the above ethical theories. Although viewed as 
irrelevant or distracting in rationalistic approaches, emotions come to the fore in 
virtue ethics, recognition theory and the ethics of care, and are integral to 
interactions and relationships between social workers and service users.  It is time for 
a more detailed consideration of the role of emotion in child and family social work 
practice and decision making, and this will be the subject of the next chapter.   
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4 Chapter 4: Literature Review (3): Emotional Dimensions 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined literature relevant to decision making, and highlighted that while 
decision making has traditionally been presented as a conscious, rational and 
deliberative process, literature over recent decades indicates it is necessarily subject 
to a number of limiting and influencing aspects, such as internal heuristic processes 
and the impact of a range of intersecting contexts. Chapter 3 then surveyed literature 
from social work and other fields in relation to ethical theories which may be relevant 
to social work decision making with children and families. These theories and 
perspectives ranged from the more rationalistic, principle-based approaches focusing 
specifically on judging and deciding between options, to approaches which 
encompass the process of interacting and working with people to determine 
decisions and actions. Rather than confining the focus to the actual making of the 
decision, the latter approaches consider the broader process of how the nature of 
the judgements and decisions themselves may be defined by the approach taken to 
interaction with the person at the centre. An implication of these perspectives is that 
ethical action and decision making in a field such as child and family social work are 
inseparable from embodied, relational and interactional aspects of the work of 
practitioners with individuals and families, including the emotions that infuse this 
work.  
This chapter considers the role of emotion in more detail. First, the emotional 
dimensions of child and family social work are outlined in light of relevant literature. 
These emotional dimensions have an impact on practitioners’ perceptions and 
experience of the process of coming to judgements and decisions with families, and 
the approaches they adopt. I then consider relevant research from fields such as 
neuroscience and psychology which provides experimental evidence of the role of 
emotion in decision making, and more specifically in ethical judgement as it relates to 
decision making. Some of these studies highlight the biasing role of emotion, but 
others demonstrate that emotion has not only a positive, but also an essential, role in 
ethical thinking and decision making. Models of case discussion that take emotions 
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into account are also discussed. Finally, the key themes will be drawn together in 
relation to the research questions.  
4.2  Emotional dimensions of social work with children and families  
In general, literature specifically focusing on emotions in social work is relatively 
sparse; for example there only appear to be two key textbooks on emotions in social 
work – Howe (2008) and Ingram (2015a) – although the role of emotions is strongly 
recognised in a range of literature on relationship based practice, communication and 
reflection. I have argued earlier that decision making cannot be seen separately from 
its context, and the embodied, relational and interactional aspects of social work with 
families. The care proceedings process will be intimately connected for practitioners 
with the realities and vicissitudes of their embodied relationships and experiences of 
working with children and their parents before and during the proceedings. A 
number of aspects of social work with children and families feature in the literature 
as likely to have a significant emotional impact on practitioners, and these are 
outlined below.  
4.2.1  Impacts of working with abuse and trauma 
Working with abused children is in itself likely to be painful. Social workers will come 
face to face with the trauma and suffering of abused children and their families, 
encountering ‘the full range of human pain and grief including shattering and 
sustained damage from abuse’ (Dwyer 2007: 50). A number of studies cited by 
McFadden et al (2014) focus on the impact on practitioners of day to day experience 
of the traumatic aspects of child protection work. Professionals in regular contact 
with abused and traumatised individuals may become vicariously affected by the 
trauma, experiencing ‘secondary traumatic stress’ (STS). Studies note that child 
protection workers, with their level of contact with abused children, are especially at 
risk for developing STS and associated symptoms of psychological distress (McFadden 
et al 2014).  
Many cases coming to court centre on children who have experienced significant 
emotional and physical neglect. Working with neglected children and their families 
can also have a powerful impact on a worker, evoking feelings such as hopelessness, 
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frustration and disgust (Turney and Tanner 2001). Negative feelings of service users 
may be projected onto social workers: 
‘For some of the people with whom social workers interact, however, no 
matter what is done to help it is never experienced as good enough or even 
perceived as any good at all; an overwhelming sense of anger, hatred or 
profound dissatisfaction is unremittingly conveyed to the worker’ (Dwyer 
2007: 54) 
A range of emotions and responses may be aroused in workers. Charles (2004: 193) 
points out that the ‘experiences endured by ‘looked after’ children engender 
powerful feelings in adults to rescue, protect or control them’. Children in care will 
experience separation and loss, and may have a range of therapeutic needs. Working 
with loss can also bring practitioners’ own past experiences and memories to the 
surface. Practitioners may avoid mentioning the child’s separations and losses, or 
may feel anxious and inadequate about communicating with children. Inability to 
tolerate children’s distress can lead to activities focused on information gathering, 
procedures and form-filling rather than addressing emotional issues, with workers 
‘devoting their energies to working around rather than with children’ (Charles 2004: 
194). In Ruch’s (2014) study there was recognition from child protection practitioners 
that bureaucratic demands were sometimes used to defend themselves against the 
emotional impact of painful communications with children.  Research by Marrable 
(2014) of emotion in responses to children with additional needs also illustrates how 
practitioners’ fears, anxieties and feelings of helplessness can affect the way children 
are diagnosed, treated and communicated with. Children were labelled and related 
to in ways that excluded, ‘othered’, or did not ‘hear’ them.  
These responses arising from difficulties in tolerating children’s distress and workers’ 
need for self-protection can thus contribute to children being related to as ‘objects of 
concern’ rather than as persons. Such factors compound points discussed in chapter 
2 regarding the way gaining evidence for long-term decisions about a child’s future 
may be prioritised at the expense of their needs in the here and now (Beckett and 
McKeigue 2010), and that a view of children as inherently needy, vulnerable and in 
need of protection is potentially de-humanising (Daniel 2010: 237). Horwath and Tarr 
(2015) note in their study of files of child protection cases that there was still 
superficial engagement with wishes and feelings of children, and what it is like for 
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them to live with, for example, a mother abusing alcohol. Children were still being 
constructed as objects of concern, as ‘the neglected child’ or ‘the chronic neglect 
case’, rather than ‘the child who is living with or experiencing neglect’ (p.1390). ‘A 
sense of disconnection’ from the children is also identified by Brandon et al (2012: 7) 
in their review of serious case reviews from 2009-2011: there was a lack of attention 
to children’s emotional development and ‘what it’s like to be a child living in that 
family’; practitioners were ‘seeing the disability not the child; and most powerfully 
holding back from knowing the child as a person’. As Ruch (2014) points out, 
increasingly prescriptive requirements have been brought in to address social 
workers’ shortcomings in communicating with children, but what is needed are 
initiatives to ‘develop practitioners’ reflective capabilities and help to improve their 
communication skills by equipping them to effectively respond in child-centred ways 
to the unpredictable and uncomfortable realities of practice’ (p2160).  
4.2.2  The child not ‘seen’ or held in mind 
Further to the discussion above, a number of writers highlight that the impact of 
emotions engendered at an unconscious level by contact with abuse may be so 
potentially powerful as to have a paralysing effect on practitioners’ ability to respond 
and intervene to protect children. This can lead to children becoming ‘invisible’, or 
not thought about and ‘held in mind’ by practitioners, even to the extent that their 
suffering and physical harm can be unseen despite them being in the same room 
(Ferguson 2017). Both Ingram (2013) and Ferguson (2005) consider the Victoria 
Climbié case, citing Stan Cohen (2001) who writes of the ‘complex obstacles between 
information and action’ and ‘the dynamics of knowing and not knowing’. The 
complexity and unbearableness of some situations can lead to ‘an active looking 
away, a sense of a situation so utterly hopeless and incomprehensible that we cannot 
bear to think about it’ (Cohen 2001, cited in Ferguson 2005: 785, and Ingram 2013: 
998). Cooper (2005) notes from the Climbié Inquiry evidence ‘that workers involved 
in Victoria’s case both saw and did not see what was in front of their own eyes’ (p8), 
and explains that: 
‘With one part of our mind we take in what is happening, but with another we 
repudiate what we have seen. This means we are unable to struggle 




Rustin (2005) observes that the Climbié report focuses on Victoria’s physical injuries, 
and there is little attention to the mental agony that she would have experienced, 
showing how  ‘mindlessness’ acts as a defence against the uncomfortable nature of 
emotions and gut feelings that are aroused in child protection work. 
4.2.3  Home visiting 
It is also important to consider the relationship between emotions and the physical 
and embodied aspects of this area of work. Much of social work with children and 
families takes place in home visits, involving interacting, engaging and building 
relationships with children and parents, and social workers’ actions and decision 
making in child protection and child care are inseparable from the embodied nature 
of the task. These aspects are explored by Ferguson (2005, 2009, 2011, 2017, 2018), 
who considers the nature of home visits, relationships, movement and touch in child 
protection, and the visceral nature of the work.  
When considering why practitioners did not recognise and respond to the suffering of 
Victoria Climbié and Baby Peter, one aspect Ferguson focuses on is workers’ fear of 
contamination. He explores the impact of smell, dirt, disorder and an ‘unwritten 
history of disgust and fear of contamination in child welfare work in terms of the 
dominance of ‘neglectful’, ‘dangerous’ families of which an obsession with smell is 
the key metaphor’ (Ferguson 2005: 790).  
Two prominent examples of this, where potential opportunities to prevent further 
significant harm, even death, were not pursued, occurred in the case narratives of 
both Victoria Climbié and Peter Connelly. When Victoria was thought to have scabies, 
Ferguson (2011) points out that two social workers and a police officer independently 
of each other refused to visit the home. Regarding Peter Connelly, Ferguson points 
out that Peter would have already had serious injuries at the time of the social 
worker’s visit three days before his death (when facial injuries were concealed by 
chocolate smeared on his face) and at the subsequent paediatrician’s appointment 
and a GP appointment, both within the last 2 days of his life. Neither the 
paediatrician nor the GP examined him, despite the GP describing him as in ‘a sorry 
state’ (Haringey 2009: 20, cited in Ferguson 2011: 99). At the time of his death he was 
found to have over 50 injuries on his body, including a broken back. In addition, by 
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that stage Peter’s childminder, whose involvement had been part of the child 
protection plan, had refused to look after him any longer because he had an infected 
scalp. Ferguson writes that ‘[t]he painful truth is that no one touched Peter. He was 
an object of disgust and professionals as well as childminders feared contamination 
by him’ (Ferguson 2011: 100). 
Ferguson also draws from psychoanalytic theory to suggest that unconscious 
projections from parents and the concept of ‘pathological communication’ may also 
have an impact in leading to and explaining professionals’ avoidance of physically 
approaching, touching and examining children: 
Parents project the hostile, rejecting part of themselves, which lies behind 
their neglectful and abusive behaviour, onto the worker. This results in the 
latter not merely losing focus on the child but embodying behaviours that are 
typical of the parents’ lack of care (Ferguson 2011: 169). 
Home visits involve stepping across a boundary into ‘the family’s space, system, 
energies, smells, sounds, movements’ (Ferguson 2009: 475). Physical aspects of the 
rooms and spaces where interactions take place can act as barriers which inhibit or 
undermine communication (Ruch 2014). The home is a space in which families can 
‘stage manage’ and manipulate what is seen and encountered by the social worker. 
Even where there is no overt hostility or refusal to allow the social worker to enter, 
Ferguson (2009: 475) writes that resistances may be in the air, conveying the 
message ‘don’t move’ and ‘don’t ask’, and that there is ‘something in the atmosphere 
of homes where child maltreatment goes on and the emotions and relationships they 
embody which often stops professionals from feeling able to move freely in them’.   
Families’ homes are also settings in which the social worker does not hold ultimate 
power. Practitioners can feel disempowered, vulnerable and exposed, especially 
where the work is emotionally charged or influenced by hostile or intimidating 
atmospheres (Ruch 2014). Practitioners in Ruch’s study at times became aware that 
they had been pressured or inhibited in their interaction with children and young 
people by unexpected physical circumstances or barriers but did not question how 
these had arisen until later when discussing them within the group. When observing 
social workers’ home visits Ferguson (2017) also found instances of practitioners not 
realising how they had omitted to engage with the child until their discussion with 
87 
 
him and subsequent reflection afterwards. Ferguson identifies that in all the visits in 
which the children were not adequately seen or held in mind by the practitioner 
there was ‘considerable anger, resistance and physical movement by parents and by 
family friends’ some of whom were strangers and experienced as distracting or 
intimidating (p1019). Practitioners were affected by anxiety and the complexity and 
emotional intensity of the work. An important point here is that in these examples in 
both Ruch’s and Ferguson’s studies the impact was to some extent unconscious at 
the time, affecting the social workers’ thinking and those small decisions in the 
moment that actively shape the course and outcome of a visit, and it was only 
afterwards on reflection with others that the workers became aware of how they had 
been affected.   
Organisational pressures also cause anxiety, as well as limiting the amount of time 
available to spend with families.  Ruch (2014: 2156) found that the demands of ‘rigid 
timescales, thresholds and evidence-gathering processes’ threatened practitioners’ 
ability to establish relationships and communicate empathically with children. 
Practitioners faced discomfort when having to leave situations unresolved because of 
bureaucratic requirements to end involvement. Ferguson (2017) argues that time 
pressure, bureaucratic demands and organisational culture may result in workers 
remaining in a detached, ‘bureaucratically preoccupied state of mind’ after leaving 
the office, and not using the car journey to prepare mentally and tune in before visits. 
Thus ‘’invisible’ children are those who are ‘unthought’ about and not ‘held in mind’ 
by workers and systems’ (p1010).   
4.2.4  Threats and aggression 
Practitioners may also experience more overt expressions of aggression and threats 
of violence than in the situations considered above. Littlechild’s (2005) study with 
child protection workers and managers found while physical violence affected a 
smaller proportion (n=6), examples of ‘indirect’ violence such as threats (including 
personal threats to workers and their families) were reported by all (n=21). Violence 
was most likely when decisions were being made about removal of children from 
parents. Fear, anxiety and stress were common effects for workers. A danger 
identified by managers was of some workers accommodating to the aggression of 
service users and being unable to challenge them, either through lack of experience 
88 
 
or confidence, and not recognising the risk or being too fearful to report it in 
supervision.  
Ferguson (2005: 786) also cites an earlier study of his own in which a significant 
theme was workers’ anxiety for their own safety and well-being as well as that of the 
children they were working with, to the point of often feeling ‘extremely unsafe’. 
Both Littlechild and Ferguson refer to a study by Stanley and Goddard (2002) of child 
protection workers’ exposure to violence and threat which identified the danger of 
‘Stockholm syndrome’ whereby people held hostage and in a helpless position 
attempt to please their captors and meet their needs in order to stay safe, leading to 
an unconscious avoidance of confronting abuse. While workers may not be physically 
captive they are not free to leave the relationship with the violent service user. 
However, in their review of literature on the impact of work-related violence towards 
child and family social workers, Robson et al (2014) suggest that verbal aggression is 
so common that social workers may accept it as part of the job and downplay its 
danger, leading to under-reporting. They found that while all violence impacted on 
social workers’ well-being, there were also instances of workers regarding incidents 
as learning experiences, feeding into training and policy development. 
Stress responses can affect decision making involving risk, as shown by LeBlanc et al 
(2012). This study involved 96 child protection social workers conducting simulated 
interviews with a parent played by an actor and then completing a risk assessment. 
Results showed that confrontational interviews elicited higher subjective and 
physiological stress responses than non-confrontational interviews, and were also 
associated with higher risk assessment scores by participants in one of the risk 
assessment tools used. 
Stanford’s (2010) study also highlights the prominence of feelings of fear in the 
experience of social workers encountering risk, when working either with people who 
were ‘at risk’ or were seen as ‘a risk’. The social workers were aware of their own 
sense of vulnerability and fear in relation to violent clients but also of fears that their 
own vulnerability might have a negative impact on clients through being too 
protective, controlling or punitive or through their inability to help.  
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Practitioners’ fears may include anxiety about negative reactions or blame from other 
professionals and colleagues (Stanford 2010; Dwyer 2007) These other professionals 
may themselves be struggling to manage their own anxieties about a child’s well-
being, resulting in the social worker bearing the brunt of their anxieties and 
projections of ‘fault’. 
All these elements discussed above will have an impact on the practitioner’s ability to 
relate to individuals and families. This may then have a significant impact on the 
course of the work and subsequent outcomes achieved. For example, Howe (2010) 
concludes that if resistance and hostility from parents leads workers to become 
‘more defensive, bureaucratic and impersonal’ in response, the levels of tension and 
anxiety will increase, with both sides less able to listen and empathise: 
Anxious people also feel less safe, less in control and more wary. In their 
efforts to gain control, increase predictability and reduce stress, workers are 
liable to resort to power and procedures, while parents retreat and disengage’ 
(p331). 
A number of other writers highlight ways in which the social worker’s approach can 
affect the level of parental resistance and the nature of the social worker-parent 
relationship (Ward et al 2014; Mason 2012). For example, Forrester et al (2008) 
found a tendency for social workers to use a confrontational approach with low levels 
of empathy in response to simulated child protection scenarios. However, where 
empathic responses were used, these created less resistance and increased the 
disclosure of information by the simulated clients. Howe (2010) also argues that 
enabling parents to feel understood will reduce their experience of stress resulting in 
them being less likely to cause harm to their children, and being ‘held in mind by the 
worker is a powerful way of containing the parent’s anxiety, fear, doubts, anger and 
sadness’ (p337). The parent then becomes more able to think about the child. 
However, increased bureaucratic demands of procedures, targets and checks, 
introduced to manage risk, serve to increase the psychological distance between 
social worker and parent and depersonalise the relationship, thus increasing, rather 
than reducing, the level of danger.  
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4.2.5  Emotional labour 
A relevant concept when considering the emotional dimensions of social work with 
children and families is emotional labour, developed by sociologist Arlie Hochschild 
(1979; 1983). This is the effort required by workers in contact with the public who are 
expected to demonstrate or suppress emotions publicly in order to produce or 
influence an emotional state in others. It can be contrasted to ‘emotion work’, which 
is the work engaged in privately managing the worker’s own emotions. Emotional 
labour involves suppressing ‘undesirable’ emotions or expressing certain expected 
emotions which conform to normative display rules. This is achieved through either 
‘surface acting’ – outwardly pretending to feel the desired feeling – or ‘deep acting’ 
when a person works to change their inner feelings in order to express the emotion 
(Hochschild 1979). Emotional dissonance occurs when an individual is required to 
express emotions which are not felt. At times occupational feeling rules may cover 
both external expression and inner feelings: for example, professionals may be 
expected to display sympathy and understanding to a client or patient while staying 
calm and detached inside, thus deliberately maintaining a dissonance between their 
inner feelings and expression of emotion, a ‘deliberative dissonance acting’ (Zapf 
2002:246). 
Emotional labour is integral to social workers’ work with service users. Winter et al 
(2018) observed 82 encounters between local authority social workers, children and 
their families, and found both deep and surface acting, depending on the situation 
and nature of work being carried out. They show the complex communicative nature 
of social work encounters, which are ‘fluid and dynamic’ and ‘change in form, nature, 
substance, experience and expression through the course of their duration’ (p.14). 
Ferguson’s ethnographic work also emphasises not only the embodied, sensory and 
visceral nature of home visiting, but also the creativity employed by social workers, 
dealing with the unexpected, improvising, managing powerful feelings, and using and 
moving within the physical spaces to ‘work the house’ (Ferguson 2018). 
An ethnographic study of emotional labour by Moesby-Jensen and Nielsen (2015) 
with Danish social workers identified three prominent aspects: ‘shutting off 
emotions’, ‘deferring emotions’ and ‘when a case gets under your skin’. ‘Shutting off 
emotions’ refers to suppressing or hiding emotions in a situation, a form of surface 
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acting. This may entail shutting off some emotions but not all, so the social worker 
may still be supportive and empathetic and recognise the service user’s emotions. 
This process also featured in Ruch’s (2014) findings in which practitioners talked of 
hiding their upset feelings when with children as they felt they needed to convey that 
they were strong and in control. ‘Deferring emotions’ in Moesby-Jensen and Nielson’s 
study meant managing them at the time, but postponing the expression and 
processing of them until later, for example in supervision, meetings with colleagues, 
or at home with a spouse. In relation to the third aspect, a case might ‘get under their 
skin’ so much that the social worker would keep thinking and talking about it, 
including in their leisure hours. There might be different personal reasons for this, 
such as the presence of parallels in the social worker’s own personal or family 
experience with their own child or parent, or personal experiences causing strong 
emotion or feeling of vulnerability at the time of the event.  
Emotional labour can be costly, especially where frequent emotional dissonance is 
involved. It may lead to emotional exhaustion, burnout and depersonalisation, with 
workers distancing themselves, becoming remote and disengaged, lacking a sense of 
accomplishment, and in some cases becoming detached and formulaic in relation to 
service users (Zapf 2002; Leeson 2010).  
The negative impact of emotional labour can be exacerbated by certain 
circumstances, for example ‘where there is a dissonance between the displayed 
emotion, the deeply felt emotion and the feeling rules of the organization’ (Leeson 
2010: 484). Research by Ashforth and Tomiuk (2000) suggests that the impact of 
emotional dissonance appears to be heightened when roles involve the expression of 
negative emotions, such as in work involving control or interrogation of others. Syed 
(2008) also points out that individuals feel greater dissonance when expected to 
behave in ways that counter their own values, beliefs and social norms. Pratt and 
Doucet’s (2000) study of doctors and call centre employees highlights the impact of 
emotional ambivalence caused by relationships within the organisation or with 
customers, or role conflicts for workers, and this ambivalence can cause splitting, 
emotional distress, burnout, indecision and paralysis and inability to act. Individuals 
may also experience conflict when they have multiple roles involving contrary 
expectations, where they are undergoing role transitions, where subcultures are 
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present which exert competing demands, or where there are rigid rules or rituals 
(Peterson 2006).  Moreover, Grootegoed and Smith (2018) discuss the impact of the 
‘emotional labour of austerity’ on practitioners where their caring values come into 
conflict with decreasing availability of resources and supportive services, which also 
links with points of Haight et al (2017) of practitioners’ distress from ‘moral injury’ 
when their work involves conflict with their moral beliefs, such as being part of an 
unsupportive or adversarial system that may harm service users.   
Gender expectations can make a difference. Syed (2008) reports on research 
suggesting the expectation on women to perform emotional labour is greater than 
that on men. Shields et al (2006) show that different emotions may be expected of 
women and men, for example stereotypes of women being expected to express more 
positive emotion such as happiness in other-oriented situations and men being 
expected to express more positive emotion in self-oriented situations such as when 
goals are achieved. Stereotypes are also linked to power dimensions. For example, 
sadness and fear (associated with vulnerability) may be expected from women, and 
anger and pride (associated with being powerful) from men. People may feel a 
compulsion to enact the stereotypical emotion. 
However, social workers’ emotional labour is important in leading to positive impacts 
for service users, such as building trust and enabling families to feel understood (Gray 
2002), and it may be rewarding for the worker to have creative emotional 
engagement with people (Leeson 2010); also see above the discussion of empathy in 
interactions with parents, potentially leading to better outcomes for them. The 
previous chapter has considered the role in social work of an ethics of care and 
relationships involving care, commitment and compassion, and there is also a place 
for love (Turney 2010). As Ingram (2015a) points out, it is important not to leave out 
the significant role of positive emotions when considering emotions in social work.  
The organisational context is important in relation to how far this supports social 
workers or compounds the pressures involved in their work. Negative impacts of 
emotional labour may be higher when there is limited recognition of the work and 
effort involved (Leeson 2010).  There is some evidence that suggests that the 
negative impact of emotional dissonance is reduced where individuals receive social 
support, such as support from colleagues and supervisors (Zapf 2002; Moesby-Jensen 
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and Nielsen 2015). In her study of the emotional labour of nursing, Smith (2012: 184) 
found ‘student nurses felt better able to care for patients when they felt cared for 
themselves by the trained ward staff and their teachers’.  
4.2.6  ‘Organisational containment’ 
Literature reviewed in this chapter so far has set out the complexities of the 
emotional dimensions of practice and their potentially powerful impacts on social 
workers. It is therefore important that workers are supported to practise reflectively. 
However, the growth of managerialism has resulted in the imposition of a regime of 
targets, regulations and performance monitoring and the marginalisation of 
emotions, relationships, knowledge and skills (Trevithick 2014), with a rise in 
bureaucratic, risk-averse, technical-rational approaches (Ruch 2007a). These 
conditions and associated time pressures inhibit reflection. Together with the 
powerful and often unconscious emotional impacts of practice they form a 
potentially dangerous combination: workers being ‘bureaucratically preoccupied’ can 
lead children to become invisible, not held in mind, as Ferguson (2017) demonstrates.  
Workers too need to be held in mind by the organisation. Horwath (2016) argues that 
practitioners must have their own needs met in order to be able to build effective 
working relationships with families, identifying as a ‘toxic duo’ a practitioner whose 
needs are not being met working with a parent who is not meeting the needs of their 
child.  Practitioners may then focus on parents’ perceived compliance with 
completing actions and tasks rather than finding ways of meaningfully engaging their 
involvement, or may limit their own engagement in terms of time and 
responsiveness. Burton and Revell (2017) argue that for ‘professional curiosity’ to 
take place, the experience of tension and discomfort is important; and workers need 
to be able to step outside their ‘comfort zone’, and also ‘need to have some 
confidence that whatever they unearth, including their own feelings of horror, fear 
and despair will be managed’ (p.6).  
Relevant to this is the concept of ‘containment,’ originally developed by Bion (1962) 
to refer to the process through which a sensitive caregiver absorbs and processes the 
infant’s unmanageable feelings and responds and reflects back these feelings in a 
way that is more manageable for the infant. This process ‘can restore the capacity to 
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think in the other person’ (Douglas 2007: 33). Ruch (2007a) argues the importance of 
containment within the organisation, and proposes a model of ‘holistic containment’ 
involving the interaction of emotional, organisational and epistemological elements, 
as key to providing a context for mindful, reflective practice in conditions of 
uncertainty and complexity. 
Sections above have examined the significant and wide-ranging emotional 
dimensions of social work with children and families. So far most of the literature 
considered has been specifically social work related, with some insights from 
sociology. There appears to be a gap in social work research focused on the role of 
emotion in decision making, and where this is considered it tends to be in relation to 
negative impacts of emotion. Ingram (2015a) cites a survey he carried out of social 
workers’ views of the role of emotions in their practice which found that most of the 
social workers felt emotions were a key part of social work, but felt they could 
remove emotions from their decision making. He suggests this relates to professional 
views of emotion as unhelpful to the making of clear and defensible decisions in 
social work. 
The following section casts the net more broadly, drawing from the fields of 
philosophy, neuroscience and psychology in relation to the roles of emotion in ethical 
thinking and decision making. As mentioned in section 1.4.2, definitions of emotions 
and feelings may vary. In this review of literature I generally keep to the terminology 
used by each author. 
4.3  The relationship between emotion and ethical thinking and decision 
making 
4.3.1  Insights from philosophy 
In philosophical ethics there is a long history of debates about the nature of emotions 
and their role, as well as the relationship between emotion and reason, and how far 
they should be seen as distinct entities. Emotions have been seen as having negative 
impacts on judgement. A master-slave metaphor has often been used, with emotion 
seen as inferior and needing to be controlled by reason (Solomon 2008).  For 
example, Plato likened the emotions to wild horses that have to be controlled by the 
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intellect acting as charioteer (Le Doux 1998). Kant viewed emotions as irrational, 
blind and overwhelming forces that hindered rational insight and wisdom, and 
needed to be controlled through the will (Molewijk et al 2011). On the other hand, 
Aristotle’s writings involve emotions as essential to the good life, as moving our 
thinking and action and enabling us to know what is important to us (Solomon 2008; 
Molewijk et al 2011).  
More recent decades have seen philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum and Patricia 
Greenspan giving attention to the relationship between reason and emotion. 
Nussbaum (2001) argues that emotions are cognitive appraisals, are intentional and 
always imply an object, involve particular beliefs about the object, and are concerned 
with values. She provides a detailed exploration of emotions as ‘intelligent responses 
to the perception of value’ and ‘part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning’ 
(p1). Greenspan (2000) also rejects the traditional dichotomy between reason and 
emotions and argues for the role of emotions in practical reasoning, and in forming 
the basis of commitment to an action. 
Views of emotion as part of the ethical thinking process, and also as involving 
judgements and cognitive aspects, are reflected in research in the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology. 
4.3.2  Neuroscience 
Over recent decades experimental neuroscientific research has drawn attention to 
the role of emotion in ethical decision making, and highlighted the significant role of 
unconscious emotional processes that both precede and strongly influence our 
rational decisions. Franks (2006) cites neuroscientists who estimate that more than 
95% of brain processes are below consciousness, and shape conscious thought. 
Damasio (1994) and Le Doux (1998) both make a distinction between ‘emotion’ as 
including unconscious processes and ‘feeling’ as conscious. 
Brain structures involved in emotion processing include the amygdala, which is 
involved in storing unconscious memories. On receiving sensory information it 
instantly appraises this and gives it a value, either positive (generating an approach 
response), or negative (leading to avoidance). It works closely with the hippocampus, 
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also important in learning and storing memories. As the amygdala can receive 
sensory information before the cortex, where information is processed much more 
slowly, an individual can experience a strong feeling such as fear before becoming 
aware of it and having time to think about it. Strong emotions can be triggered by a 
place or person, before the cortex has been able to evaluate and reflect on them 
consciously (Le Doux 1998; Franks 2006; Howe 2008). The amygdala’s evaluations of 
whether we like something or not occur within the first few milliseconds of 
perception, and this unconscious process therefore ‘presents our awareness with not 
just the identity of what we see, but an opinion about it’ (Goleman 1995: 21). 
Also significant is that ‘connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive 
systems are stronger than connections from cognitive systems to the emotional 
systems’, which means that emotions ‘happen to us’ and ‘flood consciousness’, 
whereas conscious control over them is weak (Le Doux 1998: 19). 
The somatic marker hypothesis is a concept developed by Damasio (2006), whereby 
emotions ‘mark’ aspects of a situation with a value – either overtly, such as through a 
‘gut feeling’, or unconsciously, for example through secretions of dopamine or 
oxytocin. These bodily feelings are then experienced again when similar situations 
occur. Thus when a decision is being made, prior emotional experiences produce 
‘biasing’ signals (Bechara 2011). Somatic markers, whether positive or negative, 
function to limit the alternatives we will choose between. Subsequent rational choice 
on the basis of analysis becomes significantly more manageable after the choices are 
limited.   
The somatic marker hypothesis arose from Damasio’s studies of patients whose 
ventral and medial (VM) region of the front of the cortex had been damaged (one of 
these was Phineas Gage, a nineteenth century railroad worker who accidentally had 
an iron bar thrust through his frontal lobes). While their intellect was unimpaired, 
there were abnormalities in emotion and feeling (both experiencing and expressing), 
and their personal and social decision making was impaired, such as planning their 
day and choosing friends or activities. They were slow or unable to make a decision 
or made disadvantageous choices against their best interests, differently from before 
the damage occurred. Experiments involving card games with people who had VM 
damage and those without found that those with no damage had increased activity in 
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their skin’s sweat glands prior to taking a risky card, whereas those with VM damage 
had no such reaction. It was concluded that these patients did not have the same 
activation of somatic markers or emotional signals that attach value to given 
scenarios and options, and therefore had to rely on a slow analysis of options, and 
also made choices that disregarded future consequences (Bechara 2011). Damasio 
(2006) concluded that the brain systems jointly involved in emotion and decision 
making are also generally engaged in the management of social cognition and 
behaviour.    
Further studies involving neuroimaging also show that in moral decision making tasks 
the same areas of the brain are activated as those involved in processing emotions 
(Greene et al 2001; Martins et al 2012). Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies of brain activity show that the pre-frontal cortex is active and 
dominant in both moral judgement tasks and regulation of emotional behaviour. 
Studies have shown that people with frontal damage often give abnormally utilitarian 
judgements on moral dilemmas which indicate their decisions are unaffected by 
emotion – for example, opting to suffocate their own child in order to save a group of 
people who otherwise would die (Martins et al 2012). 
The studies referred to above, together with other neuroscientific research, indicate 
that brain structures and systems involved in emotion and cognition are interacting 
and overlapping (Franks 2006) and that emotions are an essential part of the 
judgement and decision making process. 
4.3.3  Psychological research into the role of emotions in decision making 
Research in psychology over recent decades is increasingly recognising the role of 
emotions in decision making, to the point that Lerner et al (2015: 799) suggest there 
is a ‘potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories’, as the research ‘reveals 
that emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and 
sometimes beneficial drivers of decision making.’  
This section will consider some examples of relevant research within the field of 
psychology which provide further insights into the role of emotion in decision making 
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in general, followed by literature focusing more specifically on moral or ethical 
judgement and decision making.  
Studies indicate that decisions are influenced by integral emotions (these are 
emotions arising from the judgement or situation itself). Keltner et al (2006: 163) list 
a number of studies which provide evidence of the effects of affective states on many 
cognitive processes, including ‘selective attention, memory, causal attribution, life 
satisfaction judgements, use of heuristics, and risk perception’ Wilkins and Boahen 
(2013) cite studies by Roger Kneebone who found that some doctors and surgeons 
were making poor decisions without being aware of this, and that this was more 
likely to occur when they were in situations involving heightened emotion (Wilkins 
and Boahen 2013 p50).  
Reviewing research on emotion in decisions about risk, Loewenstein et al (2001) 
show that people cognitively evaluate risk on the lines of variables of probabilities 
and outcomes as identified by decision theory. However, although emotional 
reactions do respond to cognitive evaluations, they can also arise with very limited 
cognitive processing, and are sensitive to different variables, such as vividness of 
imagery linked with the situation and closeness in time, and there may be a 
difference between people’s emotional reactions and fears and their cognitive 
assessments of the risk. They suggest that the research indicates that ‘gut feelings 
experienced at the moment of making a decision, which are often quite independent 
of the consequences of the decision, can play a critical role in the choice one 
eventually makes’ (p281). 
Research also highlights the impact of incidental emotions on decision making (these 
are emotions that are unrelated to the decision situation and may also be less in 
conscious awareness). For example, Keltner et al (2006) cite studies showing that 
emotions that arise for one reason (such as a sunny day or a disturbing film) can 
shape judgements that appear to be unrelated, for example a person’s level of 
satisfaction with a political leader’s policy, or other matters (p167). Incidental 
emotions have been found to carry over from one situation to the next. For example, 
anger triggered in one situation may lead to blame of (different) individuals in 
subsequent situations, generally without conscious awareness, and affect is most 
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likely to influence judgement in situations that are complex and unanticipated (Lerner 
et al 2015).   
Some research has compared the impact of positive and negative emotions. Isen 
(2008) cites research which indicates that negative affect and arousal can narrow the 
focus of attention, impair individuals’ ability to use cues and their resulting 
performance. Positive affect on the other hand results in a broader focus of 
attention, more accurate and detailed recall, increased flexibility, greater access to 
positive material in memory, increased integration of concepts and ability to see 
connections among ideas. 
However, Pfister and Bohm (2008) argue that emotions are too complex to be 
classified unambiguously as positive or negative. Emotions commonly seen as 
negative may differ in their impact.  Lerner and Keltner (2000) found in relation to 
risk perception that fearful people tend to see greater risk, while angry people tend 
to see less risk. This links with dimensions of certainty, control and responsibility, in 
that angry people view negative events as predictably caused by and under the 
control of individuals, whereas fear is associated with a perception of uncertainty and 
low level of control, so fearful people are more likely to perceive negative events as 
unpredictable and situationally determined. Other high-certainty emotions include 
happiness and disgust, while sadness is associated with low certainty (Lerner et al 
2015).   
Lerner et al (2015) also cite studies indicating that high-certainty emotions are 
associated with greater heuristic processing through increased reliance on 
stereotypes, or the source of a message rather than its content, and less attention to 
argument quality. Low certainty emotions can increase depth of thought; for example 
Small and Lerner (2008) found that compared to those in a neutral category, angry 
participants allocated less to welfare recipients while sad participants allocated more. 
However, this effect was reduced when cognitive load was increased to prevent 
effortful thinking, implying it was the depth of processing associated with each 
emotion that made the difference. These findings indicate that emotions are not 
necessarily in themselves a form of heuristic thought. Although emotions arise 
quickly initially and can rapidly trigger actions, as mentioned above some emotions 
such as sadness can lead to more systematic thought (Lerner et al 2015). 
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A range of studies reviewed by Lerner et al (2015) also provide insights into ways of 
moderating the impact of emotions on judgement and decisions. The presence of 
emotional intelligence has been found to moderate the impact of incidental emotion. 
Time delay before making a decision is also important as the impact of many 
emotions and physiological responses is short-lived. Studies show attempts to 
suppress emotion can be ineffective, and may even intensify the emotion being 
suppressed. However, reappraisal – thinking differently about the situation – has 
been shown to be a more effective strategy. Research by Kligyte et al (2013) into the 
impact of incidentally induced emotions of fear and anger found that both cognitive 
reappraisal and physiological relaxation techniques significantly decreased the 
negative effects of anger on sense-making and ethical decisions. In contrast, they 
found the presence of fear to facilitate ethical decision making. Also, where people 
were experiencing fear, fear emotion regulation did not affect sense-making and 
ethical decision making. As mentioned earlier, fear is associated with low-certainty 
and a greater sense of uncertainty and situational rather than individual control, so 
individuals were already searching for information more broadly and seeking to 
reduce threat and risk.  
While much of the above psychological research presents emotion as impacting 
(either negatively or positively) on the rationality of decision making, Pfister and 
Bohm (2008) argue that emotion does not just impact on decision making, but is 
functional to it. They see emotion as providing four functions: to provide information, 
which helps in evaluating and constructing preferences; speed, enabling rapid 
decisions under time constraints; relevance, directing attention to aspects of the 
situation that are relevant to the decision-maker; and commitment – this is important 
in moral decision making as emotions such as guilt, shame, love, hate or sympathy 
support people to stick to long-term commitments (even if these are not in their 
interests in other ways). 
4.3.4  Studies of emotion in moral judgement and ethical decision making 
With regard to the process of ethical decision making, especially when a dilemma is 
involved, a number of writers cite Rest’s (1994) Model of Moral Action, a cognitive-
developmental model which involves four major components: (1) ethical sensitivity 
to the existence of an ethical dilemma; (2) prescriptive reasoning, leading to a 
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prescriptive judgement of the ideal solution to the dilemma; (3) ethical motivation 
leading to an ethical intention to comply or not with the judgement; and (4) the way 
an individual’s ethical character results in ethical behaviour to resolve the dilemma. 
Gaudine and Thorne (2001) augment this model to show the important and beneficial 
role of emotion at each stage, in alerting an individual to a dilemma, and in each of 
the judgement and motivation processes.  
Pizarro (2000) identifies empathy in particular as an informative moral marker, in that 
when empathy is aroused, for example in the presence of someone who is distressed, 
it signals that a potentially moral event is taking place. This signalling, Pizarro points 
out, is significant because without it the moral reasoning process may not be 
initiated. Empathy also reduces the likelihood of attributions of blame and may alter 
previously held opinions and judgements. Research by Mencl and May (2009) found 
physical proximity to be a significant factor in the human resource management 
professionals’ evaluation of the consequences on an individual in a scenario involving 
ethical decision making. Cognitive empathy, and to a lesser extent, affective 
empathy, were also found to have a significant effect on the degree to which the 
managers considered their responsibilities towards individuals and formed moral 
intentions towards them, rather than prioritising a utilitarian focus on costs and 
benefits. However, Pizarro (2000) draws attention to the potential negative impact of 
losing a utilitarian focus on justice, citing studies that show that induced empathy for 
an individual may lead to decisions that prioritise that individual over others in the 
distribution of resources, neglecting others in the group. Thus he suggests the 
existence of empathy may lead to moral judgement but can also work against it and 
may need to be suppressed. On the other hand, suppression of empathy can also be 
dangerous, such as has been documented in the cases of Nazi leaders suppressing 
empathy in order to carry out atrocities in concentration camps (Pizarro 2000). 
Keltner and Lerner and others (eg Lerner and Keltner 2000; Keltner et al 2006) have 
developed ‘an appraisal tendency framework’. This identifies that each emotion has 
its own core appraisal theme – for example, anger is associated with appraisals of 
how responsible or unjust others are, fear with events that are uncertain or 
ambiguous, disgust with appraisals of purity, and compassion with ideas of need and 
harm – and that each of these emotions only influences that related area of 
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judgement. As an illustration Keltner et al (2006) cite a previous research study of 
their own which involved causing participants to move four facial muscles to 
configure an angry expression. This led these participants to report actually feeling 
anger, and then to judge policy related events as less fair than these were judged by 
participants feeling sadness. The authors concluded that the induced emotion of 
anger affected moral judgement by altering perceptions of fairness. In addition, 
according to the appraisal-tendency framework, once emotions are activated they 
can trigger a cognitive predisposition to assess future events on the same lines. 
The role of embodied disgust in moral judgements is examined by Schnall et al (2008) 
in a series of experiments. These included groups of participants being exposed to 
different levels of an unpleasant smell and then given scenarios involving moral 
judgements. Results indicated that moral judgements were more severe for the 
‘mild-stink’ and ‘strong-stink’ groups than the control group. Further experiments 
showed that individuals with a higher level of ‘private body consciousness’ were 
more affected by disgust, and the presence of sadness tended to reduce the severity 
of people’s judgements. However, Johnson et al (2016) replicated the studies of 
Schnall et al with a larger sample size and did not find evidence to support these 
findings; they also present other studies showing an inconsistent picture in this area. 
Some of the research examples above – for example on the impact of facial 
expressions, a sunny day, relaxation techniques, and (though disputed) suggestions of 
the impact of physically induced disgust – indicate that physical, embodied states 
have a role in moral judgement. Further research shows that people can associate 
morality with physical cleanliness, and unethical behaviours as feeling dirty and a 
need for physical cleansing (Zhong 2011). Together with Damasio’s somatic marker 
hypothesis discussed above, these indicate that ‘moral reasoning is not abstract but is 
metaphorical and is embodied in concrete somatic experiences’ (Zhong 2011: 5). 
The social intuitionist model developed by Jonathan Haidt (2001) – see 2.4.3 above – 
is a clear alternative to rationalist models which view moral judgements as being 
reached through reasoning, weighing up and reflection, and emotions as possibly 
having an input into the reasoning process but not as the direct causes of moral 
judgements. Instead, the social intuitionist model sees moral intuitions (including 
moral emotions) as occurring first, leading to moral judgements, which are then 
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followed by conscious moral reasoning. This model is consistent with neuroscientific 
findings discussed earlier in which the amygdala attaches unconscious evaluations to 
experiences prior to conscious thought processes.  
Key considerations, according to Haidt, are that research indicates that people form 
very quick impressions of others, which may involve associations and stereotypes, 
leading to instant (unconscious) moral judgements, and also that people may readily 
agree with individuals they like. Also, an important element of the model is that 
moral reasoning is usually carried out interpersonally (links 3 and 4) rather than in 
private. Although it is possible for reasoning to occur privately, Haidt writes that it is 
‘primarily when intuitions conflict, or when the social situation demands thorough 
examination of all facets of a scenario, that the reasoning process is called upon’ 
(p350). In addition, triggering new intuitions can be more influential than logical 
argument in enabling other people to see a situation differently, an example being 
the impact Martin Luther King’s speech had through using metaphors and visual 
imagery. To improve moral judgement Haidt suggests that people could use the social 
persuasion link (link 4) and seek out others to talk through the issues with, leading to 
the triggering of a variety of conflicting intuitions in each other and resulting in more 
nuanced judgements.  
Further to Haidt’s identification of the essential role of intuitions and associated 
emotions in the formation of moral judgements, studies by Zhong (2011) suggest that 
judgement arising from intuitive feeling is more ethical than deliberative decision 
making based on rationalistic moral reasoning. This is in tension with Kohlberg’s 
positioning of rational abstract principle-based reasoning as the highest level of 
maturity in judgement, as also questioned by Ethics of Care theorists discussed in the 
previous chapter. Zhong’s experiments involved using different ways to engender a 
deliberative mindset in one group of participants and awareness of feelings in the 
other, prior to ethical decision making tasks. The results indicated that in situations 
where individuals need to choose whether further their own benefit or not, intuition 
seemed to produce better moral outcomes than deliberation (for example, in one 
task, participants  in the deliberative condition were found to be almost twice as 
likely to lie than those in the intuitive condition). 
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The wide-ranging research outlined above from neuroscience and psychology 
indicates that emotion, ethical thinking and judgement are inseparably intertwined, 
and that it is not possible or even desirable to try and remove or bracket out emotion 
in judgement. If we relate these insights to the complex and powerful emotional 
dimensions of social work practice with children and families, it becomes even more 
salient to increase our understanding of the interaction of emotion, ethical thinking 
and judgement in this area of social work, and in particular during the high-stakes 
decision making of care proceedings. Some important considerations raised above 
include the unconscious elements of emotion which occur prior to conscious thought, 
the many and varied impacts of different emotions, the role of low certainty 
emotions such as sadness in increasing thought and reduced likelihood of attributing 
blame, the role of emotion in moral commitment, and the impacts of vividness of 
imagery and discussion with others, as well as the role of emotional intelligence and 
reappraisal in moderating the impact of emotion. These are powerful arguments for 
the importance of reflective case discussion that includes consideration of emotion.  
Many of the studies cited above used experiments and the provision of written 
scenarios and choices, rather than participants reflecting on their involvement in 
actual situations. Below are some examples of literature considering the use of 
reflection processes by practitioners after events involving ethical decision making or 
during the process of assessing and working with a situation in practice. 
4.4  Case discussion models that include emotion 
Le Coz and Tassy (2007) suggest that doctors should reflect on medical decisions to 
review the emotions that have been involved in their judgements, suggesting that 
this reflection needs to take place after the decision has been made and is 
irreversible, and the practitioners are no longer experiencing the actual emotions.  In 
the process doctors can use their imaginations, memory or reasoning to create new 
emotions, for example identifying what other emotions would have enabled them to 
be receptive to other ethical viewpoints. This focus on using intuitions and creative 
thinking to identify new emotions echoes Haidt’s point above about the effectiveness 
of intuitive thinking of this kind. Le Coz and Tassy express the view that fantasies and 
memories can make us responsive to other values that may have been obscured by 
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the emotions dominant during the decision, and exchange of ideas in discussion with 
others is important in this, the ‘philosophical moment of the medical decision’. 
Molewijk et al’s (2011) model of moral case deliberation focuses on considering 
emotions that have been experienced in a situation and the thoughts that accompany 
the emotions. Following Aristotle’s views on emotions as embodying moral 
knowledge, they argue that emotions can inform us as to why a moral issue has 
emerged, how the facts of a case have been interpreted and evaluated, and prompt 
us to reflect on whether the expression of the emotion was morally right and 
balanced. Explicitly identifying the emotions involved can help clarify implicit moral 
assumptions that were at work. From their use of the model they suggest that 
focusing on emotion during moral case deliberation can also stimulate the 
participants’ engagement with the case and energise the group process. It also brings 
about deeper conceptual insights and personal learning, contributing to the process 
of developing practical rationality.  
That the reflection process is incomplete without the experience of emotion in the 
deliberative process itself is argued by Lacewing (2005): reflection, exploration and 
increasing self-awareness may enable the detection of underlying emotions, anxieties 
and defence mechanisms such as projection, and awareness of discomfort can lead to 
this kind of reflection – but only if the individual involves awareness of affect in the 
thinking process; this would not be possible to achieve through purely intellectual 
deliberation. 
In the social work field, Ruch (2007b) has developed a case discussion model in which 
a practitioner presents a case to a group who listen without asking questions, then 
the group engages in a discussion with the presenter listening but not participating, 
and finally the group and presenter join in a reflective discussion on aspects that have 
struck them. The discussion is not about finding solutions but is an emotionally 
informed ‘in depth’ thinking space, listening to and facing emotions experienced, 
involving curiosity, openness and ‘not knowing’. This enables greater depth of 
understanding of the case, the practitioner’s emotional responses and any patterns 
present: the practitioner’s emotions then become a resource rather than reason for 
disengagement. O’Sullivan (2018) also describes a monthly facilitated ‘Work 
Discussion Group’ that took place over a year, run with a similar structure to Ruch’s 
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groups but involving practitioners presenting a written account including thoughts 
and feelings, followed by psychoanalytically informed discussion. O’Sullivan 
concludes that the containment provided by this group enhanced a practitioner’s 
capacity to make sense of her anxiety and work with a family; however, 
organisational support for this level of thinking and feeling is important. 
Turney and Ruch (2016; 2018) have developed a ‘Cognitive and Affective Supervisory 
Approach’ (CASA) as a model for clinical supervision in social work. This is based on 
Cognitive Interviewing which incorporates detailed recall of the visual and other 
physical details of a situation together with the individual’s feelings and reactions to 
aid recollection and analysis of a critical incident. Their findings suggest that ‘the 
capacity of the model to disrupt conventional linear patterns of thinking allows for 
emotional dimensions of practice to be more readily accessed and drawn on to 
accommodate more expansive and in-depth understanding’ (p134).  
Shifts in organisational culture may be needed, however, to implement and reap the 
benefits of models such as these above. For example, Turney and Ruch (2018) found 
it was difficult for supervisors to maintain this level of detailed ‘active listening’ in the 
face of impulses to problem-solve.  
4.5  Conclusion 
Literature reviewed in this chapter has indicated the range and powerful impacts of 
emotions that child and family social workers may experience in their work. More 
detailed insights were then gained from the growing body of neuroscientific and 
psychological research of the processes through which emotions interact with 
judgement and decision making, including the formation of ethical judgements, and 
the specific impacts of different emotions.  
The literature has drawn attention to the impossibility of separating thinking from 
emotion, and ways in which understanding is embodied and relational. The 
emotional impacts explored above may have profound influences on the nature of a 
practitioner’s approach, the relationships that are formed and the judgements that 
are made. These aspects are also inherently ethical: for example, how far 
practitioners are able to ‘see’ and hold in mind a child may significantly influence 
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subsequent planning and decisions (even with life or death implications); and the 
nature of the working relationship and perceptions of the parent’s level of resistance 
or engagement will have an impact on the direction and outcome of the work and 
decisions that are made.  Links may thus be drawn between the processes discussed 
above and ethical approaches considered in the previous chapter, such as recognition 
theory, dialogue, narrative and the ethics of care.  
The range of emotional impacts identified, the insights from research into the role of 
emotions in decision making, and the unconscious elements involved, all point to the 
importance of organisational containment and reflective spaces to support social 
workers to acknowledge, process and work with these emotions.  
This study has set out to examine how social workers perceive and experience the 
ethical and emotional dimensions of decision making in care proceedings, and to 
understand more about the interplay of emotions and ethical thinking, and how 
social workers are best supported in these processes. The three literature review 
chapters have demonstrated that existing literature provides many relevant insights, 
and signals the importance of gaining further understanding of these processes, and 
practitioners’ awareness of them, for the best interests of children, their families and 
practitioners working with them.  
This literature review also brings to light areas that would benefit from further 
exploration. Chapter 2 identified studies of decision making processes in child 
protection and care proceedings, but none of these are specifically focused on 
understanding the role of emotion or the interaction of emotions and ethics in 
decision making in this field. Chapter 3 outlined a range of ethical theories and their 
relevance to social work practice and decision making. While these are addressed in 
social work literature, there are not many studies which examine in depth the role or 
application of these ethical theories in child and family social work, or which bring 
together or compare different ethical perspectives. Literature reviewed in the current 
chapter also shows that research on the role of emotion in ethical decision making, or 
on the interaction of emotions with thinking and judgement, is more prevalent in 
other fields than social work – where the impact of emotion in decision making tends 
to be viewed negatively. Research from neuroscience and psychology indicates not 
only the importance of emotions in judgement and decision making, but also their 
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potential positive role. No studies so far have brought together social workers’ 
perceptions and experiences of emotions and ethics in the way undertaken in the 
current study, or considered this in relation to care proceedings decision making. The 





5 Chapter 5: Methods 
5.1  Introduction 
As indicated in chapter 1, this research study aims to answer the following questions: 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the ethical dimensions of decision 
making in care proceedings? 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the emotional dimensions of this? 
• How do they experience the interplay between emotions and ethical thinking in 
the process of coming to judgements and decisions in care proceedings? 
• How can social workers be best supported in these processes? 
In this chapter I set out the research methodology for the study and discuss its 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions and theoretical influences. 
This research is qualitative and is informed by constructivist grounded theory. I 
recognise that the research interview and the whole research process are to an 
extent constructions, and that the role and reflexivity of the researcher during the 
research are important features. I discuss the study design and methods of data 
collection and analysis, and consider relevant ethical issues. 
5.2  Qualitative research, epistemology and interpretation 
Qualitative methods are appropriate for a study such as this which seeks to 
understand how the participants perceive and make meaning of their experiences 
and interactions, and how these meanings inform their decisions and actions. It also 
involves the study of social processes. This research is aimed at exploring and building 
understanding, rather than testing pre-existing hypotheses or measuring factors, 
which would indicate a quantitative design. Qualitative research is appropriate for 
gaining a complex and detailed understanding of an issue and the contexts or settings 
in which the participants address the issue. It can also empower individuals, or 
‘silenced voices’ to tell their story, and minimise the power relationship between 
researcher and participant (Creswell 2007). 
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Bryman (2012) identifies three broad distinguishing features of qualitative research: 
the relationship between theory and research being such that theory is generated 
inductively from research; an interpretivist epistemological position; and a 
constructionist ontological position (Bryman 2012: 380).   It is important to identify 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions influencing this research. These are 
closely related, and lead into the theoretical and philosophical assumptions 
underlying the research methodology. This in turn will relate to the research 
methods, the specific techniques and procedures followed to gather and analyse the 
data (Carey 2009).  
Ormston et al (2014) identify two broad overarching ontological positions which each 
encompass a range of perspectives: the realist position which asserts there is an 
external reality existing independently of peoples’ beliefs, understandings or 
interpretations about it; and the idealist view, broadly that there is no reality 
independent of the human mind, and that reality can only be known through the 
mind and through socially constructed meanings in particular contexts. This research 
assumes that there is some social reality and social patterning beyond the 
interpretations and constructions of individuals within a situation, but that this is 
known through the human mind and individual and social constructions.   
This research is influenced by interpretivist and constructionist epistemological 
positions. Interpretivism recognises that people actively interpret and make sense of 
their environment and of themselves, and are influenced by their own culture and 
historical context (Hammersley 2013). Meaning does not exist independently of this 
interpretive process (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2011). Symbolic interactionism is also 
relevant, considering the interaction between individuals and small groups, and 
between individuals/groups and objects, and how meanings are made in the 
interaction process and communicated via shared symbols such as language and 
gestures. People act differently towards different people or objects in different 
situations, according to the meanings they attach to these people and objects (Hesse-
Biber and Leavy 2011).  
Constructionism is related to interpretivism, and emphasises that knowledge is not 
just passively received or experienced by people, but is actively constructed by them 
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through active processes of perception, cognition, selection and construction. These 
processes are affected by individual and cultural differences; thus multiple 
interpretations are often generated within the same contexts. The process by which 
understandings are generated is relevant. Social constructionists consider the shared 
processes of communication and social interaction, and some emphasise the impact 
of particular patterns of social interaction and broader socio-historical factors and 
their role in producing different discourses (Hammersley 2013). 
Both interpretivism and constructionism focus on understanding peoples’ lived 
experience from their own perspectives. They recognise that research cannot be 
‘value-neutral’, and individuals’ understanding and experience will be affected by the 
interaction of psychological, social, historical and cultural factors (Ormston et al 
2014). Therefore qualitative research is situated, located within the specific political, 
social and cultural context of the participants, researcher and readers of the study. 
The reflexivity of the researcher is an important feature, recognising that the 
researcher’s own background will shape their interpretations (Creswell 2007).  
Ezzy (2002) suggests that understanding participants’ perspectives and their own 
subjective meanings is best achievable through ‘entering into their world, so that 
their world becomes our world’, and we can make sense of their practices from their 
own perspective. Thus qualitative research ‘is about participating in other people’s 
lives and writing about that participation’ (p.xii). However, it is not possible to 
produce an objective and uncontestable account of another person’s experiences. 
The researcher will also have an influence on the interpretation and construction of 
events, and may even have dual identities to manage. Ezzy provides an illustration of 
a researcher researching dancers, who was herself a dancer, playing the two 
identities of researcher and dancer against one another in explicitly examining the 
influence of the researcher on the research. This is a relevant aspect for me, having 
previously shared the identity of social worker in care proceedings with the 
participants of the study.  
The focus on meaning in qualitative research in itself creates a set of challenges. As 
an activity rather than a substance, meaning is hard to grasp. Meanings are also 
subject to constant change ‘and are produced and reproduced in each social situation 
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with slightly different nuances and significances depending on the nature of the 
context as a whole’ (Ezzy 2002:3). Hermeneutics, described by Ezzy (2002: 24) as the 
‘art and science of interpretation’, recognises that our interpretations will be 
incomplete and uncertain and that we can never know all the facts. We need to be 
continually open to accept that earlier interpretations may be inadequate, and as 
Merleau-Ponty (1962, cited in Ezzy 2002) indicates, to some extent all interpretations 
of qualitative data will be uncertain, open-ended and incomplete.  
Hermeneutic analysis involves a constant seeking of a more sophisticated 
understanding, emphasising the tension between the perspective of the individual 
seeking to understand and the perspective of the other, and involving an ongoing 
iterative and circular process of moving between these two perspectives. There also 
needs to be a back and forth movement between the whole and the part – the 
development of theory ‘through a continuous movement between pre-existing and 
interpretive frameworks, both theoretical and popular, and the data of observation, 
collected both through intentional observation and everyday life’. This is the 
hermeneutic circle, within which ‘interpretations, and theories, are developed, and 
continuously redeveloped’ (Ezzy 2002: 25).   
In Heidegger’s view, some prior understanding of a phenomenon is needed before it 
can be understood, so that we need to be ‘in’ the world along with what we are 
trying to understand. We need to make this situatedness explicit – but as this 
situatedness exists prior to any understanding, it must be pre-supposed even when 
trying to explicate it, so its explication is ‘essentially a matter of exhibiting or ‘laying 
bare’ a structure with which we are already familiar’ (Malpas 2015). Heidegger refers 
to ‘fore-structures’ of understanding, which enable us to anticipate and grasp in a 
preliminary way what we are trying to interpret or understand (Malpas 2015).  This 
contrasts with Husserl’s concept of epoché, or ‘bracketing’ in which the researcher 
sets aside his/her experiences to avoid them influencing the examination of the 
phenomenon being studied (Cresswell 2007). 
This prior hermeneutic involvement in our understanding of any phenomenon is seen 
by Gadamer not to act as a barrier but as an enabler to our understanding. As 
discussed in 3.2.10, the situatedness and embeddedness of the interpreter are 
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fundamental to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and he sets out the importance of the 
interpreter constantly becoming aware of any presuppositions through encounter 
and dialogue with others (Gill 2015; Malpas 2015). Thus, understanding is gained 
through a dialogical process between the familiar and unfamiliar or alien, in which 
both are affected by the other – and a complete understanding is never reached as it 
is not possible for our historical and hermeneutic situation ever to become 
completely transparent (Malpas 2015). It is also constantly changing and being 
recreated, and thus ‘the hermeneutic circle is an ongoing cycle of interchange 
between a living, constantly recreated tradition and its interpretation’ (Ezzy 2002: 
28). 
5.2.1  Reflexivity 
In relation to the arguments above I recognise that my previous experiences as a 
social worker undertaking care proceedings and current role as a university educator 
of social work students as well as researcher and interviewer, together with my 
personal and professional values and identity, have all played a significant part in my 
understanding, approach and sense-making throughout this research. In particular as 
this research is about thinking, feeling and judgement I believe it has been both 
ethical and essential for me to be reflexive in questioning my own involvement and 
interpretations, and to seek to recognise the role within it of my own thinking, 
emotions, judgement, and who I am (Etherington 2004).  I include more detail of my 
reflections in later sections of this chapter. 
Qualitative studies often give attention to the importance of reflexivity, although as 
Finlay (2002) shows, this can be defined and used in different ways according to 
different methodological or theoretical traditions, ranging from phenomenological 
and psychodynamic approaches to the more social-critique orientation of social 
constructionists, sociologists and some postmodernists. Reflexivity has the potential 
to be used to explore the impact of the researcher’s position, perspective and 
presence, and any unconscious motivation or bias. It can also be used to focus on the 
intersubjective dynamics and relationship between researcher and participant, and to 
enable the research to be more collaborative, empowering or radical (Finlay 2002). 
The researcher’s self can also become a resource (Holloway and Biley 2011). Holtan 
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et al (2014) also show how deeper understanding can be gained through focusing on 
the impact of the emotions of the researcher and the role of these in the analysis and 
construction of data. 
However, it is important not to claim more for reflexivity than can be achieved. 
Aiming to be reflexive will not prevent our non-evidenced assumptions from 
influencing the research (Holloway and Biley 2011). Fully accurate self-knowledge is 
not achievable, and an aim to recognise the other could lead to misrepresenting the 
other or not really addressing power relations, and reflexivity can be presented as a 
way of making our research seem more valid, truthful and authoritative (Pillow 2003). 
Bishop and Shepherd (2011) write that we cannot know exactly what effect we have 
on others, or how they perceive us; also our recollections may be altered through 
time and new experiences, and we need to acknowledge that our reflexive accounts 
are themselves a reconstruction.  
This has a parallel with reflective and relationship based practice in social work. There 
is a danger that seeing reflexivity as a tool or process could veer into a technical-
rational view where the trust is placed in the procedure rather than the skill of the 
person using it. Doyle (2012) argues that reflexivity in research requires a capacity to 
think and to be in a thinking state of mind, able to tolerate uncertainty and open to 
the unexpected. This was my aim during the research and I found forms of writing 
(notes, memos and drafts) particularly helpful as reflective spaces. These points 
chime with the focus of this research which highlights that the relationship between 
thinking, emotions and judgement is complex, powerfully affected by unconscious 
and embodied processes, and that having spaces for reflecting, feeling and ‘not 
knowing’ is important. 
5.2.2   Critical and feminist approaches 
Critical theories are also influential in this research, both those deriving from 
postmodern and post-structural theories, and approaches arising out of social justice 
movements and feminist perspectives. Critical approaches are concerned with 
power, and the recognition that power relationships affect the way social 
phenomena have been constructed and reconstructed. They also challenge binary 
categories and the polarisation and essentialising of difference (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 
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2011). Critical postmodern perspectives draw attention to ways in which we may 
participate in constructing power and maintaining power relations through language 
and categorising (including participating in our own domination and self-defeating 
beliefs), and that becoming aware of assumptions is important in leading to 
transformative action (Fook 2015; Fook 2012). Critical approaches also seek to access 
the ‘subjugated knowledges’ and perspectives of oppressed groups (Hesse-Biber & 
Leavy 2011: 21). This could involve ‘constructing professional narratives which help to 
represent the service user perspective, rather than simply fitting service user 
experience into predetermined bureaucratic categories’ (Fook 2012: 168). 
Feminist standpoint epistemologies emphasise that knowledge is always situated, 
and this knowledge is influenced by the shared experiences, political orientations and 
implicit assumptions that make up the standpoint of the knower. These perspectives 
challenge the dominance of an implicit white male standpoint in mainstream science 
and which silences and marginalises women’s experience and ways of knowing, 
arguing that analysing ‘women’s experience from the standpoint of women both 
provides ‘less false’ theories and contributes to the emancipatory task of social 
justice and equality of the genders’ (Ezzy 2002: 23). The focus of the current study is 
not intentionally on women’s experience per se, but as the majority of social workers 
are women and much of their work takes place with women and children within a 
variety of significant intersecting and complex power dimensions, these 
considerations are relevant. This research also involves a questioning of traditional 
and hierarchical ways of knowing and deciding, seeks to give voice to participants, 
and is open to the unearthing of other less articulated perspectives. I also reflect on 
power dimensions in the nature of the relationship and interaction between 
researcher and participant. 
In any research situation there will be multiple perspectives and constructions, and 
Cresswell (2007) points out that qualitative researchers embrace the idea of multiple 
realities – those of the individuals who are being studied as well as the researcher 
and those who will read the study. 
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5.2.3  Approaches to theory 
Closely related to ontological and epistemological considerations is the approach to 
theory taken within research. Deductive logic involves starting with a pre-existing 
theory or hypothesis and developing methods to prove or test it, and is associated 
with a positivist position and most commonly quantitative methods. It can be seen as 
a top-down approach to knowledge acquisition. In contrast, inductive logic involves 
building knowledge through evidence obtained from observations of the world 
(Ormston et al 2014). Abduction involves the introduction of new ideas through 
generating new hypotheses, through imaginative leaps, without necessarily having 
completely demonstrated all empirical steps. These new hypotheses may then be 
tested deductively or through using inductive empirical comparisons. The abductive 
reasoning process is an important feature of grounded theory, as part of the cycle of 
theory building and data collection. Ezzy writes that theories are not developed solely 
from deduction or induction, but rather ‘through an ongoing dialogue between 
preexisitng understandings and the data, derived from participation in the world’. 
Existing theory can be drawn on to develop a ‘sensitising theoretical orientation’ 
which then shapes the questions asked, without restricting the analysis, and allows 
the theoretical orientation to be developed, tested, corrected and elaborated (Ezzy 
2002: 28-9).  
5.3   Grounded theory 
This research was guided by constructivist grounded theory as set out by Charmaz 
(2014), though did not follow the full grounded theory method. Initially I considered 
using a predominantly phenomenological approach to enable a deep understanding 
to be gained of how individuals experience the ethical and emotional aspects of 
decision making. However, I was also seeking to go further than this in trying to 
understand the intersecting processes and factors involved, and to develop ideas on 
how these could be conceptualised. A constructivist grounded theory approach 
appeared to enable the generation of theory as well as incorporation of broader 
considerations of the social, organisational and political context and critical 
perspectives. Charmaz (2011) argues that constructivist grounded theory 
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acknowledges multiple perspectives and forms of knowledge and can also be used 
within a focus on social justice. 
Grounded theory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s, 
countering the dominance of quantitative methodological assumptions at the time in 
the USA through demonstrating that qualitative research could follow a systematic 
method. Charmaz (2014) points out that over time Glaser and Strauss diverged from 
each other but by the 1990s both seemed to retain some positivistic assumptions. At 
this time a constructivist turn developed, moving grounded theory away from the 
positivism in both Glaser’s and Strauss’s versions. A constructivist approach in 
grounded theory emphasises flexibility rather than mechanical application of the 
method, and also incorporates an assumption that ‘social reality is multiple, 
processual, and constructed’, recognising that the research itself is a construction. 
The ‘research reality’ arises within the situation and from what is brought to the 
situation by the researcher and participants. Thus the researcher’s ‘position, 
privileges, perspective and interactions’ must be taken into account as part of the 
research reality, and a view of ‘the research as constructed rather than discovered 
fosters researchers’ reflexivity about their actions and decisions’. This approach 
recognises that research cannot be value-free (Charmaz 2014: 13). 
A number of strategies are listed by Charmaz as features of grounded theory: 
1. Conduct data collection and analysis simultaneously in an iterative process 
2. Analyze actions and processes rather than themes and structure 
3. Use comparative methods 
4. Draw on data (e.g. narratives and descriptions) in service of developing new 
conceptual categories 
5. Develop inductive abstract analytic categories through systematic data 
analysis 
6. Emphasize theory construction rather than description or application of 
current theories 
7. Engage in theoretical sampling 
8. Search for variation in the studied categories or process 
9. Pursue developing a category rather than covering a specific empirical topic  
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(Charmaz 2014: 15). 
Charmaz goes on to explain that many researchers who claim to follow a grounded 
theory approach will demonstrate actions 1-5 but do not necessarily engage in 
theoretical sampling and theory construction, although they may believe they have 
done both. She notes that although some grounded theorists believe theoretical 
sampling and theory construction are necessary features of grounded theory, in her 
view actions 1-5 are sufficient to evidence that a grounded theory approach has been 
followed. She also has the view that researchers can draw on grounded theory 
methods as part of another approach, and emphasises that in her methods she 
provides ‘flexible guidelines, not methodological rules, recipes, and requirements’ 
(p16). 
In the event it was the guidance on coding and early stages of analysis in grounded 
theory, as described by Charmaz, that I drew on most fully, as I explain later in this 
chapter. In completing three interviews a year before the rest I was able to carry out 
some analysis of these prior to undertaking the other interviews; however, this was 
not at the level of conducting ‘data collection and analysis simultaneously in an 
iterative process’ in the project as a whole. When planning the research I also 
considered some elements of theoretical sampling, but was not able to pursue this, 
as will be explained below. While my aim was to work towards theory construction, 
rather than description or the application of current theories, I am not claiming that 
the outcome of this research is a theory, though I have developed a set of theoretical 
understandings and ideas and a conceptual framework. 
5.4   Recruiting the research sample  
The sample for the study consisted of thirty one participants, all of whom were 
qualified social workers currently registered with the Health and Care Professions 
Council. Nineteen participants were interviewed individually, and the other twelve 
took part in either of the two focus group interviews.  
Of the thirty one, eleven were social workers, fourteen senior practitioners, and six 
team managers or other senior staff. Three were male and the rest female. Eight had 
less than three years’ experience of qualified social work and the rest had three or 
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more years of experience. Basic information was also recorded about participants’ 
age group, gender, ethnicity and number of care proceedings undertaken. All were 
drawn from the same local authority and currently employed there except for three 
who were no longer local authority employees. A table of the participants can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
To recruit the participants I initially approached three English local authorities and 
Cafcass. I thought it would be useful to compare the experiences and views of 
practitioners in different organisations and areas. One local authority declined on the 
basis of existing pressures of work faced by their staff.  The proposal and associated 
documents were scrutinised by the research governance processes of the other two 
local authorities and Cafcass. The study did not meet Cafcass’ criteria for involvement 
in external research. In the two local authorities the project met the ethical 
requirements but encountered further delays in gaining approval to access the 
participants. I made repeated contacts to both to speed up the process but at the 
time both local authorities were affected by staff changes or reorganisation and 
other priorities.  
While waiting to gain access to the local authorities, as a pilot study I interviewed the 
three practitioners who were no longer local authority employees.  
In one local authority the relevant director finally gave approval for staff to be 
involved in the research, and appointed a principal social worker to ‘take the lead’ on 
it within the organisation. I had a discussion with the principal social worker and we 
agreed that an email from me, with information about the study and participant 
information sheet attached, would be circulated to all the service managers in the 
directorate to disseminate to their teams. The service managers and team leaders 
took a variety of approaches to recruiting participants. In one district three 
participants were nominated by their team managers, while in other districts it was 
discussed in team meetings, or my email was forwarded to everyone with an 
encouragement to those interested to volunteer. While the active endorsement of 
the senior management has enabled me to gain access to participants, in working 
with this organisation I had a sense of losing some control over the recruitment of 
participants, although the large majority were self-selecting. I could see that this 
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large statutory organisation might wish to monitor access to participants to minimise 
any risk to itself or the core work of its staff. On the other hand it also reflected 
interest in the research at all levels of the organisation, which I thought was positive. 
I believe the endorsement of managers probably generated more take up and a 
greater number of participants than might otherwise have come forward. In the 
interviews no one gave a sense of being influenced, or of being concerned about 
what they should or should not say to me, with the possible exception of focus group 
2, as will be discussed further in sections 8.3 and 9.2.4. There were also no discernibly 
different patterns in individual interviews between the views of the small number of 
practitioners who had been approached by their managers and those who had put 
themselves forward. However, I reflected that if I were to undertake the process 
again I would specify a consistent process for recruitment of participants. I recognise 
that interview data will be subjective and the selection and composition of the 
sample may play a part in views expressed. In sections 5.5 and 5.5.1 I discuss a range 
of considerations and limitations of interviews, including their subjective and 
constructed nature.  
In the second local authority staff changes and other delays meant that I was not 
provided access to the staff within the timescale of the project.  
I had initially hoped to undertake a second round of interviews with some 
participants to follow up any particular themes emerging. However, this became 
inappropriate within the project’s timescale, partly because of the initial delays in 
gaining access to participants but also partly because I was undertaking the PhD part-
time alongside full-time employment, which meant that transcribing and analysing 
the interviews was a protracted process. It also seemed to me that the interviews had 
already generated some rich data and a large number of themes. I wondered how far 
a few follow-up interviews would generate a significantly deeper understanding or 
whether this would be better achieved within a further research project, perhaps 
with a more participative design such as action research, involving working with 
particular groups or teams.  
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5.5   Data generation methods 
I decided to use semi-structured individual interviews and focus group interviews as I 
was particularly interested in gaining understanding of participants’ subjective 
perceptions and experiences of the relevant situations and decision making 
processes. 
There are some possible limitations to interviews as a method for studying decision 
making: participants’ memories or accounts may not be accurate (Yates 2018); there 
may be shifts in participants’ attitudes or identities since the event (Bishop and 
Shepherd 2011); and people can rationalise their decisions after the event and try to 
present their decision making in a positive light (Hackett and Taylor 2014). These and 
other issues are discussed further below.  
However, this research does not specifically aim to describe the reality of care 
proceedings decision making – although it does provide insights into this. While 
observing what people do and say during sense-making and decision making may 
provide some insights into these processes that may not be accessible through 
retrospective interview accounts (Helm 2016), such observations will still only give a 
partial picture and are open to the observer’s interpretations. Also the processes 
used in coming to judgements in care proceedings are likely to be more complex and 
drawn out than initial child protection decisions where it may be possible to observe 
in one session the whole process from receipt of referral to decision.  
I particularly wanted to gather data of practitioners’ own awareness, perceptions and 
understandings of their thoughts, emotions and experiences and how they made 
sense of these and reflected on them, including their constructions after the event 
and how they might incorporate these into their understandings of themselves as 
practitioners. This could therefore include their further reflection and sense-making 
between the events and the interview. It was also important to me that participants 
could have some control over the data they gave me, which would be more possible 
through interviews than observations. Banks and Williams (2005:1007) argue the 
value of insights gained from retrospective interviews, with the understanding that 
the findings are not presented as ‘unproblematic reflections of ‘what really 
happened’’. I would argue that practitioners’ retrospective and reconstructed 
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understandings are in themselves a valid subject of inquiry as these are what they will 
draw on to inform their subsequent practice and professional identities.  
5.5.1  Individual interviews 
At the start of each interview I invited participants to talk freely for a few minutes 
about a care proceedings case where coming to a judgement or decision was difficult 
or worrying in some way (either during the process or because of the result), and 
what made it difficult. I wanted to see what emerged from the free narrative as to 
how participants viewed the situation and key factors before I asked any specific 
questions. For most of the interview the focus was on this single case to encourage 
in-depth consideration of the processes involved and how these were perceived and 
experienced by the participant. However, the interviews also included some more 
general and comparative questions where other examples could be incorporated. I 
decided against providing a vignette for participants to discuss as I wanted to focus 
on their experience of actual cases in the real-life context of practice (with the 
provisos above and below about retrospective interviews). 
I had prepared a set of basic questions for the interviews, though did not necessarily 
ask them in the same order, depending on the direction of the interview. These 
questions focused on participants’ views about the processes of coming to decisions, 
the ethical and emotional dimensions involved, the nature of their interactions with 
the families and any relevant factors, and the availability of support and 
opportunities for reflection.  The basic interview schedule is in Appendix 2. At each 
stage I also used unscripted follow up questions for elaboration, probing, clarification 
and checking out, in addition to reflecting back wording, minimal encouragers and 
brief silences to encourage participants to elaborate further. The interviews were all 
audio recorded and lasted between forty-one minutes and one hour twenty minutes.  
Semi-structured interviews are time-consuming but have the potential to generate 
rich and illuminating data. Face to face interviews also offer a certain amount of 
flexibility: interesting responses can be followed up and lines of enquiry modified 
(Robson 1993: 229).  
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However, interviews have a number of limitations and, as indicated earlier, should 
not be viewed as ‘a simple window on experiences’ with the participant’s views 
reproduced in the research with limited analysis, almost as they might be reported in 
a journalistic interview (Silverman 2013a: 50). To a level that may be unknown to 
both researchers and participants, participants’ accounts may be inaccurate, 
incomplete, potentially influenced by a desire to make a particular impression or a 
fear of how their views may be used or interpreted. Meanings heard by the 
researcher may not be the same as intended by the speaker, and multiple meanings 
may be present with the possibility of multiple interpretations and no apparent guide 
as to which is ‘correct’ or ‘significant’ (Barbour & Schostak 2005: 42). The interview 
also takes place within a particular social, cultural and historical context which will 
influence the interview talk and understanding of the topic (Bishop & Shepherd 
2011). 
Narrative theorists would view the accounts of research participants as narrative 
constructions, with individuals constructing their identity through experiencing life 
events and ‘composing and telling a narrative of these’ (Bishop & Shepherd 2011: 
1284). As participants in this research were aware that I was looking at ethical 
thinking (apparent in the questions themselves irrespective of how much I explained 
the purpose of the research), one potential consideration for me was how far this 
awareness may then have shaped the answers of the participants who may have 
(consciously or unconsciously) sought to present themselves as ethical and moral, 
and may have imposed an ethical framework to some extent on the way they 
conceptualised and described the case. As the researcher I also played an active part 
in this construction: Charmaz (2014:79) writes that both participants and 
interviewers will construct their own ‘performances’ and present themselves to each 
other in the interview, and the performances of both interviewer and participant 
‘make and negotiate identity claims’.  
However, data analysis can include attention to sequences of talk, and how a 
participant’s answers may be affected by the way the interviewer asks questions and 
responds to the answers, as in conversational analysis (Silverman 2013a). Also, these 
constructions in the interviews can be analysed to lead to greater understanding: 
Miller and Glassner (2016) argue that in-depth interviews enable us to learn more 
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both about the social world and cultural norms of individuals’ contexts, and also how 
individuals view themselves and their world, providing ‘insights into the cultural 
frames people use to make sense of these experiences and their social worlds’ (p51). 
I believe that the nature of the interaction between interviewer and participant is 
also significant in influencing what will be said, and I applied my knowledge of social 
work communication skills during the interviews, to convey attentive, empathetic 
listening. Charmaz (2014) considers in detail the impact of the interviewer’s skills, 
ability to create a rapport and environment in which the participant feels free or 
inhibited to talk, the interviewer’s sensitivity to cues and ability to vary pace, use a 
softer voice, soften the language of questions, and explore rather than interrogate. 
She writes that the interview is negotiated, reflecting ‘what interviewers and 
participants bring to the interview, impressions during it, and the relationship 
constructed through it’ (p71).She also points out that the social locations of both 
researcher and participant in terms of race, class, gender, age, embodiment and 
relative differences in power and status will have an impact in this process.  
Ezzy (2010) explores the emotional dimension of interviewing in more depth, arguing 
that ‘all interviews are emotional and embodied performances and that good 
interviewing is facilitated by a reflexive awareness of, and engagement with, the 
emotional, embodied, and performed dimensions of the interview’ (Ezzy 2010: 163). 
He suggests that in preparing for interviews researchers should reflect on their 
emotional approach to the interview, and argues that interviews may be emotionally 
framed as either ‘conquest’ or ‘communion’.  Techniques such as probing, directing, 
questioning and active listening, reflect the interviewer’s control and direction of the 
interview process, and can be associated with ‘conquest’. ‘Communion’ involves an 
attentive openness to the interviewee, a search for mutual understanding, and is 
based on the researcher’s own sense of self as well as awareness of and openness to 
the other. Ezzy remarks that the ‘more an interview is performed emotionally as 
communion rather than conquest, the more likely it is that the interview will result in 
the voice of the Other….being heard’ (p168). This involves similar skills to social work 
interviews, where the use of self, emotional attunement and empathic responses are 
significant in building rapport and trust (Koprowska 2012), and a worker’s 
communication of empathy makes a difference to how far a service user may be 
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willing to share information (Forrester 2008). I implemented these principles in the 
interviews where possible. However, during my reflections I noted there might be a 
possibility that creating the emotional climate of ‘communion’, while reducing the 
power imbalance in one way, could also potentially involve a kind of control on the 
part of the interviewer in drawing the participant to share more than might have 
been their intention, and in that sense giving more power to the interviewer, who 
then holds the information shared. For example, Margolin (1997) shows how warmth 
and empathy can be used in social work for investigatory and coercive purposes. My 
post-interview reflections fed into my self-monitoring during subsequent interviews, 
so that while using communication skills to facilitate rapport and interaction I also 
consciously kept in check any particular wording or processes that I felt might unduly 
influence the participant. 
During an interview the interaction and conversation may also enable participants’ 
views to arise during the discussion, rather than the interview merely extracting the 
thoughts that the participant already held. Charmaz, drawing from Hiller and DiLuzio 
(2004), identifies this as ‘reflexive progression’. I was aware of this happening during 
interviews. My questions, and sometimes my responses or probing or supporting 
clarifying questions, at times seemed to facilitate the participants to think more 
deeply about or become aware of their views about certain aspects. A number of 
comments were made to me by participants indicating that there were points or 
emotions they had not been explicitly aware of before, or the interview had helped 
them reflect on the subject. In this sense some aspects of knowledge, or at least new 
understandings, are created during interviews, rather than the interviews merely 
capturing existing understanding.  
5.5.2  Focus groups  
I also chose to conduct some recorded group discussions with local authority social 
workers. In my email copied to all teams I asked for individual interviews but also 
suggested meeting teams as a group if they preferred, and two opportunities arose. 
The first focus group interview was with a ‘Children in Care’ team with three social 
workers and their team manager present.  The second was with a group of 
experienced practitioners who met regularly as an expert practitioner reference 
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group, and in the findings chapters I refer to this as the ‘experienced focus group’. On 
that occasion there were four senior practitioners, two team managers and two 
principal social workers present. Interviewing existing groupings fitted with the 
suggestion of Barbour and Schostak (2005: 43) that when conducting focus groups it 
is generally better ‘to get as close as possible to the real-life situations where people 
discuss, formulate and modify their views and make sense of their experiences as in 
peer groups and professional teams’ rather than bringing together groups of 
strangers. 
According to Barbour (2007), focus groups may involve in depth discussions which 
can generate rich and interesting data, and may be effective in accessing perspectives 
on topics which participants may not yet have considered in depth. It needs to be 
recognised that views expressed by participants may be specific to the situation and 
course the discussion takes, but focus groups have the capacity to reflect the issues 
and concerns of the participants rather than following the researcher’s agenda 
(Barbour 2007; Bryman 2012). Members of the group can challenge each other’s 
views and probe each other’s reasons for holding certain views, and this process of 
argument may enable a more realistic account of people’s thoughts. As participants 
are able to have some control over the direction of the session this can reduce the 
power difference between researcher and participants and potentially allow the 
voices of marginalised groups to be heard (Bryman 2012). The discussion can also be 
subjected to conversational analysis to provide insights into the way meanings are 
created and views developed during the interaction (Barbour 2007; Bryman 2012).  
However, as well as being subject to features discussed above in relation to individual 
interviews, focus groups have their own limitations, as discussed by Bryman (2012). 
There may need to be a careful balance between the level of control surrendered to 
participants and the input of the interviewer in order to keep a focus on the research 
questions. Focus groups may be more difficult to transcribe, especially where 
participants speak at the same time. There is also the potential for some voices to 
dominate and some views to be suppressed. Bryman cites the work of Janis (1982) on 
groupthink (see 2.4.4), and raises the issue that in groups, participants may tend to 
express culturally expected views to a greater degree than in individual interviews. 
They may also seek to impress others and be influenced by the norms of the group. 
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This may be relevant when considering the discussions in both focus groups in this 
study, which were qualitatively very different, as will be commented on in chapter 8.  
5.6   Pilot study 
My first interviews were with the three participants who were no longer local 
authority employees. I was able to reflect on these in a fair amount of depth and to 
transcribe and conduct initial coding and some focused coding on the data before 
undertaking further interviews. My reflections enabled me to carry out minor 
revisions to the interview schedule. They also opened up questions for me about the 
nature of the impact I was having in the interviews – on the lines of areas discussed 
above – such as my prior experience and knowledge of the topic, my own social 
location, and the level of skill I might or might not have used in building rapport and 
encouraging more in-depth disclosure. I continued to reflect on these and other 
aspects throughout the research through the use of notes and memos. 
5.7   Transcription and software 
I transcribed all the interviews verbatim, including pauses and ‘erms’, incase these 
might become relevant in the analysis. I used NVivo 10 software, not to carry out the 
analysis directly, but to support the analysis process as it provided a very useful way 
to organise and manage the data, make links and develop themes or categories. For 
example it was useful to be able to code the data into nodes in NVivo, which could 
then easily be reorganised or combined, and linked to memos. 
5.8   Analysis of the data 
I familiarised myself with the data through transcribing the interviews myself and 
reading through them, noting some thoughts and reflections. I then carried out 
thorough initial coding throughout each transcript, as specified by Charmaz (2014). 
Initial coding involves labelling fragments of text on a line by line basis, to categorise, 
summarise and account for each piece of data. I followed the advice of Charmaz that 
codes should stick closely to the data, focus on action and process, and should be 
expressed using gerunds, rather than as topics and themes. In a grounded theory 
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approach, the codes will arise from reading the data, rather than from the application 
of a previously determined frame. 
Through coding the researcher interrogates and sorts the data, defines what is 
happening and starts to consider meanings. Coding, according to Charmaz (2014: 
114-5), ‘impels us to make our participants’ language problematic to render an 
analysis of it. Coding should inspire us to examine hidden assumptions in our use of 
language as well as that of our participants’. This includes interpretation of 
participants’ tacit meanings. It means entering an ‘interactive space’ in which we 
‘relive and re-view our earlier interactions with participants and subsequently 
interact with them again many times over’ (p116). The codes are provisional in that 
they can be revisited and reworded.  
In keeping with a grounded theory approach I used memo writing to capture 
reflections and ideas that occurred to me after interviews, when reading transcripts 
or listening to the interviews, and during the coding and analysis processes. Initially I 
made notes in a log, and then wrote separate memos once I started using NVivo.   
I also made constant comparisons between data, and between data and codes. This 
felt a natural process. As Charmaz (2014: 132) advises, incident can be compared 
with incident to identify properties, and comparing and coding similar events can 
enable the researcher to ‘define subtle patterns and significant processes’. In 
addition, comparison of dissimilar events can help provide further insights.  
After initial coding, following Charmaz, I went through the transcripts again to 
identify ‘focused codes’.  These may be initial codes that appear more significant or 
occur more frequently than others, or codes that encompass a number of initial 
codes. Focused codes are often more conceptual than the initial line by line codes. 
This enabled me to reduce the number of codes overall but also to keep checking and 
comparing different instances of the codes with the data and with each other.   
I grouped these where possible, and organised them into NVivo parent and child 
nodes, merging and eliminating some in the process. I then transferred all the 
relevant extracts of data into each node. At this point there were 109 nodes, some 
child nodes having their own child nodes, and the amount of data felt quite 
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overwhelming, especially as many extracts were copied into more than one node. In 
my mind I started to think of themes rather than codes. Collating together all 
relevant extracts for each theme, and re-reading and comparing them enabled me to 
look for patterns, variations, meanings and insights in the data. I spent time trying to 
understand each theme, the meanings for participants and its significance.  
Watts (2014) writes of the importance of closeness with the data, which involves 
engaging with the words and views of participants from their own perspectives and 
on their own terms. This he calls maintaining a ‘first-person’ perspective and it entails 
using empathy and focusing on trying to see the world through the eyes of the 
participant, without judging her or him. He identifies two levels of coding with this 
stance, first a descriptive coding of what the participant is talking about, and then a 
second interpretative level of coding regarding how the participant is understanding 
or constructing this point. This is followed by a third level of analysis, involving 
distance from the data, which Watts calls a ‘third-person’ perspective, in which the 
researcher uses professional understandings and relates the themes to relevant 
literature. I found the idea of first and third person perspectives a useful process, and 
an aid to reflexivity. I thought that having, to some extent, an insider perspective was 
useful in that it helped in creating rapport, participants did not have to explain 
terminology and other aspects to me, and I was less likely to misunderstand them. On 
the other hand, as participants were aware of my background in social work practice 
and teaching this could have influenced their answers and points expressed. 
However, in the data a wide range of feelings and views were expressed which 
suggests they were not trying to follow a particular line. Another danger of having an 
insider perspective was that I might make assumptions based on my previous 
knowledge and not seek hard enough for participants’ own meanings. But focusing 
on empathetically trying to understand the participant’s perspective enabled me to 
question whether I was imposing my own understanding and preconceptions, and at 
times to become more aware that my view or values might be different to those 
being expressed by a participant. Shifting back and forth between a ‘first’ and ‘third’-
person perspective for each theme helped ensure that the analysis captured both 
closeness and distance without sacrificing one for the other. It also helped me try to 
work with both an insider and outsider (or emic and etic) perspective and consider 
whether I was making any assumptions based on my own previous experiences 
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(Holloway and Biley 2011) – in my case of both undertaking care proceedings, and 
academic study and teaching. I believe my academic awareness of theoretical and 
critical perspectives and research (for example, into relationship-based practice, 
social justice, the role of poverty, and contrasting family support or ‘child rescue’ 
approaches), and on the other hand first-hand experience as a practitioner of 
statutory child protection and care proceedings practice, enabled me to see both 
perspectives more clearly in relation to each other, and the differences between 
them, and to guard against making judgements or assumptions from either 
perspective. 
Questions suggested by Braun and Clarke were also useful in trying to ensure that my 
analysis was grounded in but could also go beyond the surface level of the data, such 
as: ‘‘What does this theme mean?’ What are the assumptions underpinning it?’ 
‘What conditions are likely to have given rise to it?’ ’Why do people talk about this 
thing in this particular way (as opposed to other ways)?’ and ‘What is the overall 
story the different themes reveal about the topic?’’ (Braun and Clarke 2006: 94). 
As explained earlier I was not able to carry out any further interviews, so it was not 
possible to use theoretical sampling, an important part of the grounded theory 
method to gather more data on identified categories in order to refine them and 
develop the emerging theory. On reflection, a further phase of data collection would 
have facilitated the process of developing the themes and categories towards theory 
building, and would have enabled me to check out my findings with participants. 
Charmaz (2014) and Corbin and Strauss (2008) provide guidance on developing 
categories, linking and integrating these around core categories and developing 
theory, with the writing of analytical memos a key part of these processes. I found 
this process quite difficult to follow and also did not use memo-writing to the extent 
that Charmaz (2014) advocates, but instead started writing early drafts of sections 
and chapters. I also drew some (mainly rather rough) visual maps and diagrams to 
help organise themes and ideas. Three overarching and connecting themes were 
taking shape. The writing became an important part of the processes of reorganising 
themes, sifting, analysis, sense-making and developing the larger themes, and 
enabled me to engage with the data and connections more fully than reading through 
extracts and writing notes or separate memos. Braun and Clarke (2006) state that 
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writing should be part of the analysis process, and Charmaz (2014: 289) writes that 
the ‘discovery process in grounded theory extends into the writing and rewriting 
stages’. This was my experience, though looking back it may have been more 
effective to persist with separate memo writing for each theme and overarching 
theme or category before trying to put them together into larger documents. 
I have used a constant comparative method and maintained a continual to and fro 
movement between data, existing theory and literature, and my own reflections and 
ideas through all the processes of coding, thinking and writing about the data. Much 
of the time this aspect seemed to happen without me explicitly determining to do it, 
and I had a clear sense of the reality of Ezzy’s (2002) points about the hermeneutic 
back and forth approach to data, discussed earlier in this chapter.  At a late stage in 
the analysis I also read the original whole transcripts again together to check I had 
not missed anything significant, or misunderstood or taken out of context any points 
made by participants. The more difficult process was in reducing the detail and 
constructing a coherent theory out of the many strands in the data, but I eventually 
developed a conceptual framework based on the findings, which will be explained in 
chapter 10.  
As I was unable to follow a grounded theory approach as far as I initially aimed to, it 
could be argued that the approach I followed was basically a thematic analysis. Braun 
and Clark (2006: 79) describe thematic analysis as ‘a method for identifying, analysing 
and reporting patterns (themes) within data’, which involves interpreting as well as 
organising and describing the data. They explain that thematic analysis is a flexible 
method not linked to a particular theoretical framework, so can be used within 
different frameworks, including grounded theory, and that some phases of thematic 
analysis are similar to those of other qualitative methods. They identify a number of 
phases in the method: familiarising oneself with the data; systematic coding of the 
data; searching for themes and collating the data relevant to each of these; reviewing 
and refining the themes, developing a thematic map and considering the themes in 
relation to the data set – which may involve re-coding and further reviewing and 
refining in an ‘ongoing organic process’ (p.91); further refining involving defining the 
‘essence’ of each theme and considering it in relation to other themes, identifying 
overarching themes and any sub-themes; and then the final analysis and writing up 
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process. There is thus a considerable overlap between the data analysis process I 
followed and the thematic analysis processes they describe, though they identify that 
a key factor in grounded theory is that the analysis needs to be directed towards 
theory development, which was my aim. 
5.9   Ethical issues 
Ethical issues are woven into all aspects of research, from initial planning, design, 
data collection and dissemination. A study of social work practice undertaken by a 
social worker will have additional implications. Social workers are governed by our 
own professional ethics, and it follows that research by social workers will also need 
to be consistent with these. The relevance of social work values and ethics will be 
considered in more depth below.  
The research and accompanying documents were scrutinised through the ethical 
review processes at the University, which addressed issues of confidentiality, data 
protection, informed consent, voluntary participation and opportunity to withdraw, 
not doing harm, possible power differences, and assessment of potential risks and 
benefits to participants. I also prepared and sent relevant ethical review 
documentation and a research proposal to Cafcass and the two local authorities who 
had agreed to consider the research. As explained earlier, Cafcass declined to make 
staff available for the research, and over time the two local authorities both gave 
ethical approval but only one made staff available during the time period for the 
research.  
While this ethical scrutiny was essential, a rule orientated approach is not in itself a 
sufficient means of addressing ethical issues in a qualitative research project. In the 
first place, examining any of the above aspects in more depth could open up the 
possibility of ethical dilemmas, codes and rules offer limited assistance when two or 
more priorities come into conflict, and at the start it is difficult to predict every 
possible eventuality that may impact on participants (Silverman 2011). For example, 
gaining truly informed consent may only be possible if the participant understands 
everything about the research beforehand, but this may then influence participants’ 
answers; or there may be a tension between covering a topic in depth and asking 
insensitive or over-intrusive questions; and qualitative research involves a level of 
133 
 
unpredictability because of the flexible and responsive nature of data collection and 
how participants may contribute to shaping the research encounter and data 
collected (Webster, Lewis and Brown 2014).  Silverman (2013b: 184) also remarks 
that ‘thoughtless rule following may blind you to unexpected ethical dilemmas’. As 
McLaughlin (2012: 183) points out, ’often the most difficult ethical questions only 
occur once the research has begun and were not envisaged in the original approval’, 
and therefore social work researchers need to be morally active throughout the study 
in responding to ethical issues that arise. In my logs and memos I therefore included 
consideration of ethical issues arising for me in the process of this research and my 
own thinking about these, for example the concerns about fairness and ‘betrayal’ 
discussed below.  
Silverman (2011) argues that analysis of data needs to be fair and even-handed 
towards those being described in the study. In considering fairness, an issue arising 
for me has been the tension between giving voice to participants own views, and the 
need to acknowledge the constructed nature of these, and to interpret them in 
context, and analyse the wording that has been used. How ‘fair’ were my perceptions 
and further perspectives in relation to what the participants are seeking to reveal? 
My choices, interpretations and representations of the data will have been influenced 
by my values, both conscious and unconscious and it is impossible to know accurately 
how much it has been my voice or the voices of participants that have been 
represented. As Ezzy (2002: xiii) argues, ‘one of the main challenges in qualitative 
data analysis is to ensure that the voice of the other is heard and allowed to enter 
into dialogue with pre-existing understandings’.   
Shaw (2003: 23) refers to a ‘risk of betrayal’ that may be felt in a qualitative project 
where a level of closeness and trust is built between researcher and participant, and 
there is a danger that findings could be used to worsen the situation of a group or 
population. Merely by entering a situation or story we may change it. Ezzy (2002: 
156) comments that ‘when a participant signs a consent form, this is not the end of 
our responsibilities but the beginning’. In gaining access to the statutory social 
workers I felt myself being drawn into the ethical world of statutory social work with 
its constraints on the freedom of individual social workers to make moral decisions, 
and potentially competing accountabilities to service users, practitioners, supervisors, 
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senior managers and the reputation of the agency itself. The tension of being fair to 
practitioners and managers who had made themselves available for interview, 
against the task of analysing their views and the responsibility to identify areas that 
could be improved for the benefit of service users, began to be sharply felt. 
Social work itself is ‘not a neutral activity’ as it can lead to either positive or negative 
outcomes for both service users and social workers (McLaughlin (2012: 1). One role 
of social work research could be to question and critique existing practices as well as 
aiming to extend knowledge to improve practice. Smith (2009) suggests that in one 
sense research provides a means of reflective practice, a systematic way of checking 
out, and making sense of our own interventions in order to improve outcomes. Thus 
it can contribute to preventing the reduction of practice to ‘a routinized set of tasks 
which will become increasingly detached from changing needs and circumstances’ (p 
187).  
In addition, the connection between social work research and practice means that 
the ethical considerations underlying social work research studies should also be 
consistent with broader social work values.  These should inform the purpose of the 
research, use of the data, whose interests will be served, and include service user 
perspectives, consideration of any unintended negative consequences, and its 
contribution to social work’s transformatory purposes (Smith 2009).  Butler’s (2002) 
‘Code of Ethics for social work and social care research’ includes the responsibility of 
social work researchers to act in congruence with the aims and values of social work, 
seeking to empower service users, promote welfare and equality, protect the 
vulnerable, not tolerate any discrimination, be technically competent in every respect 
of the design and method, recognising the limitations of their own expertise, dealing 
openly and fairly, respecting rights, disseminate without distortion including results 
which may reflect unfavourably on vested interests, and avoiding unfavourable 
stereotypes of service users. Social work research, McLaughlin (2012: 12) argues, 
‘aims not only to support practice but to transform it’.  
At times I felt a tension between my moral commitment to participants, service users 
and the integrity of the research, as different strands that were held in an 
unresolvable tension. It was like peeling an onion, only with the layers deeper in 
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becoming bigger rather than smaller. At times it has felt difficult holding and staying 
within this uncertainty and unresolvability. I wondered if there was an element of 
mirroring the tensions felt by participants – though my experience was a faint 
shadow of the ethical tensions at the heart of decisions in care proceedings. There 
was also a link with one theme developed in the research, the association between 
dissonance and ethical thinking.    
In response to these reflections, when writing up I worked out a balance of aiming to 
be fair to participants, and not being unnecessarily critical, but at the same time not 
leaving out points or themes that indicated aspects that could change for the benefit 
of service users. Similarly I included points about the organisation as relevant to the 
study and the benefit of practitioners and service users, but not unnecessary criticism 
over and above this. At all times I held to the principle that any matters that 
appeared directly harmful to service users or were safeguarding issues would need to 
be responded to; however, no such issues arose in the study. Throughout the study I 
believe I held to the professional and research ethics outlined earlier. In my view this 
was aided by my questioning reflective approach of staying within uncertainty and 
complexity rather than quick resolution of issues, to avoid missing relevant 
considerations.  
5.10  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explained the epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of 
the research as well as the process and methods followed. I used nineteen individual 
interviews and two focus groups to generate the data, and have discussed the 
strengths and limitations of these methods, acknowledging that interviews are to an 
extent co-constructed by interviewer and participants.  
I have briefly explored the importance of reflexivity in this study, and qualitative 
research in general, while recognising the danger of inflated claims to its significance 
in that reflexivity in itself will be constructed and necessarily limited. My approach to 
reflection and reflexivity involved considering and questioning what my impact may 
have been, as well as identifying my own responses, staying in uncertainty rather 
than seeking easy resolution of issues and tensions that arose in my thinking. I 
believe that this, together with holding an insider and outsider perspective as 
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mentioned earlier, has enabled me to keep being sensitive to the participants, and 
helped in my aim of being true to the data and giving voice to participants as far as 
possible, at the same time as seeing them in context. It has also contributed to my 
own development and learning about the research process, the embodied, relational 
and negotiated nature of interviewing, and my own self-knowledge. However, these 
reflections take time – though my learning from this experience should enable 
quicker progress through the research process in future. There are also emotional 
impacts of entering into the world of participants and their concerns and tensions 
that arose for me, and I have realised that it would have benefited me to build in 
more discussion and reflective time with others. 
The research has been informed and guided to an extent by constructivist grounded 
theory, a method I initially chose partly for its apparent clarity and detailed guidance 
for the analysis process (a boon for the inexperienced researcher) but also the 
emphasis on generating theory that is clearly grounded in the data. I was not able to 
follow the approach as far as was my aim. I did follow the initial and focused coding 
processes, writing memos, and a constant comparative and iterative method. I 
attempted to follow the stages of theory construction, and realised later that it would 
have been more effective to persist further and in more detail with suggestions of 
Charmaz, in particular the use of memos. I have developed a conceptual framework, 
or model, from the research, though this may fall short of being ‘a theory’. In contrast 
with pure grounded theory I had developed my topic and research questions and 
reviewed literature before the data collection. I also did not carry out theoretical 
sampling, or systematically conduct the analysis in step with data collection, although 
I did reflect throughout the data collection and analysis, as indicated above, and was 
able to carry out some analysis on the three early interviews which did inform the 
later interviews. However, I recognise that the data analysis process I followed was 
similar to that of a more conventional thematic analysis, and while I aimed to be 
guided by grounded theory and was able to follow certain aspects of the method, I 
would conclude that in this was not a grounded theory project but was informed by 
aspects of the approach. 
I ended the chapter by discussing ethical issues in research. These cannot be reduced 
to a set of rules and principles. They are inherent in the ontological and 
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epistemological approaches which shape the research, as well as all aspects of the 
methods and analysis and, in this study, the topic itself. I have been struck by the 
links between the research process, social work, and decision making, and the 
interweaving ethical and emotional dimensions within and between each of these. 
The next three chapters present and discuss the findings of the study: chapter 6 
considers participants’ perceptions and experiences of the decision making journey; 





6 Chapter 6. Findings (1): The Decision Journey and Landscape 
6.1  Introduction 
This research aims to illuminate how social workers perceive and experience the 
ethical and emotional dimensions of decision making in care proceedings, and how 
they can be supported in these processes.   
The focus of this chapter is on how participants perceived and experienced the 
processes followed when making decisions. The making of a significant decision was 
not a single event, nor was reasoning a process undertaken in isolation from other 
processes involved in practice such as assessment, intervention, interaction and 
relationship building. The decision process was more like a journey, through a 
particular and situated organisational, legal and social landscape. 
There were clear processes of framing, sense-making, reasoning and analysis, carried 
out both individually and with others. These will be explored first under the first main 
theme Framing, sense-making and reasoning processes. The significant decisions 
were always made in combination with others, and a number of social and embodied 
features of decision making stood out in the data, captured in the second main 
theme Care proceedings decision making as a social and embodied process. Third, the 
decision making processes, and the decisions themselves, were closely linked with 
the surrounding organisational and legal context and the interface of the courts with 
social work, and aspects of participants’ experience of this will be analysed in The 
interface of the court world and the social work world. Ethical and emotional 
dimensions of these processes will also be identified, though not explored in detail as 
these will form the subject of the next two chapters. 
Note on presentation of the findings: 
Findings will be presented thematically with illustrative quotes from participants. The 
participants will be designated (and numbered) as either: SW, (social worker), SP 
(senior practitioner), TM (team manager), FG1 (Focus Group 1 – a Children in Care 
team, which included a range from inexperienced to very experienced practitioners) 
or FG2 (Focus Group 2 – the expert/experienced practitioner group). 
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A key to the participants can be found in Appendix 1. This also specifies the number 
of care proceedings each had undertaken at the time of the interview, and whether 
they had been qualified for 3+ or under 3 years. In the text, in order to give an 
indication of levels of experience of participants I quote, I will specify where a 
practitioner is ‘exp. in care procs’ (having undertaken 5-9 care proceedings), or ‘v. 
exp. in care procs’ (10+ care proceedings). Two participants came into the category of 
being very experienced in care proceedings but had been qualified less than three 
years, and I have identified these by adding ‘under 3 yrs qual’ 
This is not a quantitative study, but in places I will indicate the number of participants 
associated with themes, especially where this appears relevant. Where I use the word 
‘several’ this generally means three to five. 
6.2   Framing, sense-making and reasoning processes 
When asked about the decision making process, participants tended overtly to 
present this as one of logical thinking and argument, set within organisational 
structures and procedures. However, there were indications that the thinking and 
reasoning processes overlaid and drew from experiential and intuitive thinking, 
categorising and pattern recognition.  
Framing and sense-making processes were involved, in which certain factors were 
seen as particularly relevant during the process of coming to a judgement, as outlined 
in chapter 2 (O’Sullivan 2011; Taylor 2017a; Helm 2017). Chapter 7 will consider some 
aspects of framing, such as how a situation was framed as an ethical issue or a 
‘difficult’ decision, and the issue of how the child’s needs are framed. This current 
section will focus on the aspects that participants raised in their conscious 
considerations as salient in guiding their thinking or clinching the argument as to 
whether or not a child should be removed from parents. Many of these also have 
ethical dimensions. 
While harm to the child was talked about by a number of participants (see chapters 7 
and 8), overall it was discussions about parents’ behaviour and understanding that 




I have identified relevant themes in the sense-making and reasoning process as: (a) 
taking into account history and time to demonstrate change; (b) intervention should 
lead to change; (c) making sense of parents’ behaviour and understanding; (d) 
temporal factors in the organisation and individual; (e) weighing, balancing and 
triangulating; and (f) using intuition and analysis.  
6.2.1   Taking into account history and time to demonstrate change 
Decisions about separating children from parents were often the outcome of an 
accumulation of evidence over time in a particular direction. A number of the cases 
spoken about had been known to the department on and off for a long time, some 
involving children coming on and off child protection plans.  
in terms of the parents, that was quite a quick judgement, that the children 
shouldn’t be in their care, cos we had quite a long history with them – I mean 
essentially we’ve been involved on and off, but largely on, with their older 
daughter throughout her entire life (SW7). 
Historical information was generally combined with an ongoing accumulation of 
evidence of the same concerns continuing or new ones developing. In two cases the 
length of time a parent had been offered support without changing was explicitly 
mentioned as part of the explanation for the decision. Historical knowledge of a 
family and the family’s response to intervention were also two frequently used 
elements guiding decision making in Hackett and Taylor’s (2014) study.  
In contrasting cases, points were made by participants about keeping an open mind 
in order to be fair. Fairness in providing more time for parents to demonstrate their 
skills and ability to change was also seen as important, illustrating that ethical 
principles were part of the reasoning process.  There are, however, tensions in the 
literature between keeping an open mind and avoiding ‘confirmation bias’ on the one 
hand, and concerns on the other hand about disregarding history in ‘start-again 
syndrome’ (Brandon et al 2008) and the ‘rule of optimism’ (Dingwall et al 1983; 
Dingwall 2013) with their potential to delay decisions for children. 
Two participants gave examples of arranging time for a family in a family centre to 
enable a more detailed assessment but also allow them a full opportunity to 
demonstrate their skills. In both cases the sustained time also identified the 
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limitations of their parenting. Time physically spent with the family, both in terms of 
intensive periods of time and the duration of involvement, was important in enabling 
a fuller and more consistent picture to emerge of whether changes could be 
sustained or whether ‘cracks’ would appear: 
I've spent 4 to 5 days a week with this family since I've been here - either 
doing the visits, the assessments, going round to, you know, do unannounced 
visits and things like that, so I've spent lots of time with them. . .but then 
ultimately. . .as you carry on with your assessment and you're there for a long 
period of time, you kind of see where the cracks in the parenting are (SW6) (v. 
exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
In contrast, frustration was expressed by several participants that their views were 
discounted by courts, in favour of an independent assessment by someone who had 
spent a much smaller amount of time with the family and therefore would not have 
the same extent of knowledge. This discrepancy was also noted by participants in the 
study by O’Connor and Leonard (2014). Frustrations over this will be referred to again 
in chapter 8. 
Children in Care team members in Focus Group 1 also discussed their concerns that 
young parents may need more ‘time’ than older parents, though have had less time 
to prove themselves – limited further by the 26 week timescale. Teenage parents 
were at an age when the maturing process was relatively rapid and for whom 
additional time might make a very significant difference: 
And the other thing about the 26 weeks is if you're dealing with a very young 
mum, you know, 16, 17 year old, do they need one or two years to show that 
they're mature enough? Particularly if they're an ex-care leaver. . .one case 
we've had recently is that a very young mum had her baby removed – she 
appealed that in the High Court, and the Appeal Court have indicated that 
there has been some maturity and some change. And we had matched for 
adoption. That placement order's now been revoked, back to an ICO and 
we're being asked to re-assess this mother again. And there were other 
factors as well, but you've now got a mum who was 16-17 at the time of those 
care proceedings – now she's sort of 18 and yet actually she's able to present 
as different (Focus Group 1). 
Ethical principles were again mentioned above, in that fairness to the young parent 
was seen as important, as was a sense of responsibility to care leavers. This example 
also implies the law could both constrain (through the 26 week limit) the best 
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interests of this mother – and by implication the child – and then uphold them 
through the appeals process which gave her the time she needed to change and 
‘present as different’. 
6.2.2   Intervention should lead to change 
A point articulated a number of times in participants’ reasoning was that change had 
not taken place despite provision of support and intervention. In seven interviews the 
overwhelming level of parents’ emotional needs or difficulties was seen as a key 
factor, but often there seemed an underlying implication that interventions should 
lead to change, and the parent’s lack of engagement or response was therefore 
important evidence. For example, this experienced practitioner described a long list 
of supportive interventions that had been offered to a mother whose children had 
had two periods on child protection plans, and then added: 
So again during that period of 10 months, again she had all the support, the 
Freedom programme again because she'd done it before but clearly it hadn't 
worked, I offered a refuge when another domestic abuse incident had taken 
place, she refused, she didn't accept advice around housing and moved 
around the children frequently, so when it came to me assessing that should 
this mum can't meet her children's needs and keep them safe, there was just 
a lot of history and a lot of evidence and a lot of stuff that we had tried to do 
to support her to do that and she still hadn't been able to do that, make that 
change (SP4). 
The argument is logical and backed up by a compelling list of evidence (including 
comments prior to the extract). In contrast, however, a narrative approach (see 
chapter 3) involving a parent’s viewpoint of her difficulties could possibly result in 
different framing and language. Other possible perspectives are suggested by 
literature, for example that parents’ apparent unwillingness to change can spring 
from feelings of shame, ambivalence and lack of confidence (Forrester et al 2012); or 
that a parent might be at an early point of the ‘model of change’ which specifies the 
steps of building understanding and readiness to change that need to take place first 
(Morrison 2010). However, the decision to remove a child might be harder to justify 
to others if a narrative approach is used as the case would appear less clear. This may 
be an illustration of Urek’s (2005) ‘institutional narratives’ which come to be used 
where there is a need to justify certain decisions, in which language and ideas are 
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used which present someone as culpable/not culpable, or deserving/not deserving. 
This is further discussed in the next chapter.  
6.2.3   Making sense of parents’ choices, decisions and behaviours 
Many examples given by participants in support of their decisions related to the 
actions of parents or family members, framed as either not meeting the child’s 
needs, or not cooperating, manifesting ‘disguised compliance’, or prioritising staying 
with the violent/abusive partner over the child’s needs.  
In three cases it was framed as though the parent had made an active choice not to 
cooperate with the plan. In the following instance it was seen as leaving no option:  
In the end it was almost not our decision, because we very much said to mum 
we really need you to stay in mother and baby – we want you to be with your 
baby so we can work with you, and if you go home we're going to have to 
make that decision, we're going to have to talk to a judge and talk to a court – 
and she said no, I do not want to stay with my baby I want to go back (SP7). 
The above case, and another, where a mother leaves her baby in the placement are 
also discussed in the next chapter in relation to moral constructions of parents and 
how far they may be presented as making an active and rational choice or being a 
victim of circumstances, and whether notions of accountability make intervention 
seem more justified. The decision to separate appears more straightforward and 
justifiable where an element of active choice and control is implied. 
In the extract below the participant found a mother’s apparent decision not to parent 
very difficult to understand. The mother had been assessed as having the capability 
to parent her child adequately and was also saying she wanted to, but just did not 
seem to do it.  The practitioner had spent a great deal of time and effort trying to 
understand her and was frustrated by the apparently inexplicable situation of a 
parent who appeared capable and wanting to keep the child but seemingly choosing 
not to parent – and felt this may have led to giving her more time, thus somewhat 
delaying the removal of the child.  
you got the impression if you could work out why this mum was doing this, 
you could help her. . .Every social worker who came across this mum seemed 
to find the same thing which was she was a very likeable person, very capable 
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person, who just for whatever reason that we couldn't work out, would stop 
parenting. . .it almost became all the evidence pointed towards choosing to 
not parent her child – as a conscious choice rather than another factor that 
we can help her with, and that's the point that we said enough's enough, 
we've got to go to court (SP3) (exp. in care procs). 
Where actions were hard to understand, or did not clearly fit with the usual ‘frames’ 
and guiding factors for assessments, this caused more thinking, questioning and 
emotional impact for the practitioner. Unless a parent clearly did not have capacity 
for particular reasons, the decision seemed more straightforward if the parent’s 
behaviour was conceptualised as a conscious choice. 
6.2.3.1 The parent’s level of understanding 
Whereas in some cases (such as those mentioned above) the emphasis was on the 
behaviour or omissions of the parent, in eight of the scenarios the emphasis was on 
the parent’s apparent inability to understand or recognise the concerns, or the child’s 
needs, and the need for change. In two this was associated with learning disability 
and in one mental health needs. In this example again the parent’s approach was 
outside the usual parameters of professional framing: 
I think the most challenging thing about this case from start to finish was that 
the dad didn't acknowledge any of the concerns at all - still doesn't. So you 
had concerns from police, from social services, from school, from health, and 
you'd try and have a frank discussion with him, but he just wouldn't 
acknowledge, so how can you work with someone to change when they don't 
see any of these as a concern. And we were trying to make decisions, and we 
were trying to work with these parents, on issues that they didn't believe 
were problems (SP7). 
This echoes some points from Devaney’s (2008) study which found many examples of 
parents in denial about their problems and inability to put the needs of their children 
before their own needs. 
The level of vulnerability of a mother was also mentioned by a number of participants 
(seven interviews) as a consideration, in relation to needing a high level of emotional 
support and care, and making unwise decisions.  
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6.2.4   Temporal factors in the organisation and individual 
6.2.4.1 Team differences in duration of involvement with families 
In this local authority a recent reconfiguration meant there were no longer separate 
duty teams, and also care proceedings were initiated by workers in one team, and 
then passed on to a team specialising in work with children in care after all the initial 
assessments and paperwork had been presented and once a foster care or adoption 
plan was decided. 
The difference between work in duty and longer-term teams was discussed in the 
Children in Care team in Focus Group 1, and in four individual interviews. Duty work 
was seen as more ‘clear cut’, based on quick decisions around thresholds and 
whether a family is able to look after or protect a child from harm. One practitioner 
(SP8) in a Children in Care team who had previously worked in a duty team found ‘the 
skill set of workers is very different’ and the decision making was much slower-paced 
than she had been used to.  
The difference seemed to turn on whether the decisions were short term or long 
term; thus temporal factors determined the purpose and apparent clarity of the 
work. Social workers in initial teams would deal with an immediate situation of risk 
without necessarily needing to consider the added complexity of the long term 
impact on the child or family, whereas decisions made in the Children in Care team 
might have life-long implications: 
I think it is because we don't just deal with here and now and pass it on. . .the 
decisions we make are for the rest of this child's life. Because when they're 
removed, that's just that moment and decisions may change and all so it 
hasn't been decided, but for us, we are determining the decisions for the rest 
of that child's life, as a child and as an adult (Focus Group 1). 
So temporal factors affected how decisions were framed, and a decision framed as a 
short or medium term intervention to protect a child from risk carries less complexity 
and uncertainty than long term decision making, and may be based on a more 
uncluttered and static view of children as passive and in need of protection from 
harm.  It may also be easier for workers to make a significant decision, such as a 
decision to remove a child from a family, if they know this may not be a decision for 
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life, the case will be passed to a different team, and there may be a chance later to 
change course following more thorough assessment and intervention.  
This illustrates the findings of Menzies (1960) of the way nursing decisions and tasks 
in a hospital were divided up as a way of defending against anxiety about the 
responsibility held. In Menzies’ study the nurse’s relationship with the patient was 
seen as a core source of anxiety, and the closer the relationship the greater the 
impact of the anxiety, so the nursing service attempted to protect the nurse from this 
anxiety by splitting up her contact with patients, enabling her to avoid ‘coming 
effectively into contact with the totality of any one patient and his illness’ (p101). 
Psychological detachment from patients was seen as desirable, leading to student 
nurses being moved on frequently to discourage them from building relationships 
with patients, which reduces their psychological involvement and sense of 
responsibility (p.111). This was not the rationale for the teams’ division of work in this 
study, but several participants in children in care teams also identified a significant 
difference between the nature of relationships they formed with both parents and 
children compared to teams with shorter term involvement, and this was associated 
with a feeling of responsibility to make the right decision: 
What I really struggled with was thinking when these children come in 15 /20 
years’ time and they read all these files, are they going to agree, are they 
going to think we made the wrong decision. . .this is actually, you know these 
children's future, we've got 26 weeks, and I found that really difficult, having 
built a relationship with them (SP7). 
As seen here, the temporal aspects of care proceedings provide a timeframe for the 
decision making process. As well as parents needing to show their ability to change 
within the required timescales, practitioners needed to complete their assessments 
and evidence within tight timeframes. This was also seen as an ethical issue by 
participants in its potential impact on the quality of decisions, and as a source of 
frustration and anxiety, as will be explored further in chapters 7 and 8.  
6.2.4.2 Length of experience of the worker 
Length of experience was associated by nine participants with increased confidence 
and skill in their own decision making in a variety of ways, such as in determining 
thresholds for intervention, or awareness of likely outcomes, knowing what evidence 
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was needed or what might work, and speed in coming to decisions. Several (three) 
mentioned that they now have more confidence in standing up for their own decision 
and willingness to challenge a manager’s view if different, or felt more confident to 
determine whether or not they needed to ‘unpick’ something in more detail with a 
manager.   
One practitioner could see a change in her tolerance of risk and a shift to working 
towards returning the child to the family: 
When I first started working, I used to do a lot of adoptions, so I remember 
having this conversation with [an experienced worker in the team] at the end 
of last year and said how many adoption orders have you done and she said 
something like one. At that point I'd done 6 and I was almost congratulating 
myself, because she sends all her children home, and I used to be – how can 
you send all your children home? But actually, I completely see it now (SW8) 
(v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
Thus, the impact of time and experience on the worker’s patterns of reasoning led to 
a shift in values. This could also link to the role of experience in enabling workers to 
work within a greater level of risk and uncertainty. It also involved the worker’s sense 
of professional identity, changing from pride at the number of adoptions she had 
completed, to a different view of her role.  
One participant identified that more experience would have enabled a decision to be 
reached more quickly to remove a child rather than continuing to work with the 
mother. Another used her experience to judge that a substance-using mother was 
more capable and less ‘risky’ than the management view of her. It was interesting 
that a number of the participants chose their first care proceedings case to talk about 
in the interviews. Overall in the data less experience seemed to be associated with 
taking longer to arrive at a conclusion, but sometimes with more discussion and 
questioning on the way which could lead to ethical consideration and openness to a 
change of route, while more experienced practitioners were able to conclude more 
quickly whether it was appropriate or not to persist with giving parents more 
opportunity. This was consistent with Whittaker’s (2018) findings that greater 
experience was associated with more sophisticated intuitive pattern recognition and 
identifying key information rather than being overwhelmed by detail. In the current 
study, while this could close down opportunity for discussion and change of view, 
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experienced practitioners’ thinking was also in general less risk averse in certain 
situations, in that they were more able to manage a higher level of risk. They also felt 
more able to challenge different views from managers. Other studies have also found 
that the length of participants’ experience was important in terms of their 
professional identity and the development of their role, learning from experience, 
ability to use more advanced communication and assessment skills in complex 
situations, confidence to challenge decisions, resilience and the management of 
uncertainty and complexity (Kearns and McArdle 2012; O’Connor and Leonard 2014).  
6.2.5   Weighing, balancing and triangulating 
It was often seen as important to weigh up the evidence and balance different 
aspects, taking care to be fair and thorough. This is a conscious analytical part of the 
decision process (O’Sullivan 2011). Participants used the words ‘weighing’ and 
‘balancing’ in relation to different people’s needs and being fair to each, or choosing 
between different options, or considering evidence for and against it being in a child’s 
best interests to be with this parent or carer, reflecting a ‘balance-sheet’ approach 
recommended in the Re B-S judgment (Masson 2014; Sloan 2015). In some cases this 
was described as a gradual process of gathering and reflecting on evidence, with the 
conclusion increasingly taking shape. In other cases the process was less 
straightforward and involved a difficult choice or balancing act as in the extract below 
(further examples of ethical dilemmas that arose will be discussed in chapter 7): 
I then had to do the final evidence and support one or the other, so I had to 
balance the fact that they were both known drug users because the hair 
strand testing came back and said yes she does use cannabis, she admitted 
that she's an occasional cannabis user. So then I had to do this really massive 
balancing act between parents that used, against the option of foster care 
(SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
Triangulating with evidence from other sources, including expert assessments, was 
also mentioned. This was presented as a straightforward process with the implication 
that the evidence concurred with or added to the practitioner’s views. This seems 
logical, though as mentioned in chapter 2, the agreement of others does not 
necessarily indicate objectivity.  
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6.2.6   Intuition and analysis 
None of the participants spontaneously raised intuition as part of the decision making 
process. While the sense-making and reasoning processes described above include 
some evidence of experiential and intuitive thinking as identified in the literature (eg 
Munro 2008; Hackett and Taylor 2014;  Kirkman and Melrose 2014) – such as pattern 
recognition and heuristics – participants did not conceptualise them as involving 
intuitive thinking but instead presented them as part of a logical reasoning process.  
When asked directly about the role of intuition and ‘gut feelings’ in decision making 
there was a pattern of consistent themes. Several mentioned that intuition might be 
used when initially looking at a referral received when on duty and having a sense of 
what might need to happen, and contrasted this with decision making on long term 
cases and care proceedings, where evidence was emphasised. Seven participants 
specifically spoke of gut feelings alerting them to the need to gather further 
evidence, for example:  
I knew – intuition, I didn't have any evidence – that we had not got the full 
picture, and I asked if we could keep that case open. Again, I had no evidence 
to support that, but sometimes you meet families and you just – there's just 
something there, erm, so we did, we kept that open slightly longer than we 
should, and that's when the older child moved back and that's when things 
really unravelled (SP7). 
A feeling of anxiety can indicate that the ‘rightness’ of the decision needs to be 
checked again, illustrating that anxiety can draw attention to an ethical issue, among 
other things: 
If I start getting anxious about something I'm a pretty good judge and if I'm 
feeling anxious about something I think to myself there must be a reason – 
and so whether it's around sort of making sure the right procedures are 
followed or something like that or am I making the right decision, have I done 
everything I should be doing to make the decision? (SP3) (exp. in care procs). 
There were also a number of comments that it was not possible to act on ‘gut 
feelings’ alone, without evidence to back them up. This could feel detrimental if the 
practitioner found out later that the feeling was ‘right’ and there had been a need to 
act. This occurs again in the next chapter when practitioners speak about having to 




6.2.7   Using decision making models 
In the individual interviews the participants were asked whether they ever used 
specific decision making models (as opposed to the usual assessment frameworks 
and report templates). None systematically followed decision models, but many 
mentioned applying particular theoretical frameworks or approaches, drawing on 
theories, textbooks and research, adapting lists or types of questions, and using 
threshold statements, wellbeing scales and questionnaires and tools for direct work. 
The courts were seen as favouring PAMS (Parent Assessment Manual Software) 
assessments.  However, most mentioned was ‘Signs of Safety’ (Turnell & Edwards 
1999), which was brought up in Focus Group 1 and six individual interviews as a 
useful practice framework. It was seen as making a clear difference to the way they 
worked with families, partly because it involved a partnership approach and parents’ 
responsibility in identifying how they would keep their children safe, but also because 
it was changing the practitioners’ approach to thinking about a case. This will be 
discussed further below. 
6.2.8   Conclusion to 6.2 
The data considered in this chapter so far show that participants were using a 
combination of intuitive and analytical processes in coming to judgements and 
decisions. This is consistent with the findings of Hackett and Taylor (2014) and Saltiel 
(2016), and broadly reflects Whittaker’s (2014) findings of the way practitioners 
generated intuitive judgements, drawing from previous experience, through pattern 
recognition and story building.  
As discussed in chapter 2, heuristics are important where time is limited, but are also 
subject to limitations and potential bias and impact from emotion and personal 
values (Munro 2008; Kirkman & Melrose 2014; Taylor 2017a, 2017b). Analytical 
processes may tend to be used reactively to evaluate intuitive judgements that have 
already been made (Haidt 2001; Kahneman 2011; Whittaker 2014). One point of note 
is that participants in the current study tended to talk about decision making as a 
logical evidence-based process. Unlike the studies mentioned above, this study 
focuses on care proceedings decision making, which by nature will involve more time 
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and analysis than initial child protection decisions.  However, participants did not 
explicitly identify the role of intuitive dimensions such as pattern recognition and 
heuristics, or the assumptions that underlie rules of thumb about parents’ ability to 
change through time and interventions. Such approaches are effective in making 
decisions manageable in complex and uncertain situations (Broadhurst et al 2010a; 
Platt and Turney 2014) but as Saltiel (2016) points out, are not represented in official 
accounts of social work. This is a relevant issue, as recognising the limitations of 
intuitive and experiential reasoning and making these processes and their underlying 
assumptions explicit and open to question, would help guard against the negative 
aspects of intuitive thinking, heuristics and assumptions. Emotion also was not seen 
as a part of the decision making process, except for what were seen as ‘gut feelings’, 
where there was an assumption that rational thinking could be relied on to check or 
overrule these.  
Practitioners’ framing, sense-making and reasoning processes were complex and also 
influenced by organisational and situational elements and ethical principles. These 
findings illustrate the differences between ‘map reading’ and ‘way finding’, as 
represented by Ferguson (2011: 210 – drawing on other literature): ‘[m]ap reading 
involves moving across a surface as imagined from above and written down, while 
way finding is to move within a world of constant engagement and readjustment in 
relation to the environment’. For practitioners in the study this ‘way finding’ was also 
a social and embodied process, aspects of which will be considered in the next 
section. 
6.3  Care proceedings decision making as a social and embodied process 
6.3.1  Sharing the decision 
Major decisions were never made alone. Clear organisational processes existed for 
sharing these decisions with managers and senior managers. However, there 
appeared some ambiguity regarding the level of discretion experienced by 
practitioners. 
When asked how they came to their decision a number of participants initially 
focused on describing the organisational processes they needed to go through, such 
as the social worker’s assessment and recommendation, consultation with and 
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agreement by a manager, legal or other planning meetings, attendance at panels and 
gaining the agreement of a service manager and assistant director. Family Group 
Conferences may also be involved, and getting a ‘Best Interests’ decision from the 
area director for an adoption plan. These were generally presented as a series of 
steps in a set order, each to be negotiated before progress to the next. Thus the 
processes and criteria provided the framework for these decisions. In some cases the 
organisational process itself was influential in determining the course of the decision, 
for example in setting or limiting the options and available outcomes. 
The process involved scrutiny of the evidence at each stage, ensuring that the 
evidence is adequate and also helps confirm the decision for the social worker. Legal 
advice was also an important part of the process, determining whether the threshold 
criteria had been met. Expectations from courts regarding the evidence (known for 
example from previous outcomes) also contributed to shaping the process of coming 
to the recommendation. Legal advice was influenced by whether or not the case 
would be successful in court in being deemed to meet the threshold criteria, as 
discussed later regarding working ‘in the shadow of the law’(Masson 2017). 
It appeared important that the decision was shared among a number of people: 
Over time I've learned more that actually to not take this on as much as this is 
my decision, because it's not – and we all own it as a local authority and it's 
based upon more than just my say (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
Before care proceedings could be initiated, or a cost over a certain level incurred, it 
was necessary to convince a panel of senior managers that the cost was justifiable. 
Going to Panel was seen as a significant event. It was seen as a hurdle – to ‘get it past 
Panel’ (SW4) – and ‘terrifying’ (SW8) and ‘you can get ‘ripped to shreds in there’ 
(SW4). 
Although the organisational processes shaped and provided a set framework for 
decision making, the individual social workers viewed themselves as having at least a 
significant role in the decision, in the sense of coming to the conclusions that formed 
the basis of organisational decisions, as reflected in the ‘weighing, balancing and 
triangulating’ section above. No comments were made that indicated an explicit aim 
to push responsibility upwards as featured in studies of Menzies’ (1960) or Whittaker 
(2011), though this could be related to the current study being based on 
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retrospective interviews rather than observations. Supervision (both planned and ad 
hoc), however, was talked about as important in providing support and guidance as 
well as checking out thoughts and ideas: 
I had fairly regular supervision while I was undertaking the assessment, so 
there were opportunities to sort of dissect the case if you like and what was 
going on, sort of question whether the ideas and sorts of evaluations I was 
making were the right ones and for the right reasons (SP2). 
This and other comments from participants also imply a concern with ethical 
principles – making the ‘right’ evaluations, for the ‘right’ reasons, and being ‘fair, and 
that supervision was being actively used by the social worker to question and be sure 
the fair or right decision was being made. 
Participants also supplemented supervision with input from more experienced 
workers in the team, for example to ‘run ideas through with them’ or ‘talk to senior 
practitioners about their experience’ (SW2).  Support from supervision and team 
colleagues will also be discussed in chapter 8 in relation to managing the emotional 
aspects of the work.  
6.3.2  Taking the lead 
The level of discretion or consultation individual workers felt they had, or needed, 
varied in terms of their experience and seniority. Several comments were made to 
the effect that a newly qualified or less experienced worker would need more regular 
consultations than an experienced one. This senior practitioner said: 
For the bigger decisions around issuing proceedings I had to have a discussion 
with the service manager about that, but that was more me leading that in 
terms of the decision and wanting a certain outcome and just having to get 
their approval. . .I think for more experienced workers we're just kind of left 
to make decisions and if there's an issue to kind of raise it with the manager 
or have some sort of ad hoc supervision if we feel that we need it – I haven't 
felt that that I have in this instance, I've just updated my managers around 
what's happening if there's any significant concerns (SP8). 
She sees herself as taking the lead and shaping the decision, just needing agreement 
from the service manager – a combination of having a significant level of power and 
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control at the same time as not having this in terms of the final decision. It was seen 
as her responsibility to raise issues or ask for ad hoc supervision if needed.  
So the process and framework for decision making both provided safety but also 
created anxiety (conveyed by other practitioners rather than this one, for example 
around the panel process experienced as a scrutiny of them as much as the 
evidence), and represented both having, and not having, power and autonomy. This 
tension is seen again in chapter 8 when practitioners felt highly responsible for the 
decision but also at times powerless.  
6.3.3   Becoming unstuck or changing perception through discussion 
Many comments indicated that, in general, discussion with others was an important 
part of the process of coming to judgements and decisions. This accords with Helm’s 
(2016; 2017) study which demonstrates the importance of practitioners’ 
communication and interactions with colleagues and establishing shared 
understandings in the process of ‘sense-making’.  
One aspect raised was that discussion or supervision could also challenge a 
participant’s viewpoint and lead to a different view. For the following participant, 
analysis of a situation was facilitated by an alternating process of drafting and 
consulting, which also led to a change in her view: 
I had a viability assessment on another case that I was doing and I was really 
stuck with what my recommendation or outcome would be, and actually 
writing it and then giving it to my manager and then talking about it, going 
away and then amending some more bits and then going and speaking to her 
again about it I actually came to a different conclusion than I had when I first 
began my assessment because as I went through it and analysed the 
information more it changed things (SP4). 
Informal discussions with team colleagues were also valued as helping to clarify 
thoughts: 
Sometimes you just need a colleague to sit down and actually ask you the 
right questions and you think yeah I did know that, it's just lost (SP10) (exp. in 
care procs). 
. . .to get another worker's kind of perspective because it's easy I think to 
become a bit kind of erm living in a bubble sometimes, when you're working 
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with a family and you've got a case that's particularly complex – you might 
have a certain viewpoint and it's quite nice to hear another worker's view 
really that can be objective (SP8). 
The value of co-working, which also arose in Ruch’s (2014) study, was discussed in 
Focus Group 1 and mentioned in five individual interviews. For example: 
When I went out with [colleague] the other day, and just coming out and 
having that discussion with her after, she you know could point out things 
that I hadn't picked up on. . .really just opened my eyes up a bit more. . .and 
even maybe have people challenge you as well. . .People not agreeing with 
you, I think sometimes that's a healthy thing (Focus Group 1). 
Whittaker’s (2014) study also found supervision and peer discussion was important in 
providing ‘a second pair of eyes’. 
Four participants spoke of the value of structured team discussion to assist them to 
understand or become unstuck with a difficult case. The Signs of Safety model had 
also recently been introduced in the local authority and was referred to a number of 
times by different participants as helping them see things differently, as indicated 
earlier. Here the model was used as part of team discussion: 
There’s some cases where you get a little bit stuck or you may have a 
particular view and you’re going to make a decision. Every week we have a. . 
.meeting where we sit as a team and we talk about a case picked by us social 
workers and a case picked by a manager, and just quickly summarise the case, 
what’s going on at the moment, what we feel we’re stuck on, what we need 
help with, and sometimes doing that and looking at what you’re worried 
about, what are complicating factors, what are strengths, and what you feel 
the next steps are (SP4). 
Another practitioner referred to Signs of Safety as ‘changing the way that we think’ 
and also changing practice, as it was leading to children returning home and cases 
being closed or stepped down, such as in the following instance:  
We sat down – myself the social worker and my manager – and we used the 
Signs of Safety and we were actually able to change our view, and we then 
said that we could do a rehabilitation plan (Focus Group 1). 
It seemed that the application of a model such as Signs of Safety was leading to 
changes of direction, with the outcome that more children were remaining with or 
being reunited with their families. Developments in case law and court practice were 
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having a similar effect as will be seen later in this chapter, although some unhelpful 
aspects of these were identified by participants. This illustrates how judgements and 
decisions are delimited not only by individuals’ ‘bounded rationality’ but also the 
culture, ideology and processes of their organisations. Judgements are assumed to be 
evidence-based and as objective as it is possible to be, until the guiding assumptions 
are challenged by the imposition of a different model such as Signs of Safety.  
Another consideration is that taking time to have the discussion could lead to an 
ultimate saving of time, if situations improve and cases are ‘stepped down’. Taylor 
and White (2006: 946), drawing on Eraut (1994), write that ‘the pressure to ‘handle 
cases quickly and efficiently’ may predispose social workers to use formal knowledge 
in a way that shores up their ‘anchor hypothesis’ when we may want to encourage 
them to use theory or research findings to shake up or destabilize precipitously 
formed judgements’. In this case, spending time discussing cases with a model such 
as Signs of Safety enabled judgements to be ‘shaken up’. 
There was also recognition that in the structured group discussions it was helpful to 
have a variety of viewpoints represented. One participant mentioned that in the 
team ‘we’ve got a good skill mix which is really helpful’ (SP10). The contribution of 
unqualified staff who might have a high level of contact with families was recognised 
by a team manager, again reiterating the the impact of encountering a different 
perspective: 
I tell you who really do shine in those meetings is our family support workers 
– they just chip in little nuggets of like really sort of good reflection, or come 
from a different perspective, can have some really great point to make, and it 
just helps clear our thinking about particular cases (TM1) (v. exp. in care 
procs). 
The above points highlight the benefit of discussion with others in seeing a case more 
clearly, or differently, and the idea that a new way of thinking can be generated by 
discussion with others, especially through the application of a model such as Signs of 
Safety. The value of discussion involving hearing other people’s perspectives 
(whether gained through joint working, or informal or structured discussions with 
colleagues) in enabling the individual to see things differently, or more clearly, is 
significant in a number of ways. As well as providing new ideas and ways of seeing a 
situation, other participants in a discussion can also act as ‘critical mirrors’ for each 
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other, enabling the other to become aware of their own assumptions, in comparison 
with how difficult it is for individuals to become aware of their own assumptions 
without the help of others (Brookfield and Preskill 2005). The act of talking itself also 
enables people to come to know themselves and achieve a greater sense of personal 
agency, as people define themselves and make sense of themselves and their 
experiences through language, interaction and negotiation with others (Parton 2003). 
Denzin (1997: 5) also observes that ‘[l]anguage and speech do not mirror experience: 
they create experience and in the process of creation constantly transform and defer 
that which is being described’. Conversation and language have a key role in moving 
people to change and to act (Parton 2003).  
The importance of face to face communication in social workers’ sense-making is also 
noted by Platt and Turney (2014) and Saltiel (2016) in relation to threshold decision 
making, and Helm (2017) who points out that discussions enable tacit knowledge to 
be made explicit, and hypotheses ‘created and tested, and where curiosity and 
methodical doubt can be brought together’(p393-4). Discussion, then, is clearly 
significant, not only in sense-making, but also in enabling challenge and changes of 
perspective, and learning and constructing identity. 
6.3.4  Impact of interactional and embodied processes in working with families 
As well as interaction with colleagues, aspects of interaction with families were 
associated with coming to judgements. This section will consider participants’ 
reactions to the physical environments or appearances of children and families, as 
well as a focus on the embodied, interactional and relational nature of social work, 
doing direct work, home visits, meetings, and the ways in which interactions and 
building relationships over time with individuals could also change perceptions of 
them. First, I explore the role of ‘pivotal moments’ involving embodied encounters 
with children or family members. 
6.3.4.1 Feeling sure and pivotal moments  
In the pilot study it was striking that there seemed to be pivotal moments for 
participants during the decision making process which helped them feel more sure, 
or alerted them to important considerations. I thought it would be useful to explore 
the nature of these further, so in the individual interviews that followed I added to 
158 
 
my question about what made them feel sure this was the right decision, asking 
additionally if there were any moments they could point to. All the participants 
responded with a description of a significant moment. These instances were not 
described as pivotal in the reasoning leading to the decision, which was presented as 
a more rational process.  It was more that these moments helped the participant to 
feel sure they were making the right decision, or in some cases changed a perception 
or provided the final impetus for action. Some of the examples below were in answer 
to the question I asked, and some were mentioned at other times in the interview. 
Several of these pivotal moments related to seeing a change in a child or children, for 
example: 
because it was neglect and abuse and it was so chronic, the change in those 
children was so significant – so quickly – that we knew it was the right 
decision (SP7). 
seeing the girls and working with the girls did give me a lot of joy – to see kind 
of the progression, but you know, the eldest being very proud when she got a 
good report in her school, you know, I think it's that that kind of helps you – 
about making the right decision (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
In some cases the actions of the parent created a significant moment and, in this 
case, the impact on the child as well:  
when she let the father into the home and left him with the children, and 
lied, to me and other professionals about actually happened and then when I 
saw her children, and one of them was shaking and crying whilst he was 
telling me what happened and how he felt – that's when I knew that was the 
right plan for them (SP4). 
Or the parents’ level of understanding and ability to understand the child’s needs:  
The thing that made me think this is definitely right for this child, er is hearing 
both parents give evidence on the stand, and kind of looking at their insight 
into how their behaviour could potentially harm their child – or being able to 
identify how actually they weren't able to acknowledge any risks, not only 
from themselves but from their social network. That definitely made me 
recognise that the right decision had been reached. . .So having all the 
information that I could gather allowed me to reach to reach that decision, 
but then observing parents within the final hearing process sort of cemented 
that view (SW2). 
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This is only a selection. All but one of the pivotal moments described in the 
interviews involved personal and embodied observation or interaction with a family 
member or child, and an element of emotion. They were not presented as part of the 
reasoning process for the decision itself, but may be seen as consistent with 
literature reviewed in the previous chapters about the role of emotion in decision 
making, such as views of Pfister and Bohm (2008) of how emotions function to enable 
people to come to decisions and stay committed. Also relevant are Haidt’s (2001) 
views that reasoning follows moral judgement and is used to confirm it, and that 
emotion is part of both the initial intuitive judgement and the post-hoc reasoning 
process. In stages 3 and 4 of his model (the reasoned persuasion link and the social 
persuasion link) it is the affective responses triggered in individuals, often linked with 
visual imagery, that persuades them of the rightness of their initial judgement.  
Many of these pivotal moments, involving concern about a parent’s understanding of 
a problem or ability to keep the child safe and prioritise their needs, or joy at seeing 
the positive change in a child, could also be seen as linking to an ethics of care in 
focusing on the caring relationships and care of the child (see section 3.2.12). These 
moments and their impact are intimately related to the embodied nature of social 
work. In contrast, in the court arena, unless the parents or family members give 
evidence, these embodied moments will not occur, and written evidence is key.   
6.3.4.2 Home conditions and physical appearances: 
Ferguson (2011) describes intimate child protection practice as a ‘a deeply bodily 
experience in which all the senses – sight, smell, touch, hearing – are used’ (p16), and 
argues the importance of practitioners recognising the impact of these aspects on 
themselves, including the impact of disgust and fear of contamination, but also that 
practitioners feel discomfort about acknowledging this. In the interviews the home 
conditions were only rarely mentioned initially as key considerations in coming to the 
decision, and in some cases arose in response to my direct question about the impact 
of home conditions and physical appearances. 
Some vivid physical descriptions were given to illustrate points of concern. One 
participant stated that she would ‘never forget reading that within the house a dog 
ate another dog – like a different breed. . .I can't let go of that – it's massive’ (SW6). 
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Another described how a ‘little girl took a biscuit out of a dirty nappy on the table 
when I was there’ (SP1). Generally the descriptions were linked to concerns about the 
parent’s lack of awareness or understanding of the impact of them: 
when you walk up the path you can smell the house, when the windows are 
open it does smell really strongly, and it's not clean. . .If you turned up 
unannounced it would be worse than if it was announced, but I think their 
threshold for what was clean and tidy you know I could stand there and be 
almost not able to breathe, and dad wouldn't see a problem with that (SP7). 
. . .dog faeces, then the toilet's overflowing and all the beds are jagged on the 
edges, you know – there's no thought about that for a toddler (SW6) (v. exp. 
in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
However, in this case of emotional neglect involving a five year old child the house 
was very clean: 
The house was so so clean. . .So clean you could eat off the floor it was that 
clean. It was one of the cleanest houses I've been to. . .[the child’s] room was 
the only room where her clothes were in bin bags or on the floor. She had no 
cupboards in which to put her clothes in, erm mother's idea was that she was 
treated more like a mate or a lodger than her daughter. Mother's room was 
very beautifully furnished. . . [the child] didn’t like the fact she had to root 
through bin bags to get her clothes out. So that formed part of the neglect. I 
had to write where her clothes positioned in her room in black sacks. . .The 
house was immaculately clean and tidy but not [the child’s] bedroom. She was 
expected to clean it (SW5). 
Aspects of the physical appearance of the person were also sometimes striking, for 
example: 
I could see that she was using something – her eyes were not quite right. I 
looked in the bins and then she broke down, and admitted it straight away 
(SP6) (exp. in care procs). 
In one case the practitioner’s observation of the appearance of one child in the family 
in comparison to his siblings was pivotal in leading to a safeguarding intervention as it 
transpired that this child was receiving a different level of care from his siblings: 
He just looked like a lost little soul. . .really tiny for his age. But then the 
difficulty is that no other health professionals had ever raised that as an issue 
or a concern. . .I kind of like challenged the health visitor on it a number of 
times and saying you know I think we do need further assessment because I'm 
not happy with what you're saying. . . He was very small in comparison 
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because mum and dad are very tall actually, and the older one's quite tall 
(SW3). 
In a sense this child had been ‘invisible’, not ‘held in mind’ by his parents or other 
professionals, rather like one of the children described by Ferguson (2017) who was 
treated differently to her sibling, although in SW3’s case she as the social worker was 
able to ‘see’ him. Even then, however, she had to keep challenging for a further 
assessment. Later on she described him as ‘thriving in foster care, absolutely grew, 
put on weight, completely changed little boy really’. 
6.3.4.3 Relating to children 
As discussed in earlier chapters, relationships are central to social work (eg Ruch et al 
2010; Ingram 2015a). In the interviews there was a great deal of talk about the lived 
experiences of relating to the children and adults in the families, building 
relationships, spending time visiting and doing direct work. I have included this 
section as part of the theme of Care proceedings decision making as a social and 
embodied process to illustrate the importance in the data of time spent in 
relationships and embodied interaction with families as a background to, and 
influence on, decision making. 
High importance was given to the relationship with the child, and it was clear that it 
also took time and effort to build these relationships and establish trust with 
children. Participants expressed concerns about the impact on the child of 
transferring cases to another team at a time of significant changes for the child, for 
example:   
The girls had had a relationship with the previous social worker for 3 years. 
The first time they met me she sat with her piece of paper in front of her face 
because she didn't want to tell her story to another (SW8) (v. exp. in care 
procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
There was also a feeling of loss for the transferring social worker, who might remain 
concerned about the wellbeing and future outcome for the child. Cases might also be 
transferred once the proceedings were concluded, to enable an experienced social 
worker to take on another care proceedings case, and one senior practitioner (SP10) 
explained that she had negotiated to keep the case after the proceedings had 
finished because of her concern about the impact on the girls she was working with. 
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For social workers to gain a rich insight into a child’s world it is necessary to spend 
time building up trust and relationship with the child (Tait and Wasu 2012), tune in to 
the child’s world (Woodcock Ross 2016), and be emotionally available (Lefevre 2010). 
There was evidence of these aspects in the interview data. Some of the participants 
talked in rich and vivid detail about their interactions and relationships with the 
children, all of which helped build a picture of their needs and create windows into 
their lived experience.  
For example this participant provided a rich picture of the changes in the children she 
was working with after they had been in a foster placement for a while: 
it was the best anyone had ever seen them really. . .I remember the first time 
I met them and I went into the living room and I literally had all of them on 
top of me, and I'd never seen these children before and they had their arms 
around me hugging me trying to kiss me, and I remember being really like just 
it was almost overwhelming because I'd never seen children that young be so 
sort of attached to someone they'd never met before, and towards the end of 
our involvement when I went to go and see them, you know they came to 
greet me but they weren't obsessive about me, they saw me as someone they 
knew and they were happy to see me and they stayed near their carer which I 
hadn't seen them do that before with their grandparents or with their mum 
(SP5). 
The social worker working with the five-year-old girl quoted above in 6.3.4.2 
described that once when taking child and mother to the school she held the child’s 
hand when crossing the road. The child then said her mother never held her hand 
crossing a road because it was ‘babyish’: 
But when she said it was babyish and walking into school she said to me 
'[name] can we walk very very slowly into school, because she said ‘I just want 
to feel your skin on my hands because I love holding hands’. . .and whenever 
we met after that I always made a point of always holding out my hand to her 
if she wanted to, to let her to take it if she wanted to, but I just always went 
like that to her – whether that was right or wrong I don't know but I always 
did that – but from then on she always grabbed my hand but really held it 
tightly so tightly I could always see the white of her hands that clenched mine 
(SW5). 
However, a challenge for this social worker was then to present the child and her 
situation ‘on paper’ for the court: 
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describing this little girls’ life in words enough to get an interim care order and 
to portray her world succinctly and as the court want it, so succinctly now that 
it’s putting her world on a piece of paper that’ll be read, that will do justice to. 
. .what this little girl’s life is for her every day, and what it means for her. But 
how she experiences it, and that is very very difficult to put down in words 
(SW5). 
6.3.5   Changing perceptions: ‘you can read on paper but it’s not who they really are’ 
The previous extract showed how difficult it was to translate embodied, interactional 
knowing of a person into ‘a piece of paper’. Correspondingly, participants also gave 
examples of the limits of written accounts in conveying what a person was really like, 
illustrating the difference between reading about families and actually knowing them 
through embodied interaction. One manager talked about how it helped to meet 
families: 
It always helps to put a face to a name. I might read reams of paper and 
assessments and case notes about families and I might talk to social workers 
in supervision about families. . .but it's always good to meet them, and. . .it 
really does help me think about them, as not a case, as a person with needs 
(TM1) (v. exp. in care procs). 
Sometimes interaction over time and building a relationship led to a change in 
perception, for example from a negative to a positive view: 
What I knew of him was through paperwork, was through previous evidence, I 
knew that he'd been a drug user, I knew that he had been a drug dealer in the 
past. So my opinion of him was very low, and I was not in favour of the girls 
going with him one bit. However, when the order was made I very quickly had 
to build a relationship with him. . .I've got to know him better and I've come 
to know his character and a little bit more about what he thinks is important, 
and I've seen how he – how he is around the girls, and actually my view has 
changed of him (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
Later she expressed it succinctly: 
But you know there’s so much history and so much knowledge that you have 
to get, and nothing replaces the knowledge that you have of actually 
physically working with these families. You can read on paper but it’s not who 
they really are (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
This is similar to a point in Whittaker’s (2014) study in which participants spoke of a 
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difference between ‘paper versus flesh and blood families’. 
This section on Care proceedings decision making as a social and embodied process 
has highlighted the importance to practitioners of discussion with colleagues and also 
of the embodied interactions and relationships with the children and families they 
worked with. Examples have been given of how both of these areas not only 
contributed to the process of coming to judgements and decisions, but could also 
lead to changed perceptions and new directions. They illustrate that decision making 
and reasoning processes in care proceedings cannot be isolated as objective, 
cognitive and unbiased thinking processes, detached from the embodied, 
interactional, uncertain and ‘messy’ world of social work practice.  
6.4  The interface of the court world and the social work world 
In contrast, there was a sense that going to court for practitioners meant stepping 
into a different world. But this world, and its corresponding ‘worldview’ also exerted 
an influence that extended back into the everyday practice of the social workers, not 
only in timescales and processes imposed by the Public Law Outline (PLO), but also 
through the pressures of contrasting ideologies, principles and views of evidence.  
Some of the pressures, frustrations and ethical tensions that arose for participants 
through contact with the courts will be discussed in the next two chapters. The 
current chapter will focus on three themes relevant to the journey and landscape of 
the decision making process: losing control; shifting paradigms; and the nature of 
evidence. 
6.4.1   Losing control 
6.4.1.1 The power of timescales  
Participants experienced the PLO and 26-week court timetable as structuring their 
work to some extent, in combination with internal planning and approval processes.  
it had to be um kind of guided by the court timetables to be honest – we had 
to have reached a certain decision and within that decision there’s a huge 
amount of paperwork, and internal processes that need to be met by 
different timescales in order to apply for the placement order. . .So I know if 
I’m going to proceed with that option, I need to have my evidence finished 
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and sort of signed off and sent over by this date, for that to be agreed or 
heard at panel by this date. So there is a huge amount of pressure in terms of 
the options available to you (SW2). 
However, delays could be caused by additional family members ‘popping up’ towards 
the end of proceedings that the judge wanted assessed, particularly after the Re B-S 
judgment. Frustration was also expressed that the local authority might have worked 
hard to be ready but delay was then caused beyond the 26 weeks by the court not 
having space, or adjourning hearings to make decisions about finances such as 
payments for the Guardian. In one case (the child of short stature above) a delay was 
caused by the judge not wanting to pass the case over to anybody else ‘because it 
was such an interesting kind of case’ (SW3). 
6.4.1.2 An alien world: ‘it’s all about the lawyers’, and ‘are we allowed to talk to each 
other?’ 
There was also a sense that social workers, who may have been working intimately 
with a case for some time, suddenly lost control to lawyers and mysterious processes 
taking place behind closed doors. One described it as ‘so far removed from 
everything to that point’ (SP3). A feeling of powerlessness was conveyed at the way a 
carefully thought out plan based on intimate involvement with a case over a period of 
time could be challenged by lawyers, the judge, or the Guardian who may not know 
the children but whose views are valued above those of the social worker. This 
paradox that in order to gain control over the case (through gaining a care order), the 
social worker has to experience a loss of control is noted by Dickens (2006). Social 
workers’ assessments, plans, and all their work completed so far became subjected to 
scrutiny and challenge. 
you have the lawyers talking to each other in rooms, and you don’t know 
quite what’s going on, and. . .families don’t know what’s going on either. And 
I’ve been in a position of sitting outside a court room chatting to the 
grandmother and she said, oh are we allowed to talk to each other – we’re on 
different sides. And I said well yes this is OK. But you know, I think it’s the 
adversarial bit of it, with people being sort of put on different sides but then 
not having any power over it, because, you know, it’s all about the lawyers 
(SP1). 
As Wellbourne (2016) points out, many issues are decided in informal negotiations by 
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advocates in meeting rooms rather than in court. The content of these discussions 
and how interests and views of children or parents are represented may be unknown. 
The family member above asking ‘are we allowed to talk to each other?’ illustrates 
not only the incomprehensibility of court processes to families, but also the shift to 
an adversarial stance from the expectation of a collaborative working relationship 
with family members, a tension also identified by Beckett et al (2007) and Burns et al 
(2018). Other participants (four interviews) also mentioned the discomfort where the 
focus of the work shifted completely from keeping the family together to seeking to 
remove the child: 
when it goes into court sometimes it feels a bit, you know, you versus them, 
and it becomes a bit of a battlefield sometimes I think when it gets into court, 
which is hard you know. When it's on a child in need level or child protection 
level you're doing as much as you can to keep that family together, so you're 
trying to support them as much as possible, but in care proceedings the 
dynamics seem to change (SP5). 
Concern was also expressed about the obscurity of the language of court evidence 
which might be outside the comprehension of some family members: 
another thing that I sometimes struggle with – we write court proceedings in 
this way that a family member probably wouldn’t even understand, and that 
annoys me. . .They have to be formal but. . .a lot of the families we work with 
might not have brilliant reading and writing. They need help even with 
standard letters, and then we’re giving a 30-page parenting risk assessment 
which is all full of jargon and complex language and they just have no hope 
really do they (SP5). 
The game-like nature of court processes is referred to by social workers in the study 
by Beckett et al (2007), with its features of being an adversarial contest, trading deals 
and fighting for the adults rather than the needs of the child. In the current study the 
idea of a game was not explicitly stated, but the same sense was conveyed of this 
being a contest belonging to the lawyers who would be sparring over the needs of 
the adults, and with its own complex set of rules that needed to be learned.  With 
experience, however, court work could be interesting and become the best part of 
the work. One of the practitioners in the experienced focus group stated that the 
court work was her favourite part of the job. This again reflects a view expressed in 
Beckett et al’s study that court could be exciting.  
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There was consensus that the Guardian’s view was clearly prioritised in the courts 
(again this is consistent with social workers in the study by Beckett et al (2007). 
However, two participants found the Guardian’s opposition to the original plan to 
lead to a positive change of plan.  
Sometimes it felt as if the pre-proceedings process ‘stood for nothing’ as work was 
repeated – echoing one of the points arising in research about the pre-proceedings 
process by Dickens and Masson (2016). There were many references in the interviews 
to participants feeling criticised, not listened to, and generally treated very differently 
to the Guardian, or other professionals. In many instances these issues led to a great 
deal of frustration, and will be considered in more detail in chapter 8. 
6.4.2   Shifting paradigms and ‘working in the shadow of the law’ 
In some ways an ideological gulf appeared to be opening up between local authority 
children’s services and the approach of the courts in the wake of the 2013 landmark 
judgments of Re B and Re B-S, in relation to how children’s best interests were 
perceived. Two participants spoke of Re B-S changing the practice and outcomes of 
courts. There were references to children being ‘sent home’ at final hearings, with an 
increasing instance of no order being made at the final hearing. One significant 
development mentioned in both focus groups and ten individual interviews was the 
increase and change in use of Special Guardianship Orders to keep the child within 
the extended family, consistent with the national picture (DfE 2015; Masson 2017).  It 
also seemed that case-holding social workers and Guardians were looking for a 
different level of care, and this is explored in the next chapter. 
The fall-out from the judgements was also resulting in additional work: 
We got to a point some time ago where we found that every placement order 
was being appealed. And so the judges tightened up their judgements, and in 
so doing they required from us more assessments and more types of 
evidence, so it had a knock on effect (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
In her article about Re: B and Re: B-S as ‘disruptive judgments’, Masson (2017: 416) 
refers to the phrase ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ originally used by Mnookin 
and Kornhauser (1979) to refer to the way lawyers’ negotiations were shaped by 
what they expected the courts to decide. Masson points out the declining number of 
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placement orders nationally has been partly due to judges being more reluctant to 
make orders, but has also been a result of fewer applications being made by local 
authorities, with local authority lawyers advising against applications for care or 
placement orders where evidence was thought to be insufficient. A number of 
comments by participants were consistent with the idea that these judgments were 
having an impact on practice, planning, assessments of family members and options 
being considered, so to some extent their practice could be seen as working ‘in the 
shadow of the law’.  
6.4.3   Priorities of evidence, and getting ‘drowned in paperwork’ 
Preparing the written evidence was discussed in both focus groups and cited in ten of 
the individual interviews as one of the greatest challenges of court work, in terms of 
both the volume and the nature of it, as well as needing to capture ‘the child’s world 
on a piece of paper’ as mentioned earlier. Participants spoke of pressures of being 
expected to write high quality statements as quickly as possible. 
There also appeared to be a clear difference between social workers and the courts 
as to what should count as salient in evidencing significant harm to a child.  The 
courts were focused on incidents and measurable evidence, and appeared not to 
share social workers’ concern about the level and nature of care received by the 
child. These differences reflect a tension between a positivistic and a more relational 
orientation to knowledge, as well as to what was seen as an important indicator of 
harm. There were a number of comments about the difficulty in convincing a court of 
the impact of neglect and the need for an incident, or that they would never get an 
order because ‘nothing had happened’.  
it feels like if there’s no disclosure by a child, or if there’s not one massive 
significant event, it’s really difficult for – to get that point across in the court 
arena, about the longstanding effects on these children (SW6) (v. exp. in care 
procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
But what my hardest challenge was, was doing my statement for court, in 
proving emotional abuse – proving that in court. I’ve had another case where 
a mother as a heroin addict has dropped her newborn baby on the floor in the 
hospital – that was relatively easy (SW5). 
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Also identified was the courts’ increasing interest in PAMS assessments as apparently 
a more objective and thorough way of measuring parenting ability. Examples were 
given of practitioners requesting internal funding for a PAMS assessment and being 
turned down by the internal local authority funding Panel, to then go to court and be 
instructed to provide one and be questioned about why one had not been completed 
at the pre-proceedings stage. Two different practitioners spoke of coming up with 
their own version of a PAMS-like assessment before a case went to court, in order to 
pre-empt this situation. 
In addition, five practitioners specifically expressed concern that the amount of 
paperwork reduced the time they had to work directly with the children and their 
families involved or others in their caseload, one (SP8) describing this as ‘sadly we do 
just get drowned in paperwork’. Anxieties about this aspect will be considered 
further in chapter 8. 
Thus the shadow of the courts extends over practice, imposing timescales and 
paperwork, shaping the plans and outcomes sought, and even influencing how social 
workers spend their time with other families not in proceedings. Once in court the 
case is removed from the embodied, emotional and relational realities of work with 
persons, where work may focus on trying to help a parent understand and change, 
and becomes a static contest of points to be won through the quality of written 
evidence and argument. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Participants presented coming to decisions as a cognitive process based on evidence 
and analysis, set within and guided by the organisational and court contexts, 
although, like participants in studies by Hackett and Taylor (2014) and Whittaker 
(2014) their sense-making and reasoning processes included some features of pattern 
recognition and story building associated with intuition and experience as well as 
weighing, balancing and triangulating. Emotion was not viewed as part of the 
reasoning process except for ‘gut feelings’ which could alert to an issue that needed 
to be checked through gaining further evidence.  
The process of making judgements and decisions was also a social and embodied one, 
involving discussion with colleagues, as well as embodied interactions and 
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relationships with children and their families. These included emotional dimensions, 
and could make a difference to perceptions and the outcomes of assessments or help 
the practitioners to feel sure they were making the right decision.  
The context of care proceedings and the courts also had significant impacts on 
practitioners, leading to practice in some ways being carried out ‘in the shadow’ of 
the courts. A sense was conveyed that going to court was in some ways like stepping 
into a different world – a world with a powerful impact on practitioners’ emotions, as 
well as their thinking and practice.  
Although I have not yet presented data specifically focused on ethical and emotional 
dimensions in this chapter, there have already been indications of their part and 
interplay in the practitioners’ perceptions and experiences of the decision making 
processes. The next chapter will focus in more depth on themes arising in relation to 
the ethical dimensions of coming to these decisions, and further links between 




7 Chapter 7. Findings (2): Ethical Dimensions 
7.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter a number of themes and patterns were discernible in the 
data, in particular relating to: significant factors in framing, sense-making and 
thinking processes during decision making; the embodied and interactional nature of 
social work and its role in decision making; the importance of discussion; and the 
impact of the courts on the practice of social workers. Some elements of ethical 
thinking and emotions were evident in participants’ talk about the decision making 
processes. The current chapter further illuminates the relationship between ethical 
thinking, emotion and decision making.  
This chapter focuses on the ethical dimensions that featured in participants’ answers. 
Some of these were directly identified by participants in response to a question about 
what ethical dimensions did they see in the case, and some themes and ideas arose 
from what they said elsewhere in the interview.  
As discussed in the literature review, ethics and values are difficult to delineate, and 
also permeate all aspects of practice and policy.  When reading the data it is in some 
ways harder to decide what is not an ethical dimension. As suggested by Banks and 
Williams (2005) and mentioned earlier in 3.3, ethical dimensions can be seen as 
encompassing ethical issues, tensions and dilemmas. I am also including the role of 
ethical principles, expectations, theories and perspectives as they operate in practice, 
and the impact of the many macro and micro constructions that have an influence in 
social work decisions and practice with families in this area of work.   
It was not one of my aims to study specifically which ethical theories and approaches 
were used by the participants; however, elements of many of these were apparent in 
the data and will be commented on in places in this chapter. 
Because there are so many, and in some ways quite disparate (though often 
intersecting) themes arising from the data, ordering and organising them has been 
complex. The order I have chosen roughly corresponds to the Values and Ethical 
Principles section in the BASW (2014) Code of Ethics (interpreted broadly), namely 
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Human Rights, Social Justice and Professional Integrity, with the addition of a section 
on the Ethics of Care.  
7.2  Rights 
Many comments were made by participants which related to a concern with the 
rights of either child or parent, and in some cases linking to tensions between these. 
The tensions between Fox Harding’s (1997) four main child care policy perspectives 
(see 2.2.2) are at times discernible in the data, either as implicit in the broader 
context of the work or taking shape more obviously within viewpoints expressed by 
participants. 
7.2.1  The draconian nature of separating parents and children 
The draconian nature of the decisions was experienced as a tension in particular by 
six participants who had come to the conclusion that it was in the best interests for 
the child to be removed from the parent, but still felt torn about the far-reaching 
implications of this decision, especially where adoption was the plan. 
I think the only thing I found very difficult in my own values it was that if we 
were looking at an adoption order for the younger children, I felt sort of 
morally quite sad that that meant that these children would have no contact 
with their birth mother, or very limited contact. . .It felt very uncomfortable 
for me almost because although I knew that these children needed to have 
stability and adoption is probably the best way of doing that, I did feel that 
those child’s parents, or the mother might not be able to have contact with 
them again, and that made me feel quite awful at times, if we did go down 
that route, that you know this mum’s given birth to these 2 children. Although 
she can’t look after them she still loves them a lot (SP5). 
While presenting this as an issue relating to values, this social worker speaks of 
finding it ‘difficult’ and finding something ethically difficult was clearly linked to an 
experience of emotional discomfort: feeling ‘morally sad’, ‘very uncomfortable’ and 
‘quite awful’. 
There was a sense that it was somehow humanly wrong to separate child and parent 
(even though it felt right in other ways) because she has given birth to them and 
loves them, and a concern for the extreme loss that would be experienced by both 
child and parent. It is hard to separate the elements of emotion and ethical thinking; 
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this link between perceiving, thinking and feeling can often be seen in the data and 
will also come into the Emotional dimensions chapter. 
A mixture of ethical approaches can be identified in the above extract.  
Consequentialism is present in terms of the impact of intervention and conceptions 
of benefit or harm to the children and mother. Deontology can be seen in relation to 
the rights of both mother and children to have contact or a continuing relationship 
although this would interfere with the children’s needs for stability, as well as Kantian 
principles of respect for persons, and how far the mother should be treated as merely 
a ‘means to an end’ or not. The social worker’s intention appears to do what is right 
and uses reason to try and determine this, which also links to a Kantian approach, 
although in contrast she is allowing emotion a strong role in the reasoning process. 
There are also elements of ‘recognition’ in her acknowledgement of the mother, and 
ethics of care in her appreciation of the mother’s love for her children and in the 
social worker’s own care and commitment towards both children and mother.  
The issue of removing a newborn baby from a mother in hospital was mentioned by 
several participants (five altogether, with three using that case to focus on). In the 
following case it was the mother’s first child: 
The case was a newborn baby first born to mother, and to initiate care 
proceedings to remove that child with a view of permanency with adoption. . 
.It's just quite a few people's opinion quite a draconian measure to remove a 
first born, where mum hadn't had an opportunity to parent (SW4). 
This removal had taken place following the birth, causing heart-searching to this 
social worker, and debates within the team, as to whether it was fair to allow a 
mother a few days with her baby in hospital before the baby was removed. The social 
worker described considering whether it was fair towards the mother to allow her to 
bond with the baby before losing him/her – or was it fair not to allow her to have this 
time, take photos and so on. Also, which was better for the child – to be able to start 
forming an attachment with a foster carer immediately, or have the disruption of 
being cared for by mother and then moved – but on the other hand this would allow 
photos with her mother to be taken for the life story book. Again, elements of 
deontology and consequentialism are interwoven in the social worker’s reasoning. 
However, there was the added complexity that it was not clear to the team which 
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route was actually fairer to the mother, and what was in the best interests of the 
child, illustrating that these are not neutral concepts: ‘fairness’ and ‘best interests’ 
may be conceptualised differently according to the underlying assumptions and 
constructions held by different people.  In the end: 
we ran that past Queen’s Counsel – Queen’s Counsel said that that is 
extremely draconian, and he said the judge would throw that out. But it did 
cause – actually within the office it caused quite an ethical debate, about 
whether or not that sort of thing should go ahead (SW4). 
This illustrates that from the court’s point of view, decisions about removing children 
should be proportionate and use the least intervention to protect from harm, as 
advised in the Re: B judgment (Masson and Dickens 2015). 
The Re B and Re B-S judgments of 2013, with their focus on the draconian nature of 
adoption, have had a significant impact on the outcomes of proceedings and have led 
to the prioritisation of assessment of family members. For example, in one case, a 
maternal great-grandfather put himself forward ‘completely out of the blue’ at the 
final hearing leading to the case being put back a further 4 weeks: 
because adoption is such a draconian order it was felt there actually needed 
to be another opportunity – which it was a difficult one to work with as the 
child's social worker, because it meant delaying things for her (SP9) (v. exp. in 
care procs). 
Where such significant and far-reaching decisions were at stake the timescales 
themselves also become an ethical issue. In the case above, delay might be beneficial 
if it enabled a child to stay successfully within his/her family, but harmful if it 
needlessly delayed her permanent placement.  
There was also a view that decisions like this should not have to be rushed: 
I think a huge dilemma is the timeframes. . .being an adopted child affects her 
whole identity, and really cuts off those biological ties with her family, and I 
think for me knowing that I not only have the power to make those decisions 
but only have a limited timespace to make those decisions is really difficult 
(SW2). 
If you are pressured to come to a quick decision, is that always the decision 
that you are comfortable with emotionally?. . .If there’s something that’s 
niggling you, are you going to be able to have the time to really explore it 
properly. . .I suppose you can also justify it to families as well, that it’s not that 
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you’ve gone out and seen them twice, and rushed to a decision on the basis of 
a quick judgement of how they are on a couple of days, but it’s actually 
something that’s been explored in depth (SP1). 
Again, in both these extracts the link between ethical thinking and emotions is 
apparent, with the use of words such as ‘difficult’, ‘niggling’, or questions about being 
‘comfortable emotionally’. When a decision involved a significant ethical issue, such 
as changing a child’s identity or separating parent and child, it seemed important for 
it to feel right – and that it had been thoroughly considered without being rushed. 
This echoes points expressed in the Family Justice Review (2011) and other literature 
(see chapter 2) that courts’ mindfulness of the draconian nature of the decisions 
being made, and concern to make the right decision, was leading to delay through 
commissioning of multiple expert assessments, ensuring there was no rush to 
judgment and no stone had been left unturned. It follows then that, while reducing 
unnecessary drift in case duration, the subsequent implementation of the 26-week 
timescale and curtailing of expert assessments furthers the ‘bounded rationality’ 
involved in these decisions. At the same time it has potentially made the decisions 
more difficult by increasing the level of felt uncertainty involved, and placing a 
greater burden of responsibility on the quality of the social work assessment and 
evidence and the judge’s discretion. 
7.2.2   Separating siblings 
The decision whether to separate siblings was significant, and featured as an issue in 
nine of the interviews.  This was framed differently to the separation of child and 
parent. Where the decision had been made to separate a child from a parent this was 
often presented in the data as the culmination of a period of intervention and 
accumulation of sufficient evidence to satisfy the social workers, so they did not 
express doubts as the rightness of the decision, more their discomfort about the 
implications of it – an ethical ‘tension’ more than a dilemma (Banks and Williams 
2005). However, decisions about siblings appeared more difficult to make, and the 
level of uncertainty about making the ‘right’ decision appeared much higher. This was 
partly because it was harder to predict the long-term outcome of different options, 
and also because there was awareness that a decision to keep the children together 
or separate was likely to benefit one child at the expense of the other. This was 
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therefore an ethical dilemma rather than merely an ethical ‘tension’. Generally, 
keeping the children together was seen as beneficial for the older child but would 
prevent the younger from being adopted, while separation would be more beneficial 
to the younger but potentially harmful to the older child. 
So it’s a really difficult one, because potentially, in terms of thinking about the 
welfare of the children, you’re, you know are you sacrificing one for the 
other?. . .So it was that balancing, I think, was what made it so difficult, and 
thinking that the gain for one was going to be a loss for the other, and vice 
versa (SP1). 
In the above case the children were placed separately, whereas in the following one 
they were kept together: 
I think the discussion around them as sisters and actually what you could 
argue is the younger one has potentially missed out on having a permanence 
via a new family – I think that’s an ethical dilemma (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
Consequentialist thinking is apparent in the weighing up of relative amounts of 
benefit or harm to each child, but also deontological elements in that both siblings 
are viewed as equally important and have rights not to be ‘sacrificed’ for the other, 
and also perhaps in the duty of the social worker to both. Emotional commitments 
more in line with the ethics of care could also be seen in other comments by 
participants, revealing pleasure or relief when the outcome was to keep siblings 
together, and this also indicates an implicit valuing of the maintenance of family 
bonds.  
The level of uncertainty in making decisions about siblings, together with feelings of 
discomfort generated by having to choose one child’s needs over the other, and an 
influencing ‘practice mindset’ of ‘siblings as better together’, are also reported in 
research by Yates (2018). There is some support from research findings about the 
importance of sibling relationships (eg Gass et al 2007; Hegar and Rosenthal 2011), 
though they may vary in quality from supportive to conflictual (Cleaver 2006). 
However, statutory government guidance on adoption has now changed from 
guidance issued in 2013 that siblings should be placed together for adoption ‘unless 
there is good reason why they should not be’ (DfE 2013, 4.12), to the revised 
guidance of 2014 that decisions on whether siblings are placed together should be 
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based on a balanced assessment of the individual needs of each child in the group 
(DfE 2014, 3.15).  
7.2.3   Constructions of the best interests of the child and ‘good enough’ parenting 
When working out which option was the best for a child, or whether this or that 
family member would be able to meet the child’s needs, there seemed to be a clear 
underlying assumption that it would be best for the child to stay within the family if 
there was a suitable family member available. However, in terms of the principles 
and criteria used to judge the suitability of a placement there seemed to be a 
significant tension between the case-holding social workers and what they perceived 
to be the courts’ or Guardians’ views.  
This seemed to be cast along the lines of the tension between philosophies of ‘child 
rescue’ and ‘family support’ (Kirton 2009). The social workers often seemed to find 
themselves on the opposite side to the Guardian, both arguing that they were 
focused on the best interests of the child. The tension seemed to be between 
whether the ‘best interests’ of the child were conceptualised primarily as prioritising 
on the one hand the child’s need and right to remain in their birth family, or on the 
other, the child’s need and right to be kept safe and cared for (whether inside or 
outside their family). The Guardians seemed more aligned with the former and the 
social workers with the latter. This reflects Lowe’s (2002) points that conflicting moral 
claims may be rooted in the same moral resources (in this case the child) but are also 
linked to their historical and cultural contexts 
Participants’ accounts conveyed that the emphasis of the Guardians and courts was 
on whether parenting was ‘good enough’, focusing on the family member rather than 
the needs of the individual child, and that Guardians and/or courts interpreted this as 
just good enough and that it did not matter if there were concerns about the care 
provided. Choate and Engstrom (2014) also note the lack of a common standard in 
literature about defining ‘good enough’, as well as the complexity of determining 
this. A number of participants (four in particular) were concerned about instances of 
courts deciding to place children with grandparents where there had been concerns 
about the care the grandmother had provided for the child’s mother when she was a 
child. Concerns about the increased use of SGOs that may not be in the best interests 
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of the child, and that may be made without sufficient consideration of the 
placement’s long term viability, have also been raised by ADCS and Cafcass (2015) 
and practitioners consulted in the Government commissioned reviews (DfE 2015; 
Research in Practice 2015). 
In the following situation a grandmother was already caring for a baby’s 7 year old 
sibling but as there were concerns about the history of the case and the care of the 
older child the social worker was recommending placement of the baby with a 
different family member. The implication of this is that the threshold of concern for 
removing a child is much higher than the threshold when placing a child. Also, the 
younger age of the baby may have been a factor. From the court’s viewpoint, 
however, if it was good enough for the 7 year old why would it not be good enough 
for the baby: 
the court quite rightly were pushing me as to why I am suddenly saying these 
or this baby shouldn’t be with this grandmother who’s cared for the 7 year old 
for this long (SW7). 
Concern with the different interpretations of ‘good enough’ arose in Focus Group 1 
and two individual interviews. This participant felt very strongly about the situation, 
also again illustrating the connection between emotions and ethical considerations: 
I really struggle with the term what’s good enough as well – I really struggle 
with that, because, you know, in one breath as social workers we’re told you 
need to fight for your children on your caseload, you advocate what they 
need so they can have the best future possible. . .But actually if we’ve got real 
doubts about this family. . .you know, surely we should be saying for each of 
our children that they deserve a really good life, because they’re a child at the 
end of the day. And actually we’re saying we’re looking for less, and I struggle 
with that. . .I can’t get past my own feelings regarding this child, and I’ve 
made it quite clear that I will stand up and support my feelings regarding this 
– this decision because I really don’t feel that this child would be safe  (Focus 
Group 1). 
This participant conveys that it is not only the needs of the child that justifies finding 
the right placement, but the idea that the child deserves more than just good enough, 
the reason being ‘because they’re a child’. A construction of children as deserving a 
good life provides a strong focus for emotion and action, and also leads to a struggle 
to understand or accept a decision that seems to prevent this. This illustrates the 
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interplay between perception, ethical viewpoints, emotions and judgements, each 
contributing to the other. The wider organisational and professional context also has 
an impact in this interplay; the sense of struggle and conflict is greater when, in the 
social worker’s mind, the decision also seems to run counter to organisational and 
professional expectations of a social worker’s role and purpose. There is a sense that 
this construction of the child and the social work role are part of a moral professional 
identity which also involves standing up for the child. Emotions can be seen as an 
important part of professionals’ moral identity, accompanying and revealing their 
personal and professional values (Keinemans 2015). 
The notion of deserving was also expressed by another participant, who when 
describing the situation of a family of children she was working with and the severe 
neglect they were experiencing, became visibly moved when saying: ‘I kind of felt 
sorry for them. . .they deserve better’ (SW6).  Again, the interplay of emotions and 
value positions is visible. In this social worker’s account there appeared compassion 
for the suffering of the children combined with the construction of the children as 
innocent victims, deserving of protection and care. This links with Nussbaum’s (2001) 
writings about compassion, drawing from Aristotle, that ‘compassion is a painful 
emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune’ 
(p301). There is a sense that for this participant the emotional reaction to the 
children’s suffering seems both to feed into, and be strengthened by, the value 
orientation that it was wrong and undeserved.  
While these extracts demonstrate the particular commitment of these participants to 
individual children, this may also relate to collective emotions stemming from the 
idea of the idealised innocent child as explored by Warner (2015), and a tendency to 
displace negative feelings about parental neglect and poverty into collective 
commitment not to let it happen again. 
7.2.4   The sacrificed child 
Extracts above illustrate concerns that one sibling could be ‘sacrificed’ for another. 
But in another way it was sometimes felt that the child’s needs and well-being in the 
here and now were being sacrificed in order to gain evidence to protect the child, and 
this also generated strong emotions.  
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But you need the evidence, and that can be really difficult sometimes. Erm 
because it’s not there, and sometimes it feels like we’re having to leave 
children in situations of risk to get the evidence – it feels the wrong way 
around. So I think that’s a big challenge (SP10) (exp. in care procs).  
you’ve missed the boat, we knew there was some early indications, a lot of 
early indications, we didn’t need to get here, if we’d – but again it’s finding 
that evidence isn’t it, it’s kind of Catch 22 in this job, you’re trying to find the 
evidence to take the case to court to make your case but at the same rate 
you’re damaging a child you’ve damaged along the route and I find that really 
really frustrating (Focus Group 2). 
This links with research by Beckett and McKeigue (2010) showing that decision-
making for children’s long-term future may be prioritised at the expense of their 
needs in the here and now, in terms of the immediate impact on children’s well-being 
of moves, appointments and assessments during care proceedings. But the points 
expressed above also go further, implying that it is sometimes necessary actually to 
allow children to suffer further harm at home in order to obtain sufficient evidence to 
protect them from harm. This is based on the means being seen to justify the end. It 
illustrates the tensions between the ‘court world’ and ‘social work world’, and the 
influence of the ‘shadow of the law’ (see previous chapter) in shaping practice and 
implies from the court a more instrumental, disembodied view of the child. 
Sometimes the court delayed the decision in order to gain more evidence – for 
example through calling for further assessments of family members or a period in a 
mother and baby placement. It would feel as if the child’s welfare was being 
sacrificed for the principle of giving the parent a fair chance, together with further 
exploring the idea of keeping the child in the family as a possibility in the child’s own 
long term best interests. In the following case the social worker had asked the 
employing local authority to fund a cognitive assessment but had been refused, and 
then the court had insisted on one (so the ethical tension for this participant being 
caused by both the court’s decision and the LA’s earlier refusal to fund an 
assessment): 
we knew that she had learning difficulties but she hadn’t had a diagnosis of 
learning disability and the view was that you could do a PAMS assessment 
because it was an assessment tool of a parent with learning difficulties, but 
that we wouldn’t have the cognitive assessment. Then we got to court and 
initiated proceedings, and the first thing they did was ordered a mother and 
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baby placement because they wanted a cognitive assessment. And so we 
ended up with another 12 weeks in a mother and baby placement when we 
really should be separating that baby from that mother at that stage – that 
was appropriate for the baby. She is now adopted, and very happy. (Focus 
Group 2). 
It seems the ethical tension for the practitioner is greater, and may also be linked to 
feelings of frustration and anger, when it turned out the practitioner had been 
‘correct’, but had not been listened to by the makers of the decision (managers or 
court). Above and in other cases, a feeling of vindication was combined with a sense 
of the unjust power difference between the social worker who might know what is 
needed but is prevented from acting in the best interests of the child by the power of 
the organisation and the court. This is discussed again in the next chapter. 
Practitioners might also have to take responsibility for a plan or decision they 
privately did not agree with, and in some cases felt they themselves had let the child 
down:  
there's a sense when that happens that you do in a way let that child down, 
because you know actually that you've not done what needed to be done to 
allow that child to have the best future, because of you know the politics and 
whatever decisions have been made up above. And that can be really difficult 
to deal with (Focus Group 1). 
In the following instance the social worker had found it frustrating that the court had 
ordered an assessment on a family member late on, but also saw a positive in being 
able to evidence to the child that everything had been looked into. In this way the 
delay could be seen both as detrimental and in the child’s best interests: 
In this particular case it’s gone out of [the 26 weeks] and I think sometimes 
that can be to the detriment of the child and the family cos you’re not always 
necessarily making the right decision, so although I found it difficult with this 
particular case that we had to delay things, actually for that child when 
they’re older they’ll know that every single opportunity was given to try and 
keep her within her family (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
Some of the extracts above tap into the complexities of the social work role and 
identity. There is a sense conveyed that the social workers felt responsible for doing 
the right thing for the child, but felt prevented by more powerful forces, but that 
these were also the forces they themselves represented in their statutory role. They 
felt they let the child down, but at the same time felt let down by their organisation 
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or the courts. There is also perhaps some mirroring and displacement here, in an 
identification with the powerless children they were working with, and possibly some 
displacement of feelings about the parent onto the harmful organisation or court. 
This combination of guilt and powerlessness will also be considered in the next 
chapter. 
7.2.5   Adolescents 
Adolescents were mentioned a number of times in connection with ethics, thinking 
about their rights, and minimising harm to them.  
I think it’s kind of rare go to court with young people 14 and above. . .but I 
certainly feel in my experience that they’re the most chaotic young people 
going, and actually if we get it right earlier on – (Focus Group 2). 
This experienced focus group then had a discussion about traumatised adolescents 
who had suffered a great deal of harm through lack of intervention: 
you feel an anger that people didn’t make those better decisions earlier, and 
that’s hard and you’re right they are very chaotic because sometimes we 
leave them in those situations (Focus Group 2). 
As in earlier extracts there is a feeling that the adolescents had been let down by 
others’ decision making, but also the use of the word ‘we’ implies that the 
participants felt some identification with that responsibility.  
Awareness was expressed of the high level of risk teenagers may face at the same 
time as their needs often being seen as less urgent than those of younger children, 
with the assumption that teenagers are less vulnerable because of their age and that 
they appear to be making their own choices. Research and serious case reviews have 
drawn attention to the potential high vulnerability of teenagers, the impact of their 
stage of brain development with an increased drive towards risk taking occurring at 
the same time as undeveloped capacity for thinking and decision making, the effects 
of accumulation of harm; and the need to understand the particular sets of risk they 
face (eg Hanson & Holmes 2014; Hicks & Stein 2015). 
The following case of a 15 year old girl whose baby was subject of care proceedings 
illustrates a number of ethical concerns in the social worker’s eyes: 
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this is a vulnerable - was - she's now 16, but a vulnerable 15 year old, and 
actually as a social worker our role is to meet the needs of the child, but 
actually because even though she is a child with her own needs, her baby is 
taking that priority. As a professional I found that, and have found that difficult 
throughout really, because I've obviously got to know this mother quite well. . 
.and there are things that she finds difficult to understand, that because she 
had such a terrible upbringing – why is she still at home?. . .because when you 
look back at the history actually you know she should have been – she 
probably should have been removed. Erm the consequence of that is that it's 
led on to her to have a child that is now [removed]. . .Unfortunately what she 
can't understand is, if she's able to identify that the parenting she received was 
not good for her, and not to a good enough standard, but actually, why – why 
didn't we do anything? So therefore for her, well she is doing – she's doing a 
better job than her own mother (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
The social worker finds the injustice to the young mother difficult: it does not make 
sense that her own parenting is actually better than her mother’s (and she is aware 
of this), but her baby has been removed from her by the local authority while she was 
left with her mother whose care was worse, and still is left with her, in an 
environment that is seen as unsafe for her to bring up her own child within.  
If the issue of whether or not there was poor previous practice or decision making is 
taken out of the equation, this situation also illustrates the very different level of 
priority given in statutory practice to a baby over a teenager.  The baby is the subject 
of the care proceedings so her needs would be paramount under section 1 of the 
Children Act 1989. However, in the broader picture, consequentialist thinking can be 
seen in the idea of early intervention in a child’s life preventing later harm, and thus 
prioritising the baby’s needs over the (already harmed) teenager’s. But constructions 
of children may also have a role in policy, with the very young as the innocent 
idealised child, weak and in need of protection, in contrast to more ambivalent views 
of teenagers, no longer innocent victims and less morally deserving. Research by 
Broadhurst et al (2015) also indicates that younger mothers are more at risk of having 
repeat removals, with the probability of recurrence being 32% of sixteen and 
seventeen year olds. Those mothers experiencing recurring removals had themselves 
experienced considerable neglect as children (Broadhurst et al 2017). This also links 
with the wider debate between Ward and Brown (2016) and Bywaters (2015) 
regarding earlier publications of Brown and Ward (2013,2014; Ward, Brown & 
Westlake 2012) of their findings about harm caused to children through delayed 
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intervention, and whether this is contributing to an emphasis on removals of babies, 
or whether the emphasis should be on supporting families in situations of 
disadvantage.  
This is also an example where the mother’s level of need, arising from her own 
history, becomes construed as risk, in this case a risk to her own child. Lonne et al 
(2016) make the point that under neoliberal discourse, disadvantage and poverty 
have been transformed into indicators of risk. In this case, the social worker, having 
‘got to know this mother quite well’ keenly feels these injustices to her. Again, ethical 
thinking is intertwined with emotions in the feelings of injustice, guilt, frustration and 
sadness.  
7.2.6   The child’s voice 
The importance of the child’s ‘voice’ came up a number of times. There were two 
cases cited in which the child’s voice actually led to intervention and ultimately to 
care proceedings. In both cases neglect had been occurring for years but only became 
identified when, in one case a child became old enough to speak about what was 
happening, and in the other, an older and verbal child moved into the family and 
talked about the situation.  
In other examples, two participants in particular talked about how important it was 
to them that the court should hear the child’s view directly in the child’s own words. 
One had asked the children to write their wishes and feelings in sealed letters to the 
court.  The other recorded word for word what the child wanted to say into a 
document for the court. This was the social worker who in the previous chapter 
spoke of writing evidence about the five year old child’s life as ‘putting her world on a 
piece of paper’. She also spoke of trying to quote the child in court reports, but being 
told by the local authority legal department to cut down the quotes to make more 
space for the social worker’s analysis, and how she struggled with this: 
How much do you quote the child in a report? . . They said 'too long, take it 
out, take it out'. . .and I said don’t take – take out my bits, don't take out the 
child's bits. Don't take out the child's bits. . .but then you're told no you have 
to put in more of the social worker's – and I struggle with that. They said that 
judges don't want to read long reports but I'm thinking gosh if you've worked 
with a child for 18 months and you're told to cut it down and make it more 
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concise, take it out, take it out, and I'm saying don't take out the child's bits, 
please don't take it out (SW5). 
However, concern was also expressed that the child’s view may be disregarded: 
and the child may not be heard because the child’s too young or because the 
child’s assumed to be, you know, of the same view as the mother, whatever 
(Focus Group 2). 
Macdonald (2017) also makes the point that children are listened to more when what 
they say accords with the adults’ views.  
7.2.7   The ‘lost’ or ‘invisible’ child 
Although the importance of the child’s welfare and wishes and feelings in 
proceedings is stipulated by the Children Act 1989, and despite warnings from serious 
case reviews of children’s needs being overlooked in comparison with the needs of 
parents (Ofsted 2011), there were references in the interviews to the child being 
‘lost’ in the court proceedings as these often appeared to focus on the adults’ needs, 
to the point that it was painful that the child’s name may not even be mentioned in 
hearings: 
In many cases, we just end up grappling with issues around the adults, and 
what they're doing what they need, and what referrals need to be made. The 
children sort of get lost. Yeah and sometimes you don't even hear the 
children's name mentioned in court hearings, you know, it's all about what's 
happening with the adult. . .and no one says 'and how are the children coping 
with that'. Quite painful actually (TM1) (v. exp. in care procs). 
This and the following extract link with earlier points about the differences between 
the court and social work worlds and views of children as objects of concern. 
Court is very much you and the parent but social work is about you and the 
child and it's sort of trying to flip it back around. . .9 times out of 10 it's all 
about the parent, and getting it back on the child is the bit that I struggle with 
(SP3) (exp. in care procs). 
While in the study by Beckett et al (2007) the child’s welfare being ‘lost’ because of a 
focus on the adults’ issues in court was also a key concern, Beckett et al also note the 
groups in their study had comparatively little discussion about children’s views. The 
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greater emphasis on children’s views in data in the current study may reflect the 
increased emphasis in current practice on the child’s voice.  
Although concerned to prioritise the child, in a number of places participants were 
also concerned about balancing the child’s and the parent’s needs and rights. In one 
way or another this came up in 13 of the individual interviews and Focus Group 1. A 
clear example was: 
But also parents – our job is to kind of empower them and try and make the – 
try and help them, support them to make things better and get to a place 
where we want to, so just to kind of disregard their rights and views would be 
erm terrible practice – but actually . . .when the child’s rights are so very 
different or in contrast to parents, it’s very difficult to kind of weigh those up. 
. .That relationship for me was never altered in terms of – I am here to 
support you, and to try and help you, but actually I am your child’s social 
worker and I need to prioritise your child’s needs not yours (SW2). 
These words and those of other participants on this issue are more nuanced than the 
view put forward by Featherstone et al (2014) of social workers saying they are ‘only 
here for the child’. A feeling of conflict was conveyed by the social workers, even if 
they viewed the choice as clear that they must prioritise the child. 
7.3   Social Justice 
7.3.1   The parent as victim 
The idea of the parent being a victim, vulnerable and having suffered abuse was seen 
a number of times as an ethical issue in relation to mothers and once in relation to a 
father. The mother being vulnerable and having suffered herself led to sympathy and 
sometimes a wish for her to be cared for because she hadn’t been cared for enough 
before. Again there is a link between feelings, thoughts and ethical judgements. 
Views of parents as victims also link to the idea of ‘deservingness’ and rights 
discussed in the previous section. 
With mum, I kind of feel sorry for her. I felt sorry for her the whole way 
through. Cos she's very young, she's very vulnerable, and she's suffered a lot 
of abuse herself (SW6) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
I think it was difficult because you felt that she was such a victim. . .I felt she 
needed a foster placement, and if I could have given her a foster placement – 
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she needed to be cared for. . .and valued, and listened to, and regarded and 
respected, and I didn’t feel that she’d probably had much of that  (SW1). 
There was also at times an implication that being vulnerable and having suffered 
abuse also took any blame away from the mother, for example: 
It really wasn't her fault, but she'd had a horrendous upbringing herself, she'd 
been physically and sexually abused by her parents, and as she grew up and 
became an adult she was being financially abused by her parents (SW4). 
There is an implication that intervention is more justified, or less unfair, if parents are 
seen as culpable or accountable. This links to some extent with findings of a study of 
initial assessments that referrals were more likely to lead to action if the parent is 
perceived as accountable for problems (Platt 2006, cited in Platt and Turney 2014). 
The idea that the parent, already a victim in their life, was made again a victim by the 
Social Services involvement seeking to remove her child, has already been raised in 
connection with the teenage mother above. In that case the social worker was keenly 
aware of the injustices to the young mother and that she had been failed by a lack of 
intervention in her earlier life. Another participant below broadens this perception to 
highlight the oppressive nature of this, feeling that this was like ‘punishing’ parents: 
Is there something about the way that the state intervenes, and the decisions 
that we are making as employees of the state, which is oppressive, which is 
making a judgement about how somebody is living? And actually is there 
more support that could be done for – you know they were a family who 
were seriously disadvantaged. . .and you kind of think actually are we 
punishing her for a lack of intervention early in her life?. . .The mum had had 
a really horrible childhood, and we were trying to teach her how to do 
something that was very difficult actually. In some ways she was functioning 
still like a teenager, and was unable to put her children’s needs above her 
own. And was that her fault? And that’s the challenge with care proceedings. 
. .It feels you’re punishing parents for something which potentially they don’t 
have the ability or the resources to do (SP1). 
Other participants have referred to service users being let down by local authority 
interventions or lack of it, and there have been some references to the power held by 
social workers.  However, this participant (who was no longer a local authority social 
worker) was the only one to link this so clearly to ideas of being part of an oppressive 
State, punishing parents for something that was not their fault.  
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The above extract also recognises that it was very difficult for this mother to put her 
child’s needs above her own for various reasons. The ability to prioritise the child’s 
needs was mentioned in ten interviews, and a key issue seemed to be how far this 
appeared to be a conscious choice, or not the parent’s fault, again implying a link 
between accountability and intervention. 
In chapter 6 an example was given of a mother apparently choosing to stay with her 
abusive partner rather than prioritise the baby’s needs, leaving her new baby in a 
mother and baby placement to return to her partner, knowing this would lead to care 
proceedings. Earlier the mother had left her older children with a family member to 
return to the baby’s father, and at that stage work continued with her, but leaving 
her baby was decisive and the participant said ‘the day that she walked out and left 
baby there was the day that we issued care proceedings’. There is perhaps something 
particular in universal understanding about leaving a baby that draws a line. This may 
link with earlier points about constructions of babies and young children as more 
vulnerable, innocent and in need of protection. It may also link with the same 
perceptions mentioned earlier in this chapter that it is somehow wrong at a basic 
human level to break the bond between child and parent. An enforced separation 
arouses strong feelings of sympathy and discomfort, but a mother apparently 
choosing to leave her baby perhaps seems contrary to human nature. 
A similar situation involving the teenage mother mentioned earlier was not framed as 
a conscious choice of the mother to leave her baby:   
The placement she chose to leave in the end, and the consequence of that 
was leaving her daughter behind. . .So when the placement ended, mum left 
and baby was left behind, and then obviously work has had to continue to you 
know assessments and everything to get to a decision as to what we're 
approaching now (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
If a mother is presented as a victim of injustice and affected by her own needs 
without the implication that leaving her baby was a conscious choice, the impact of 
the wording is different. Framing a mother as in some way ‘choosing’ not to prioritise 
her children’s needs over her own enables her to be viewed as accountable, because 
control and conscious choice is implied, which can then be seen to justify a plan to 
separate child from mother, while framing the situation as one of ‘need’, vulnerability 
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or victimhood is linked with sympathy and even deservingness, which might imply 
that further work should take place. This could reflect the ‘shadow of the courts’ in 
the sense that it may be necessary to depict a parent as accountable or incapable in 
order to gain the decision sought in proceedings. As mentioned earlier, Urek (2005) 
shows how language may need to be used by social workers to construct narratives 
which may involve characterisation and moral constructions, as part of needing to 
persuade the audience that their work is justifiable and responsible. 
However, emphasising vulnerability may appear to be more consistent with social 
justice but as Brown (2012: 49-50) points out, also links to a moralising agenda of 
dividing the deserving from the undeserving, and ‘gives tacit emphasis to the 
individual factors which contribute to difficult circumstances, rather than the 
structural forces which may have influenced life chances and situations’. Also, as we 
have seen above, parents’ needs and the harm they have suffered can then become 
reclassified as risks that they themselves pose to their children. Associated with this 
may also be an instrumental view of parents merely as a means rather than an end – 
‘as impacting upon children rather than being in relationships with them and with 
each other, thus practice focuses on how their actions/inactions do or do not affect 
children’ (Featherstone et al 2014: 12).  
In this area of perceptions of need, fault, victimhood, deservingness, vulnerability or 
agency, the moral constructions, emotions and judgements seem to be impacting on 
each other, but it is not clear which comes first. Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist view 
is that initial judgements are made intuitively, prior to conscious thinking, and then 
conscious thinking is used to justify the judgement. Keinemans (2015) draws on a 
range of literature to argue that emotions can signal the values and moral 
constructions that are present in practitioners’ thinking, and therefore reflecting on 
emotions can help to bring these to self-awareness as well as understanding the 
impact of emotions on judgement.  
7.3.2   Poverty 
Home conditions were mentioned by several participants as an issue they were both 
concerned about and trying to support families with, and participants talked about 
taking food bank vouchers to families. The impact of poverty on parents or on 
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parenting was not named as an ethical issue by participants, which echoes the 
findings of Bywaters et al (in CWIP 2017) and Jack and Gill (2003) of the limited 
attention paid by practitioners to the impact of poverty on families. However, one 
social worker was concerned about the ethics of placing a child with a very affluent 
foster family, in a house the child described as a ‘fairy castle’, leading the child to say 
she never wanted to go back to her road again: 
Does anyone ever look at the poverty we take these children from, and into 
the rich world we submerge them in for a moment in time? (SW5). 
As indicated above, the idea of ‘disadvantage’ was seen by participants as an ethical 
issue, and this included material disadvantage. In a number of instances, as indicated 
above, poor home conditions formed part of the overall picture of neglect and 
therefore risk to the child. 
7.3.3   Class and ‘social engineering’ 
When talking about home conditions a number of the participants mentioned that 
people have different thresholds in relation to home conditions, and one described 
awareness of being a middle class professional going into a disadvantaged family. In 
2015, Munby’s judgment in Re A stated that neither the local authority nor the court 
were guardians of morality, and quoted the judgment in the 2014 case of NE 
Lincolnshire v G & L, that ‘the courts are not in the business of social engineering’. 
This was mentioned twice in the interviews.  
On the other hand, in focus group 1 there was also a discussion around concern that 
the courts, and possibly social workers, could be biased towards middle class 
professional families, and an example was given: 
They don’t present in the way that a lot of the families we work with, they’re 
reasonably pleasant on the surface in terms of working with, they’re not 
aggressive, they’re not in your face shouting being abusive, so I think people 
think and feel differently about it because of their behaviour . . . and social 
status, you know, perhaps their family have good jobs, you know, their family 
as a whole appear upstanding with the community, but there has been what 
is viewed as a non-accidental injury. . .if you take the same case, and being a 
middle class from a middle class situation and a working class situation I think 
you would probably end up in a different place (Focus Group 1). 
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Relevant to this is Bernard’s (2017) research which supports these perceptions and 
shows that abuse and neglect were more easily hidden or unrecognised in affluent 
households, with affluent parents also able to resist professional intervention 
through exerting power, status and use of complaints.  
7.3.4   Culture and ethnicity 
Culture and ethnicity hardly arose as an issue, but that may be because the 
population of this region is predominantly white. One participant having moved from 
another part of the UK talked about differences in the nature of child protection 
work, where her previous experience had focused more on forced marriages. Two 
participants talked about culture explicitly as an ethical issue in their case. One 
related to an Eastern European family where the social worker was concerned that 
removing the children from their parents would also separate them from their 
language and culture. The second involved a mother of an Asian ethnicity and culture 
in which the social worker felt it was important and good practice that the foster 
carers had continued the mother’s religious practices for the children.  
7.4   Professional integrity and guiding values, and the social work role 
7.4.1   Not doing harm 
In various ways participants were concerned about harm, and not doing harm. 
Examples have already been mentioned of participants’ awareness of harm 
experienced by children and young people either through actions or lack of action 
from parents and caregivers, or from interventions or lack of these from social 
services. The need to reduce either risk of harm, or further impact from harm, was 
one factor in decision making. It was also a factor guiding approaches to working with 
children and parents during the processes of the work, one example being ensuring 
that a mother had support from mental health professionals in place because of 
awareness that it was going to be very upsetting for the mother to be challenged on 
certain issues.  
7.4.2   Being fair to parents  
The idea of being fair to parents featured in Focus Group 1 and most (sixteen) of the 
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individual interviews. Sometimes the desire to be fair was associated with 
understanding the parents: 
We were trying to engage them in a process that they didn’t really 
understand. They were very resistant, they were very frightened, very scared, 
and I think to protect themselves from that, they shut themselves away and 
just refused to engage. . .we were trying to make them [participant’s 
emphasis] fit to a system that they couldn’t understand and couldn’t work 
with (SP7). 
Or it could mean ensuring the parents had a full opportunity to be able to prove their 
parenting capacity, for example arguing for them to have additional assessment 
sessions in a family centre (as in 6.2.1). 
cos I've reassessed her in some respects I had to kind of wipe my mind clear of 
everything that had gone on previously, to give mum the opportunity to have 
another - you know, a fair shot at this assessment (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
Participants also expressed concern not to be ‘biased’ regarding parents, and 
frustration when courts assumed they were biased. They spoke of being ‘balanced’, 
‘being open to all the possibilities’, not wanting to ’make assumptions’. Reflection, 
questioning and talking through issues in supervision were mentioned as ways of 
maintaining fairness. One participant was concerned that a mother with a learning 
disability should have an independent advocate, but she ‘just flatly refused’, because 
she liked talking to the social worker and did not want to talk to another person, 
leaving the social worker feeling ‘at what point can you force somebody if they don’t 
want something? – so that was quite difficult’ (SP7). 
7.4.3   Are we getting it right? 
Another recurring concern for participants was whether they were making the ‘right’ 
decision. The previous chapter explored how weighing and balancing was part of the 
decision making process. At times participants could see there were ethical 
arguments on both sides, for example that the parents needed more opportunity, 
which had to be weighed against the risks to the child and it was not clear what was 
‘right’.  
There might also be awareness that what seemed right in the short term may not be 
right in the long term, for example feeling sure it had been right to remove a child 
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from parents, but unsure about the long term impact on the child of being in care, 
and ‘only time will tell’ (SP10). 
In coming to the decision one consideration for participants (in ten interviews) was to 
weigh up whether enough had been tried, or could more have been offered that 
might have made a difference. For some, there was a continual self- questioning and 
reflecting over whether they had done the right thing, whether their analysis was 
correct and the outcome right, coupled with a strong feeling of responsibility to the 
child to get it right. The links with emotion are clear, as references were made to this 
being a ‘hard challenge’, ‘anxiety’, ‘self-doubt’ and finding it ‘really difficult’. These 
emotions were linked with uncertainty over what would be the best decision, and are 
explored further in the next chapter.  
7.4.4   Good practice 
‘Good practice’ was mentioned several times as important. On the one hand this 
seemed to include doing the job well, making sure their work was thorough, that 
evidence was of high quality and met ethical standards as discussed above, for 
example ensuring right decisions were made that were also fair and unbiased, and 
that they had done everything appropriate or possible.  
For two it also seemed to include going above and beyond what was expected. But at 
the same time some ambivalence was expressed that going the extra mile was 
helpful to the family but might not have been the best response in terms of managing 
the professional role and workload. This participant described actions and attention 
to details that she felt showed good practice, but then said: 
I think I gave more than I should. In terms of time management I don’t think I 
was effective in that (SW1). 
This could also have an emotional impact and affect the practitioner’s wellbeing: 
I put more strain on myself, by trying to get everything right and please 
everyone, you know, to a degree, whilst still obviously promoting the 
safeguarding of the children to the best of my ability. . .I’ve kind of gone out 
of my way to respond to everyone immediately. I feel like that’s kind of 
strained me (SW6) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
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There is a tension between the dual expectation that social workers will go the extra 
mile (and see that as an ethical responsibility) and at the same time they need to take 
self-care seriously to avoid burnout. This is explored by Weinberg (2014) who sees it 
as an ideological dilemma; social workers in her study struggled and fluctuated 
between the two positions, reflecting the implicit dilemma between needs of the 
individual against those of society. 
There were also many instances raised by participants, some already referred to in 
this chapter, where they felt previous poor or inadequate practice or decisions had 
not met the parent’s needs and were having an impact now. These included cases 
where they felt more intervention should have taken place earlier, or cases that had 
‘drifted’, or situations where the mother of the child had suffered harm when she 
had been a child herself and had somehow ‘slipped through the net’.  
7.4.5   Integrity and honesty 
Honesty was mentioned as important, for example being honest with children. This 
could be difficult: 
they’re asking you when am I going to go back to my mum, when am I going 
back to my grandparents, and you know that’s hard cos they’re asking you 
questions you’ve got to be honest but at the same time at the time you don’t 
really know and you’ve got to explain to them that’s the decision the judge is 
going to have to make, and explain to them in a child-friendly way (SP5). 
In one participant’s case there had been a plan to place the children with an aunt, 
who had also been a social worker. It then turned out that the aunt had been 
dishonest about an important issue. This had a strong emotional impact on the 
participant, the intensity of her feelings being greater because she had expected 
higher ethical standards from a professional, and she added: 
I suppose it touched me in a way because I feel that this job is a privilege, to 
have some sort of input into families' lives, and I expect all social workers to 




7.5   Ethics of care, commitment to child or adult 
There were many examples of feeling or motivation expressed that went beyond 
professional ‘duty’ or a clinical balancing of outcomes, or principles of professional 
integrity and good practice. Feelings of care and compassion about child or parents 
were often expressed. Often there was a strong sense of personal commitment to 
the individual, associated with the relationship, and a feeling of responsibility for 
them. This could also be seen in attitudes expressed by team managers in relation to 
workers they were supervising. There were clear instances of workers being strongly 
motivated to do their best for the child or in some cases, family members, going 
above and beyond the requirements of the role. Sadness, frustration and anger were 
felt when the child seemed ‘lost’ or let down, or frustration and distress when they 
felt they themselves had let the child down. Examples have been identified already, 
and more will feature in the next chapter. These aspects seemed to point to the 
importance in social work of an ethics of care, involving relationship and 
commitment. 
Other comments were made about wanting to support a parent to succeed, and 
keeping a family together. The level of care from the parent to the child was also 
important in the social workers’ perspectives and in relation to thresholds for 
intervention. This was in contrast with the perceived need for evidence of incidents 
that appeared to be necessary to convince a court to intervene, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  
Words were used which powerfully conveyed emotion:  one participant was ‘trying so 
hard’, another ‘desperate for this mother to prove something’, another ‘if I could 
have done anything in my power to keep mother and daughter together’, or a social 
worker described by her manager as ‘exhausted but still giving her all’, and another 
‘standing up for this little boy, passionate’. The next chapter will cite examples 
showing that working empathetically as well as authoritatively was challenging, and 
‘recognition’ of the parents as human beings with their own narrative could also 
bring powerful feelings of sadness. As pointed out by Bunting and Lazenbatt (2016: 
497), narrative approaches involve ‘sustained emotional and social support over and 
above the ‘traditional’ social work interventions that are routinely made available’.   
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Two interesting examples came up in which social workers went beyond their 
required role, in order to care for or protect a parent. In the first example the social 
worker speaks of continuing to offer support to the parents: 
I think – one thing I found quite weird in this case is still working with those 
parents, because we have never stopped, even though the children haven't 
been in their care for months and months and months. You know, they're 
really struggling financially and I took them a food parcel last week, and I 
always imagined when those decisions were made that you couldn't keep 
working with the parents, but actually that relationship – that relationship-
based practice – because I've got nothing else to use (SP7). 
In the absence of statutory or procedural responsibility to give direction to the work, 
the social worker finds herself falling back on relationship-based practice because 
there is ‘nothing else to use’, here illustrating that social work professional values can 
provide meaning beyond organisational requirements, and beyond an instrumental 
view of parents as only important insofar as they impact on their children rather than 
being ‘ends’ in themselves.  
The second example involved a mother also mentioned in the next chapter. The 
children were in foster care and subjects of care proceedings. However, in order to 
protect the mother from pressure from the violent father the social worker found 
ways of redirecting his annoyance onto the social work team rather than the mother: 
And also in some ways, it was to protect her as well, from him. Because when 
he became party to the proceedings, we were acting as a bit of a buffer I 
guess. . .In court, she sat with us. . . .And in fact the local authority solicitor 
said to her solicitor – there was one point that her solicitor was going to argue 
– and they said well actually this will be helpful to your client, because she 
won’t take the blame – it will come to us. . .So things like you know the 
contact letters would have to come by us, rather than you know to her, so 
there were  little things that I think were beneficial to her because she would 
have taken the brunt of his annoyance and anger, whereas it kind of came to 
us (SW1). 
The above examples of social workers committing themselves to their service users, 
involving a relationship of compassion and care and a sense of moral responsibility 
towards them, can be seen, as the social workers in Stanford’s (2008) study, to be 
enacting an ethics of care.  
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A link between ethics and emotions is again strongly indicated here, though as 
before, it is not clear whether emotions lead to a greater ethical commitment and 
motivation, or whether it is the other way round. There is some evidence from this 
study that emotions arise out of the relationship of care and commitment. For 
example SP4 stated that her relationship with the children led to her feeling 
protective of them and ‘the relationship I had with the children motivated me more’, 
and SW6 also said  ‘with all your cases, you kind of want them to do it, you really do’. 
In her explication of the ethics of care, Noddings (2013: 205) emphasises the 
importance of attending to the other. She writes:  
‘When we attend carefully, we often experience motivational displacement: 
that is, our motive energy begins to flow towards meeting the needs 
expressed by the cared for. The “feeling with” (empathy) that often results 
from our attending moves to do something to help’  
Noddings also considers situations in which the needs expressed by the cared-for 
person arouse disgust, or if we assess them as inappropriate, and in these cases she 
suggests that we should ‘respond in a way that will maintain the caring relation’. Thus 
it seems that for Noddings, the ethical commitment to ‘attend’ comes before the 
emotion.  
7.6   Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented data linking to ethical dimensions in three main 
sections which broadly correspond to the three sections of the BASW (2014) Code of 
Ethics: human rights; social justice; and professional integrity (and guiding principles), 
as well as the ethics of care.  
I have identified that the participants’ talk contains elements of deontological and 
consequentialist thinking as well as clear indications of virtue ethics and the ethics of 
care. Social and moral constructions are identifiable in the data, supported by use of 
language. Constructions and judgements at times seem closely linked, but it is not 
clear which comes first, the construction or the judgement.  
In the data, strong links between ethics and emotion can be seen.  Ethical conflicts 
and tensions are felt as difficult emotionally; constructions and value positions 
appear to be linked with levels of sympathy and frustration; concerns to make the 
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right decision lead to anxiety and frustration; emotion and relationship appear to 
motivate to action, but also emotion and motivation appear to spring from the 
relationship, attention and commitment to the other. Thus, emotions, ethics and 
judgement appear to interact, each continually affecting the other in a strong and 
complex dialogical relationship. These links will be underlined further in the next 
chapter focusing on emotional dimensions.  
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8 Chapter 8. Findings (3): Emotional Dimensions 
8.1   Introduction 
The previous two chapters have explored the findings in relation to the processes and 
contexts of decision making, and the ethical dimensions involved for the participants. 
Many themes have arisen for these areas, and so far three overarching themes have 
been taking shape as relevant: the dialogical relationship between emotions and 
ethical thinking in the decision making process (including the social and embodied 
nature of social work); the interface of the court ‘world’ with the social work ‘world’; 
and the role of organisational support and spaces for reflection and discussion (seen 
in chapter 6 in relation to decision making processes). These three themes will be 
developed further in this chapter in its focus on the emotional dimensions of decision 
making in care proceedings.   
A wide range of emotions was generated for participants. Some emotions and their 
impact were described in response to my questions about which emotions the 
participant was aware of at the time or afterwards. Others were mentioned while the 
participant was talking about what was difficult or challenging about the decision or 
working with the case, or while talking about relationships with the child or family 
members. 
In this chapter I start by breaking down key emotional responses into separate 
sections for sadness, anxiety and frustration; however, in some cases these emotions 
combined and seemed to interact with each other to increase the impact on the 
participant, and many examples are not neatly divisible into these separate 
categories. Other key themes were the nature of the relationship between 
practitioner and parent and feelings associated with this, the sense of responsibility 
that was keenly felt by some, and evidence of emotional labour. Data illustrating 
these themes will be presented. Following this, the means used by the practitioners 
to reflect on and manage their emotions will be explored. 
8.2   Emotions experienced  
When speaking about emotions it was noticeable that the practitioners tended to 
provide an explanation for their emotion and what triggered it. The emotions 
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appeared to arise from interpretations and meanings the practitioners attached to 
the events and observations. As discussed in the Methods chapter, a time period had 
elapsed between the events being described and these interviews. Some reflective 
processing will have taken place, but it is not always clear what difference this would 
have made – for example, whether these were meanings that were attached to the 
event at the time, or afterwards, and how conscious the emotions and associated 
meanings were at the time. The fact that this was a research interview may have 
made a difference to what was said, and it is possible that some emotions may have 
been left out of practitioners’ accounts. Whatever was the case, it was noticeable 
that practitioners’ explanations for their emotions were infused with ethical 
dimensions.  
8.2.1   Sadness and feeling upset or distressed 
Sadness was indicated many times, in relation to either (or both) the child or the 
parent. There were some general feelings of sadness expressed about a situation or 
in relation to thinking about a child or parent’s history and experiences of abuse, as 
seen in the previous chapter. Emotions seemed to be closely linked to thoughts and 
ethical dimensions.  
Participants most often spoke of their emotions in relation to seeing the parent or 
child upset, or when relating the experience of removing or moving a child, or seeing 
parents in court. Some words used by participants conveyed a strong emotional 
impact, for example: 
She loves these kids, there's no doubt about it, absolutely. And she went on 
the stand and she gave the most moving account of her past. She takes 
responsibility, absolutely, she's very articulate, very er – beautiful woman, a 
nice person, a caring person, but she's just too overwhelmed with her 
addictions, and to watch a broken woman on the stand that was heart-
breaking, it was awful (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
This is an illustration of a woman having to give ‘an account’ of herself in the sense 
put forward by Judith Butler – in this case publicly, in the care proceedings process – 
and reflecting Arendt’s words that the ‘exposure and vulnerability of the other makes 
a primary ethical claim on me’ (Arendt 1958, cited in Butler 2005, cited in 
Waterhouse and MGhee 2015: 246). There is a tension for the social worker between 
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recognition of the woman as a human being with vulnerabilities and strengths, and 
judgement of her as a mother failing to meet the needs of her child under the 
auspices of the child protection system. The social worker finds it painful – ‘heart-
breaking’ – to watch the mother. She seems to feel a sense of ‘violation of the other’ 
in the mother’s exposure on the witness stand. A narrow instrumental view of 
mothers merely in relation to their role as parents would enable judgement and 
condemnation to be experienced as straightforward.  In contrast, Waterhouse and 
McGhee (2015: 249) make a powerful case for the recognition of mothers in child 
protection processes, where practitioners are ‘able to suspend judgement in order to 
apprehend the other, in this case, the mother, as fully as possible’. However, they do 
not explore how potentially painful and conflictual this may be for the worker. In the 
above extract, the painful feeling for the worker seems increased by her recognition 
of the mother’s strengths as well as the difficulties she has faced in her life. There is 
some dissonance between the emotions and the judgement. 
In the following extracts the practitioners’ sadness is inseparable from ideas about 
being human, whether the humanness of the parents or their own humanness, and 
the enormity of separating parents from their children, even if this was considered 
best for the child. 
My assessment has said they can't have their children, and that's hard to sit 
with - that's really really hard, because everyone is a human being at the end 
of the day, I'm not heartless, I don't think you can do this job if you are hard 
(SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
When you're sitting there in court and that judge says, you know actually the 
yes we are going to go forward with the adoption plan, and those parents 
hear that, although you feel that actually you've achieved what is right for 
that child, as a human being that's a very difficult thing to watch those 
parents, their lives, change, and know that they're never going to have that 
child back in their care. . .as a person and a human being to watch those 
parents have to hear that, and be so very final, is difficult, and I don't think 
that will ever go away (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
Emotional responses in some cases were triggered by being present at the expression 
of emotion by the child or parent. However, when speaking about them, the 
practitioners invariably included an explanation of their own emotions, and it 
appeared that the emotional responses, at least in part, arose from the participant’s 
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own thinking about, expectations or interpretation they brought into an event or 
situation, as well as from the child or parent’s actual feelings about it. Ethical 
dimensions were not necessarily overtly linked in the practitioner’s mind with their 
emotions but are present in the words and ideas expressed. But the emotions also 
seemed to contribute to the ethical reasoning, in heightening the awareness of a 
shared humanity and stirring the individual to think ethically about the other. This 
seems consistent with Small and Lerner’s (2008) findings mentioned in chapter 4, 
that sadness increases depth of thought about the other.  
The act of removing a child from a parent, or moving a child or doing goodbye 
contacts, arose in nine interviews as very upsetting, with removals of babies being 
particularly upsetting. Words used included ‘traumatic’, heartbreaking’, ‘always a 
struggle’, ‘horrendous’, ‘really difficult’, ‘upsetting’, ‘draining’. It was something you 
can't really prepare yourself for, or that you cannot describe to someone who hasn’t 
experienced it, and a memory that ‘will be here to stay with me for quite some time’.  
The word ‘difficult’ was often used and appeared to be associated with experiences 
that were either sad, anxiety provoking or frustrating, or a mixture of these. For 
example, speaking to a child about not returning home to the parent was described 
as ‘difficult’: 
the previous worker hadn’t had a discussion with her around the possibility 
that she probably won’t be returning back home to mum’s care. So that was 
quite difficult, naturally she was upset, she cried, exhibiting – able to verbalise 
lots of feelings of anger and resentment towards mum, cos of mum’s 
behaviour – she was able to say that mum had promised last time when they 
were accommodated that she wouldn’t drink or do drugs again, and she felt 
very let down by mum that mum hadn’t kept this promise (SP8). 
Sometimes the feeling of sadness or distress in relation to a child they had formed a 
relationship with was also linked to frustration or a feeling that the child had been let 
down in some way. In the above example there is a sense that both the previous 
worker and the mother have let the child down. It is not clear in that example if this 
thought had actually increased the practitioner’s own level of emotion, but it was 
clear in some instances such as the following: 
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When I went to see the children and that child was crying and presented that 
way, I think it choked me up quite a lot because I just thought how can you 
keep doing this to your children? (SP4). 
It was really upsetting when it came round and we had to remove the child. . 
.that was probably the most upsetting thing I've done – that and young 
babies, if you have to remove young babies – cos this girl for months and 
months you're telling a child we're here to help you, we're helping your mum. 
. .she sort of thinks, you can tell, they've been lying to me the whole time. She 
sat in the back of my car and very calmly very thoughtfully just told me that 
she hated me, and I had to explain to her that's OK she's allowed to hate me 
and all of this. It was really upsetting, quite distressing (SP3) (exp. in care 
procs). 
The following extracts illustrate how significant the participant’s own thoughts were 
in triggering and shaping their emotion, rather than any expression of emotion from 
the parent or child. This practitioner found removing these children from their parent 
upsetting while the children themselves did not:  
That night when we had to go get the children that was very stressful, we 
needed a police escort and you know that was – it was probably more 
upsetting for us than it was for the children cos the children didn't seem that 
bothered (SP7). 
For the following practitioner, talking about a removal at birth, it was the fact that 
the mother was understanding towards him rather than angry that was most 
upsetting: 
When I removed the child from hospital, at the time, when the baby was 
born, she actually turned round and said ‘I know you don't want to do this, I 
feel really sorry for you’. That was more difficult emotionally than dealing 
with a mum screaming and shouting – because she was being compassionate 
for me at the time of having her baby removed. . .That was quite emotionally 
tough. . .It nearly reduced me to tears. . .I do know that that will be here to 
stay with me for quite some time. I'm still emotional thinking about it now 
(SW4). 
It was also striking that some of the practitioners linked their feelings about the 
issues being discussed to their own families. For some, being a parent made them 
more sensitive to removing children: 
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I struggle with the unborn babies and the parents that have had five children 
removed before. . .I don’t know whether it’s because I’m now a mum, as 
when I first qualified I wasn’t (Focus Group 2). 
It used to make me come home and you know squeeze my daughter a bit 
tighter, and be thankful, you know. (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
Or separating siblings made them think of their own children or siblings:  
because I’ve got children that are 10 and 8. . .All cases touch me but this case 
was particularly close to home, and it made me think about my own children a 
lot, and I couldn’t imagine them being separated ever. And that was really 
hard. . .And when you’re sitting with a 12 year old whose heart is breaking 
because she’s never going to see her brother again, and she’s been his 
primary carer since he was born, and there’s nothing you can say to make it 
any – there’s nothing. There’s nothing you can possibly say to make it any 
better. And er it just makes me think of my sons. And it makes me think I 
wouldn’t let my children be separated so what makes it all right that I am OK 
with these children being separated? (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs 
qual). 
In the above case the personal link caused the felt emotion to be stronger, but this 
also led to greater ethical questioning – if it’s not all right for me what makes it all 
right for them?  
I have a very strong relationship with my own sister, erm, and we in our own 
lives have been through a lot of different things together as we were younger, 
so I couldn’t help but kind of reflect upon that in my work with these two girls. 
. .I couldn’t imagine not having, being with my sister, so to think about that 
with 2 others – that was a big one (SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
The above examples illustrate how important the practitioners’ own self, history and 
family were, in combination with ethical ideas, in influencing and increasing the 
sadness and distressed feelings they were aware of experiencing. There are clear 
links between family history, emotion, reflection and ethical questioning. Moesby-
Jensen and Nielsen’s (2015) study of emotional labour also found that parallels with 
the social worker’s own personal or family experience could lead cases to ‘get under 
their skin’ more. Menashe et al (2014) point out the scarcity of studies examining the 
inter-relationship of the spheres of work and home/family for child protection 
practitioners. The focus of their study of Israeli practitioners is on the impacts of work 
on the practitioners’ own mothering, but it also highlights the ‘built-in dialectic’ 
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(p395) between the roles of parent and child protection worker, and that where 
there were similarities between the family of the worker and that of the client, ‘the 
greater the resemblance between the two families, the greater the risk of emotional 
turmoil and boundary confusion’ (p397).  
8.2.2   Anxiety and uncertainty 
Anxiety, worry and feelings of stress were linked with a number of issues, some of 
which mirrored those reported by Taylor et al (2008). 
Dealing with constant phone calls and pressure from parents and family members 
was mentioned by several participants. For example: 
what I'm feeling at the moment is pressure – from kind of every angle – 
because I've got about 14 family members ringing me, daily – what about this, 
what about that, why are you not doing this, why are you not doing that – 
whilst I'm dealing with the case and having all the meetings and going to 
court, and dealing with mum and dad, and dealing with the children and doing 
the stat visits. And it feels like, um, you're kind of undermined and criticised in 
court – when you're the one that's doing everything (SW6) (v. exp. in care 
procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
I quoted this practitioner in the previous chapter in relation to going the extra mile as 
good practice. Here the feeling of pressure is compounded by a sense of unjust 
treatment. 
A number of participants described the stress caused by the sheer volume of 
paperwork and multiple assessments (such as viability assessments of family 
members, with limited timescales allowed, some of which might suddenly be 
required late in the proceedings). For those in family support/child protection teams 
(who generally initiated the proceedings before they were passed on once a child was 
placed in care) the care proceedings work heightened their anxiety about neglecting 
their other child protection cases, for example: 
That's the tough bit, trying to balance everything and not neglect your other 
kids on your caseload, that's what's emotional, it's not the actual proceedings 
itself, it's. . . knowing you're not going to be able to see little Johnny in the 
corner on timescale because I've got to spend time doing a court report, that's 
what the pressure is for us as a practitioner (Focus Group 2). 
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The sense of being ‘under the spotlight’ in care proceedings, and open to criticism as 
a practitioner, arose a number of times (three interviews in particular), in a similar 
way to social workers in Burns et al (2018) feeling as if they were on trial, or example: 
In the court arena everything is very much scrutinised, and. . .when, you 
know, you're giving evidence it's almost like you'll stand yourself under the 
spotlight, and I think if you didn't weigh up all of the viable options you would 
be heavily criticised (SW2). 
Five participants focused on their first care proceedings. There were comments about 
feeling out of depth and how hard it was being new and inexperienced, both in terms 
of their own self-doubt but also being doubted, questioned and scrutinised more in 
court. Giving evidence and being cross-examined were seen as a cause of anxiety; 
these were also among a number of aspects of court work child protection 
practitioners found difficult in Reeves et al’s (2018) study. 
Aggression, hostility and threats to kill from parents (mostly father but occasionally 
mother and/or grandmother or aunt) were talked about by a number of the 
participants (nine interviews). This could lead to anxiety, for example:  
At times, dad was quite scary if I’m being honest. I think his mental health 
means at times he can be quite unstable, unpredictable, he can be quite 
aggressive verbally and physically (SP7). 
It was understood that care proceedings might stir up deep feelings of anger and 
resentment from families which might lead to confrontations:   
There’s the possibility the children might not be returned to a parent, so that 
can actually bring up lots of feelings of anger and resentment from them 
towards you as the worker. . .I think it’s just about kind of being prepared for 
like confrontation really, and being prepared to challenge, but also alongside 
that thinking about your own kind of safety as a worker – where that’s done, 
how you word certain things, just for your own safety as well (SP8). 
As illustrated by the above extract, combining understanding of parents’ emotions, 
being prepared for confrontation and maintaining their ability to have ‘difficult 
conversations’ at the same time as managing their own safety, involves finely tuned 
awareness and skill in the moment of the visit. This combines Schon’s (1983) 
‘reflection in action’ with Ferguson’s ‘child protection skin’ in relation to the use of 
authority (Ferguson 2011: 203-4; Laird 2013: 161), and Ruch’s ‘confrontational 
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empathy’ and ‘contextual communication skill’ in attention to the impact of family 
emotions and their own anxiety in home visits (Ruch 2014).  
The prominence of fear of aggression in the experience of social workers 
encountering risk is highlighted in social work literature (Littlechild 2005; Ferguson 
2005; Stanford 2010; Robson et al 2014).  However it was not presented as a 
significant issue, in comparison with other issues, by practitioners in this study. In the 
interviews it was noticeable that fear and anxiety from aggression or threats was not 
in any of the cases the first emotion the participants talked about. It was only raised 
either part way through the range of emotions or challenges they experienced or in 
answer to direct questions about working with this or that family member. It is not 
clear whether or not this actually indicates that fear was not so important to these 
practitioners, or whether there was any impact from being interviewed a time period 
after the event, or participants’ views about what might be expected or appear 
acceptable. 
A number of examples of significant anxiety and worry about the child arose, and 
these were when the worker was powerless to change the situation, either because 
the decision was out of their hands, or the court had not granted the order the social 
worker sought. Worries were expressed about the child’s safety in that situation, or 
their wellbeing, for example in a potential move to another country or to family 
members the child(ren) had never met. In some cases a high level of anxiety was 
experienced about the child’s safety when remaining at home, for example:  
The worker she not only struggled with actually formulating a care plan, she 
also struggled with her own emotions over the case actually, and her own 
feelings, because she was so, so worried that if she sent the baby home, is the 
baby going to be injured (Focus Group 1). 
the little boy – a massive impact, massive impact on how I felt, I was very – 
lost sleep over that case, and really felt strongly that potentially he shouldn't 
have been in that family home, and he shouldn't be returned to that family 
home (SW3). 
Losing sleep was also mentioned by this participant who framed it this way: 
If we remove, and we've made a mistake, that child could lose going home. If 
we don't remove and we've made a mistake that child could be dead the next 
day. . . And as traumatic as it is and seeing parents fall apart, I can justify my 
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actions, I can sleep with that in mind because I know that child is safe. If it was 
the other way round and I hadn't taken action, I would not sleep for weeks 
(SW4). 
Anxiety and losing sleep was only mentioned in terms of whether a child should have 
been removed for their physical safety, but not over whether a child may have been 
removed unnecessarily. Perhaps it is too painful to look back and question the 
decision retrospectively, and there is a need to feel sure that the decision was right. 
In a focus group discussion in the study by Beckett et al (2007), participants also 
indicated they had not lost sleep worrying if they had wrongly removed a child. 
Participants also found uncertainty and not knowing the outcome difficult, especially 
when they also had to deal with the child’s emotions and anxieties in response to 
uncertainty about what was going to happen:  
Mum then made disclosures about her mother and grandma decided to pull 
out. So we – to the point where the girls had their bags packed, ready to go, 
and sort of 2 days before, we are having to take it back into court. So and all 
the time I’m reflecting and I’m feeling all this emotional tension with it, so 
how these little girls are trying to kind of process it, was a real real challenge 
(SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
In some instances practitioners expressed anxiety about a dilemma, such as whether 
or not to place siblings together (see previous chapter). Words such as ‘difficult’ or ‘a 
struggle’ were used in ways that seemed to convey anxiety and sometimes sadness 
or frustration or other uncomfortable feeling, illustrating how dilemmas and difficult 
decisions often involve a sense of guilt and anxiety (Banks 2012). 
References to feeling ‘uncomfortable’ or things ‘not sitting comfortably’ were also 
made a number of times in connection with a situation that had ethical elements – 
not in relation to a decision they had to make (where it was anxiety that was more in 
evidence), but where they had to go along with someone else’s decision which in 
some way went against the participant’s values, such as refusal of financial support. 
One participant spoke of a situation where an EPO was granted to remove a young 
person but where the police were not available until midnight and the family were all 
in bed, meaning that they had to wake them up: 
But for me the – just my own personal values, how awful that must have been 
for that family – that was a very difficult one (SW2). 
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There were many examples of participants expressing a feeling of responsibility 
(discussed in both focus groups and four individual interviews) for not only the 
decision but the whole course of the child’s life, or feeling they had let the child down 
if they didn’t get the decision they sought. For them there was no sense expressed of 
just presenting the evidence and leaving the court to decide the outcome. In some 
cases this feeling of responsibility caused anxiety or distress. Here are several 
examples: 
To be the author of her world is quite a hard challenge and I would question 
am I getting it right?. . .I feel extremely responsible. I'm the author of her 
world (SW5). 
I definitely did [feel responsible], you know, it's my name on the care plans, 
it's my name on all the statements, it was my evidence, and I still do now, you 
know, I think about as these children get older, I'm very conscious of that 
whenever I work with all children, whenever I'm writing you know my case 
notes on my visits, these are these children's lives. . .you know - it's a huge, 
huge weight to kind of hold (SP10) (exp. in care procs).  
The extract below is from the practitioner quoted earlier, in which separating the two 
girls made her think of her sons, when the preferred placement fell through at the 
final hearing: 
I felt like, for the first time ever, I felt like I'd let some children down. I've 
never done a case where I haven't been happy with the outcome. And I felt 
like I'd done these girls a great injustice – and I couldn't get that right in my 
head (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
The role of anxiety will be discussed further below in relation to anger and 
frustration. 
8.2.3   Anger and/or frustration 
There were many expressions of frustration or anger. Some of these were in relation 
to court attitudes or decisions, or local authority decisions. 
Some participants expressed frustration at the current tendency (following the Re-B 
and Re B-S judgments) of courts – or specific courts or judges – to ‘send children 
home’ at final hearings or make SGOs to family members the social worker had 
assessed to be unsuitable but the Guardian or an independent social worker had 
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assessed more positively. These points were also raised by interviewees in the 
Research in Practice (2015) report. One experienced practitioner pointed out that 
there were a lot of adopters available but not many children being given placement 
orders by the courts.  
Other experienced practitioners in the same focus group gave examples of very 
strong feelings evoked when courts had not granted an order that a social worker 
was pushing for, and a child subsequently died or suffered harm. Very strong feelings 
of anger towards judges were expressed, for example: 
We had a young care-leaver with one child, living with somebody we thought 
was a very dangerous man – he was a very dangerous man. We got knocked 
back in the High Court, that young woman was – no order was made 
essentially, and several years later she was killed, she had two more children 
by then she was killed by him in front of her 3 children. And, talking about 
emotion, I can remember feeling so angry, you know [sound of 'mmm's from 
others in the group], cos we knew it was – we’d had meetings, we’d thought 
about everything, and I was as angry as I'll ever been around my work. And I 
actually wanted to go and sit down and say, you might not remember this 
young woman – this is what happened – (Focus Group 2). 
Another frustrating aspect was the large number of viability or SGO assessments they 
were expected to do: ‘the fact that so many relatives can all pop up as well - at the 
last minute - when they've never had a relationship with these children’ (SW6). In the 
PLO, kinship or connected persons assessments should be filed by the Case 
Management Hearing; however, the fall-out of Re B and Re B-S has meant some 
judges were allowing potential carers to apply up to the final hearing, as has also 
been the picture nationally (Research in Practice 2015). This could mean delaying the 
outcome beyond 26 weeks, which for one participant was particularly frustrating in 
terms of the well-being of the child: 
. . .frustration, in court when they delayed the hearing, because this little girl, 
you know the court don't see her, I see her on a regular basis, and I – I know 
how vital it is that this little girl particularly erm she's ready for that 
permanence, you know she's had mum, mother and baby, another foster 
placement (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
The above extract also illustrates the embodied nature of social work practice in 
comparison with the court where she is not seen. There is a sense that the social 
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worker ‘seeing’ the child involves knowing and ‘recognising’ her as well as physically 
seeing her.  
Working with families could also generate frustration, through the constant phoning 
up or demands of extended family members for contact or objecting to other family 
members, or when parents seem capable of change or say they will do something 
and then do not carry it through, or the sudden interest being shown by extended 
family to care for children once care proceedings started when they had never shown 
support or interest before.  
Particularly frustrating or difficult to deal with was the attitude towards the social 
worker or the local authority that was sometimes taken by courts, with assumptions 
that the social workers were biased: 
I've gone into court once and it was a non-accidental injury. . .11 week old 
baby had a spiral fracture to his leg. It was first hearing, we walked in and the 
judge hadn't read any of the papers and turned round and to me and said 'I 
hope you're not saying that mother has done this' and that was his view 
straight away. . .in the fact finding actually the parents were found to have 
caused the injury, but it was that automatic – like 'you're saying this? How 
dare you say this' and actually I wasn't saying anything, I was saying that this 
child has a non-accidental injury when he was in the care of his parents. . 
.Sometimes you walk in and you do have to think there are specific judges 
when you get them you think – I wonder what mood he's going to be in today 
– is he going to like a social worker today or is he going to dislike social 
workers today – and it makes our job really hard, because sometimes it's 
made to feel that we're there just to cause this family some undue pain (Focus 
Group 1). 
The assumption that the social worker was biased often led to further parenting 
assessments being requested from an independent social worker, or even a social 
worker from another district team of the same local authority. 
We will always be accused of being biased. I think they don't see us as being 
able to do a non-judgement assessment. . .But we know the child, we know 
the family, we have that background. . .the child trusts us and is able to 
disclose things. . .you know inside out that that family and that case – so why 
are we not looked on to be professional enough to do that assessment? 
They're asking independent people to do it, and they don't know that 
information (Focus Group 1). 
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There were frustrations that pre-proceedings work was not taken into account 
enough and practitioners were being required to ‘repeat all the work you’ve 
previously done in a sense, within a shorter timescale, so that's frustrating’ (SW6). 
Frustrations, often deep, about not being listened to by courts were discussed in both 
focus groups and five individual interviews For example: 
I think there was a lot of frustration, a lot of upset, a lot of just really feeling 
like I'm powerless in this situation even though I feel like I'm probably the best 
one, you know, along with my managers, to make decisions like that. I felt like 
nobody was listening to me (SW7). 
You're going into court having worked your guts out and then next thing. . 
.you're being made out to be unprofessional. I've had it before where rather 
than my assessment being used they've insisted on independent reports being 
used because you're biased and all this, and you just think to yourself – I've 
done all this to get us to this point, for the last year or two – here we are (SP3) 
(exp. in care procs). 
In the above extracts and others the frustration and anger seems to combine feelings 
of being misjudged, devalued, treated unjustly, at times humiliated and demeaned, 
decisions making their work more difficult, a strong sense of powerlessness, and in 
some cases a feeling of vindication at being proved right afterwards. Feelings of 
powerlessness seemed linked in some ways with identification with the child in 
relation to those in power (including parents), and the child being let down. There 
was sometimes a sense that the judges (and often the Guardian) were experienced as 
aligned powerfully with parents against the powerless social worker and child. This is 
illustrated in the following description of a day at court:  
The father had come onto the scene and he lives up north somewhere. And 
he demanded contact that day. The social worker felt that contact wouldn't 
be suitable for the children that day because we didn't know what was going 
to happen in court and actually we were still pressing for the children to be 
removed on that day. The father wanted contact, and the judge took a view 
that father whatever happened he was going to have contact. . .The judge 
wasn't interested in anything the local authority had to say. He said you will 
sort out contact today, you will take half an hour, you make some phone calls 
and come back in and tell me how that's going to be managed today, go and 
do it. And we'd gone to court that day that was not the issue of the day but it 
became the issue of the day and we had to do it (TM1) (v. exp. in care procs).  
This left an impact on the practitioners: 
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– anger, being drained, you know you hadn't eaten anything, he doesn't care 
that no one had had any break. He'd had his break but we had to work in our 
break, still we had to keep on going. All of those things will add to the initial 
feeling that no one cares about us as a group of professionals (TM1) (v. exp. in 
care procs). 
There were many references in the interviews to participants feeling criticised, not 
listened to, and generally treated very differently to the Guardian, or expert 
witnesses, or the police, consistent with findings of other studies that social workers 
felt their views carried less weight than other expert witnesses (Beckett et al 2007; 
O’Connor and Leonard 2014;  Burns et al 2018). 
The other thing as well is that if that child is set a court date and everybody's 
looking at their diaries, if the social worker's on leave they are expected to 
come in. The barristers aren't, but we are (Focus Group 1). 
Instances were given of where experts wanted more time to complete an assessment 
they would be given it without challenge, whereas the local authority social worker 
would be challenged, may be criticised, and even have costs put against the local 
authority: ‘it always tends to be, in my experience, the local authority that is criticised 
for going outside of those timescales’ (SW2). 
Some practitioners in the experienced focus group also expressed frustration at local 
authority lawyers for not listening to them and wanting them to make changes to 
statements, where it later turned out that the social worker’s points would have been 
appropriate. There appeared a level of tension and frustration with lawyers, which 
also arose in Dickens’ (2006) study. Dickens makes the valuable point that inter-
professional differences should not automatically be seen as problems, but can be 
productive in leading workers to reflect on and account for their views and practice, 
which also links with one of the themes of this thesis, the value of dissonance and 
dialogue. 
There were also frustrations about local authority decisions leading to the social 
worker having to ask for or recommend an order he/she did not agree with.  
Sometimes decisions are made from up above that doesn't reflect what the 
child wants, or what the child needs. . .and it can become very difficult and 
very stressful to manage, knowing that you're possibly going to step into the 
court arena not – how to word it – not really fully advocating what you feel, 
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but just because of management decisions and things like that (Focus Group 
1). 
One of the challenges of care proceedings was seen as standing by their own views in 
the face of all the opposition: 
And remaining true to your own informed decision when you know everybody 
else has a different opinion, including say the Guardian, and you know that if 
you're going to stick to your guns, it's you against the world type of thing 
(Focus Group 1). 
This practitioner’s words, ‘it’s you against the world’, seem to encapsulate a common 
feeling in the data. Practitioners’ feelings of being misjudged, devalued and pushed 
around were interlaced with frustration that they were the ones with the knowledge, 
putting in the effort, and trying to do what was right for the child while being under 
siege and thwarted from all angles. In their study of social workers’ experience of 
decisions in care proceedings Taylor et al (2008) note the tendency of the 
practitioners to feel responsible and to criticise others’ lack of responsible behaviour. 
Drawing on Menzies’ (1960) work on social defences against anxiety they suggest 
unconscious use of the psychodynamic defence of ‘projection’ and splitting into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ’us’ and ‘them’ was one way the social workers defended against 
anxiety at the level of responsibility they had and the painful nature of their 
‘judgements of Solomon’. They comment that this anxiety is projected back and 
forth, as social workers are also targets for projection from others in their function as 
society’s defences against anxieties. In the current study the comments from 
participants, and strength of feeling expressed, may likewise indicate involvement of 
the defences of splitting and projection, with many comments conveying a sense of 
the irresponsibility or obstructiveness of others, whether this was judges, guardians, 
lawyers, family members, previous case holders, or managers. Another defensive 
device that may be relevant here is that of Karpman’s (1968) ‘drama triangle’ which 
involves the shifting roles of victim, persecutor and rescuer. All these defences 
function to protect the individual from unbearable levels of anxiety and 
responsibility. In addition, identifying with the child who is powerless but at the same 
time holds a kind of symbolic power as the innocent victim at the centre who is in 




8.2.4   Conclusion to 8.2 
The above sections about sadness, fears and anxieties, and anger and frustration 
have captured a range of emotions from practitioners, in many cases expressed very 
strongly.  It was also noticeable that when the practitioners talked of emotions in the 
interviews, they included their thoughts and reflections in explaining why they had 
the feeling, or why it was significant or mattered to them. These reflections involved 
ethical dimensions, sometimes clearly identified by the participants, and sometimes 
by implication or association in a broader sense. There were some possible 
indications of defences of identification and projection being used, and in places 
some underlying moral constructions were implied, interacting with emotional 
responses and influences. 
Thus emotions and ethics appear strongly linked in care proceedings decision making, 
in a dialogical relationship. The way participants framed the situation and attached 
meaning to their interpretations appeared to lead to emotion. It also appeared that 
emotions were more keenly felt because the situation raised an ethical issue of some 
sort, and on the other hand sometimes it was emotion that seemed to lead to greater 
ethical awareness and questioning. 
As these interviews took place after the event it was not clear if these emotions were 
strongest in the participants’ memories and thus explored in the interviews because 
the emotional residue from unresolved dilemmas and ethical conflicts was stronger 
and more enduring than other emotions they may have felt at the time but not 
remember so clearly later on. It is possible that there is a range of enduring emotions 
and residue that practitioners need to reflect on afterwards in supervision and other 
arenas after the event, but also other emotions that are generated at the time which, 
because they are less enduring in practitioners’ memories and less accessible to 
reflection, are more likely to have unconscious, or less conscious, effects on the 
practitioner’s thinking and practice. 
8.3   The relationship with parents and combining support and authority 
Several participants (five in particular) talked about the particular nature of the 
relationship between social worker and parent in care proceedings and the emotions 
connected with this. The relationship between social worker and parent has already 
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featured in the findings in previous chapters in relation to the impact of the 
interactional and relational nature of social work on the decision making process, the 
way this relationship changes when entering the court ‘world’, and the relevance of 
the ethics of care as a concept in the data. This section will focus specifically on how 
participants experienced the tensions and the emotional dimensions of combining 
support and authority within this relationship, as this seemed a significant theme in 
the interviews.  
Literature about the relationship between social worker and parent, such as Ferguson 
(2011) regarding good authority and intimate practice, and Howe (2010) about 
mindful relationships with parents, sets out the importance of social workers being 
able to work empathetically, reflectively and collaboratively with parents when 
carrying out their authority role. This combination of care and control was complex 
and challenging for participants, especially once care proceedings were initiated – 
and also potentially painful as indicated earlier – but seen as important in the long 
term: 
It’s difficult for them to continue to work with you as well, so it's – yeah it is 
difficult, it's a challenge. And again when it is adoption you want to try and 
maintain that working relationship with the birth parents, because they'll also 
play a vital role in the life story bit for that little boy or girl (SP9) (v. exp. in 
care procs). 
The social worker/parent relationship itself can be an emotional rollercoaster, with a 
parent who is angry and in pain but wants and needs help at the same time, as 
illustrated in scenarios by Ruch (2010a). Some participants found that keeping the 
boundaries became more challenging as mothers tried to treat them as a friend, for 
example: 
I think mum – because mum was quite needy I think she would use me quite a 
lot to offload – someone to speak with, and that felt quite a conflict really as I 
was trying to advise her and support her, but then I also had to sort of be very 
clear. . .and I think her relationship with me she tried to make it quite friendly 
and she would always ring me and tell me that oh I think you're really nice 
and, you know, that was difficult (SP5). 
This could also link with the defences of splitting and projection mentioned earlier, in 
that service users may see professionals as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, finding it too difficult to 
hold the idea of an individual having elements of both (Ruch 2010b).  
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There was a sense that the closer and more empathetic the practitioner was, the 
harder they had to work to keep those boundaries. This practitioner was not the 
case-holder and was completing an independent parenting assessment: 
Sometimes if you get alongside parents and you’re able to have those sort of 
open discussions with them, sometimes you can sort of slip into that that less 
professional role so to speak and you have to keep remembering you’re there 
in a professional role and not to befriend them (SP2). 
The following practitioner talked about her first care proceedings case, taken on 
when relatively inexperienced, a case that involved physical abuse (whereas most 
participants talked about neglect or emotional abuse).  
I remember just feeling very sad for her. . .But I also had to balance that with 
what the children must have been experiencing. . .she was such a victim, a 
massive victim. And I think that was our focus, and you do have to focus on 
that, because I think you’re aware of keeping families together, you’re very 
aware of that, and what can be done, because you know you’re aware of 
outcomes for children in foster care are not good – homelessness and you 
know the amount you know you’ve got that all in your head, and you’ve got to 
work with her – you really do have to – and I think you do form a relationship 
that is quite difficult to separate out, because in your head you’re thinking 
well if I can work with her and help her change, then that will help the 
children. . .It seems inherently wrong, that this woman has given birth – but, 
these children’s lives were miserable and there was immense suffering (SW1). 
This social worker conveys compassion and sympathy for both the mother and the 
children. Her emotions were heightened because of the ethical issues but the ethical 
conflict seemed more acute because of her awareness of the suffering on both sides. 
She also described herself as probably going above and beyond the role and giving 
more than she should: ‘I think possibly because I was newly qualified so I wanted to 
do things – I don’t know whether had I been doing that in four years, ten years, I 
would have been the same’.  
Did this social worker’s relational closeness and commitment to the mother generate 
the depth of thinking and feeling and seeing the mother as deserving of care? Or was 
it her sadness, or the way she framed the situation ethically in her thinking – that the 
mother was a victim and needed care herself – that led her to commit herself so fully 
to the relationship and trying to help her? As in examples discussed in the previous 
chapters, there seems to be a complex interplay of relationship, commitment, 
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recognition, embodied interaction, emotions, moral constructions and judgements, 
continually impacting on each other. But this relational closeness and level of thought 
takes effort that may be difficult to sustain in the long term.  
In contrast, in the expert focus group there was very little discussion of working with 
parents, while concern for the child was conveyed much more strongly. A sense of 
straightforwardness was conveyed about working with parents who had been offered 
all the support possible and had not changed, leading to removal of the child. There 
may be a number of possible reasons for this such as their level of experience (for 
example Whittaker (2018) shows that more experienced practitioners were able to 
see patterns and select more quickly the key aspects to focus on), or the fact that it 
was a group discussion amongst experienced social workers and managers where 
certain approaches or emotions may have been felt to be more appropriate to 
demonstrate than others, or possibly this was just the direction the discussion took. 
However, the individual interviews and the smaller focus group discussion included 
much more in-depth consideration of relationships with parents and the detail of the 
work with parents.  
It seemed that increased emotion and ethical thinking about parents was linked with 
closeness, detail, painful feelings and uncertainty, which could be overwhelming, 
while a more detached approach was associated with distance and certainty. But 
constant exposure to painful feelings, anxiety, uncertainty, ambivalence and 
projected feeling from families can cause unbearable pain and anxiety, against which 
workers may need to defend themselves through distance (Pinkney 2011), reinforced 
by the organisational climate and time pressures, which is a challenge when 
considering how to create containing spaces to ‘think and feel’ (O’Sullivan 2018). The 
impact of organisational factors will be considered further later in this chapter and in 
the next chapter. First another related feature of practitioners’ work with families will 
be explored which adds an additional layer to the management of emotions: that of 
emotional labour. 
8.4   Doing emotional labour 
A number of extracts in previous sections involve workers managing feelings within 
interactions with families to have an impact on others or for the benefit of others, for 
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example to keep the parent engaged in working with them. This links to Hochschild’s 
(1983) concept of emotional labour, which involves the suppression or working up of 
feelings for such a purpose through ‘surface’ or ‘deep’ acting (see section 4.2.5).  
In some cases there was a dissonance between the emotions felt by the participant 
and the emotion (or lack of emotion) they thought they should portray in a situation 
as a professional. For example: 
I think as local authority social workers. . .you almost have to put a cap on 
your emotions – and not shut them off as it were because it's highly emotive 
work and you can never not have some form of emotion around these kind of 
proceedings. . . In terms of say my emotional display in court, in contrast to 
mother's it must – to her, it must have looked like I was quite cold and very 
shut down, because I was able to kind of evidence succinctly and quite clearly, 
I wasn't – I was able to contain my emotions in terms of not being upset or 
not being overly angry and displaying aggressive tendencies which neither 
parent were able to do (SW2). 
And I was there when we actually did remove the children. We did it at the 
family centre. . .I remember the parents were saying you’re such hard what’s 
its because you’re not crying. But actually the social worker and I were trying 
hard not to cry (SP1). 
Both the above extracts indicated it was felt to be right as a professional to suppress 
emotion, but this suppression conflicted with another kind of ‘feeling rule’, that it is 
wrong to be hard and cold in a sad situation such as this. There was also effort 
involved in ‘trying hard not to cry’. The practitioner below (who was also quoted 
above in section 8.2.1) regarding the mother’s sympathy for him) describes this effort 
as putting a ’professional head on’. Practitioners’ use of the word ‘professional’ in 
relation to managing emotions was also noted by Ingram (2015) in his research. 
There is also an aftermath to be dealt with – in this case on the way home: 
But you put your – as much as you can, you put your professional head on, 
erm you do your job, take the babe to the foster carers, and then, just try and 
deal with it on your way home. . .At the time when she said it, truthfully, it 
nearly reduced me to tears. But just tried to keep my professional face on, grit 
my teeth (SW4). 
The next practitioner, also male, had gone through a process of ‘psyching up’ and 
suppressing emotions in readiness for removing a newborn baby from a mother in 
hospital, before being given the impression after some hours that the EPO would not 
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be granted. Then suddenly it was. The process of psyching up, down, and up again 
during a day seemed to make the emotional impact and its aftermath greater: 
I thought to myself I'm not going to be doing that – so I almost let my guard 
down and I thought to myself I don't have to go through that – and then I was 
being told go to the hospital and the baby's going into care, and that was one 
where I just went into sort of automatic and dealt with it, but then after the 
event I had to erm – yeah for days I was in pieces about that (SP3) (exp. in 
care procs). 
The above examples correspond to Hochschild’s ‘surface’ acting in the sense that the 
practitioners were consciously putting on an act as a professional in this challenging 
situation, rather than trying to engender the positive emotions within themselves, 
which would have been ‘deep’ acting. While the professional expectation was that 
they would suppress their emotions, perhaps other social/cultural expectations or 
feeling rules that it is wrong not to feel upset in this situation, caused further 
dissonance and conflict for the practitioners, who would not have wanted to 
engender positive feelings about removing children. It is surface acting that is more 
likely to cause emotional burnout because it involves repeated ‘expressions of 
inauthenticity and cognitive dissonance’ (Green 2017: 783). 
The previous two extracts were both of men talking about removing babies from 
mothers. While there were examples in the data of female practitioners identifying 
responses such as feeling upset, the male practitioners appeared to speak in more 
detail about these feelings (other extracts from SW4 and SP3 are in section 8.2.1). 
The number of men in this sample is too small to draw clear conclusions from but this 
could indicate further interesting lines of inquiry, for example into whether certain 
emotions (such as feeling upset) or emotional conflicts may be perceived by social 
workers paradoxically as more acceptable (or powerful?) for men than women to 
speak about in social work organisations (or to a female researcher) – and in general 
to explore the multi-layered role of gender in emotion expression and emotional 
labour in social work.  
The next extract, though still largely ‘surface’ acting does involve an element of the 
social worker trying to generate some positive emotions within herself to be 
consistent with professional values. This is consistent with Pizarro’s (2000) argument 
that individuals use cognitive strategies such as perspective-taking to engender an 
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empathic response. Reminding herself the mother was a victim seemed to be part of 
this, which again links to the way framing an individual as an innocent victim or 
vulnerable reduces negative feelings and engenders a positive approach: 
She didn't listen. When I was really fed up with her I still had to go out there 
and be polite and not be judgemental and try and be supportive – at the end 
of the day she's a victim as well. And I think that was one of the values I was 
trying to stay focused on and tried not to let my emotions or feelings kind of 
show (SP4). 
Winter et al (2018) and Moesby-Jensen and Nielson (2015) show how emotional 
labour, either deep or surface acting, is threaded through the interactions and 
relationships between social workers and the children and parents they work with. 
Winter et al found workers used various ways to manage their feelings and the 
emotional dissonance involved – through humour, self-care such as bringing in food 
to share, and social activities or other distractions. The next section will focus on the 
means participants in the current study used to manage their emotions.  
8.5   Managing the emotions 
Participants spoke of a mixture of individual and interactive ways of dealing with the 
emotional impacts of the work. 
8.5.1   Driving, music and household chores 
Driving appeared very significant and was referred to in five of the individual 
interviews as important for processing thoughts and emotions, for example: 
And I do a lot of thinking in my car – I do a lot of driving, and that’s when I 
tend to think about things, and try to make sense of them all (SW8) (v. exp. in 
care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
We drove together. All the way back we could talk about it and go through 
everything (SP7). 
Two also talked of the positive impact of listening to music while driving. Ferguson 
(2011) points out how the car may function as a safe, containing space, a ‘secure 
base’, where workers can process their feelings and thoughts, and that ‘cars have 
deep meanings for staff as spaces where the self can be replenished and helped to 
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build up the emotional resources needed to do effective social work’ (Ferguson 2011: 
195). 
Doing household chores could also be helpful: 
I'm a reflective person, I need that time on my own. I do remember doing my 
house chores on that weekend and just thinking about it, you know. It's fine, 
I'm OK doing that, it's a good time to do it (TM1) (v. exp. in care procs). 
That also reflects Ferguson’s (2011) discussion as he mentions the social worker’s 
home as being a potential place for processing the emotional impact of the work. He 
draws attention to the circular connecting of home visits, the car, the office, and the 
social worker’s home life and relationships, all interrelated in their influences. It also 
illustrates the increasing blurring of boundaries between work and home (Hochschild 
1997). 
8.5.2   Supervision and talking with others 
Supervision and discussion with colleagues have already been mentioned in chapter 6 
in relation to decision making. They will be briefly explored here as processes that 
were identified as important to participants in managing their emotions.  
Formal supervision was mainly associated with advice and case management rather 
than reflection or dealing with emotion. It was the availability of the manager for 
informal or ‘ad hoc’ supervision and discussion that was highlighted numerous times 
in association with reflection on cases and dealing with the emotional impact of the 
work.  
My manager was there for those conversations, and she did make time to sit 
with me and talk to me about how I was feeling. . .so even though we didn’t 
have supervision, she was still there (SP4). 
I know I could ring my manager and say look could I just sound this off with 
you because it's playing on my mind, erm, just to get some – that's more 
about reassurance I think at the time, but afterwards, it's about learning 
(SP10) (exp. in care procs). 
The second extract above alludes to the difference between talking at the time or 
afterwards, which will be considered further below. It was recognised that sometimes 
practitioners might need to take responsibility to seek support and reflection about 
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something that was having an impact, and that some workers are better than others 
at seeking this. One participant mentioned that she received case management 
supervision from her manager but was able to talk reflectively with a senior 
practitioner in the team. Two participants suggested clinical supervision away from 
the office would be very helpful. 
While formal supervision helped manage anxiety from not knowing what to do, it was 
informal conversations that helped participants more with managing other feelings 
arising in their work. Revell and Burton (2016) suggest that a ‘rule of optimism’ within 
the supervisory relationship can function to avoid or reduce reflection and 
professional curiosity, through supervisors assuming experienced supervisees make 
competent judgements and manage emotional aspects, and supervisees concealing 
their feelings. However, the organisational role of formal supervision with its focus on 
procedure, targets and performance management is a barrier to it being a space to 
think and feel. In the current study there appeared to be a split between uses of 
formal and informal supervision, suggesting that organisational constraints rather 
than individual approaches were impeding reflective discussion. Ingram’s (2015b) 
study also found that practitioners edited emotions out of supervision, and instead 
used peer support to discuss emotional elements; he also points out that notes are 
not made of informal conversations, unlike formal supervision. Peer support was also 
highly valued by participants in the current study, as discussed in chapter 6 and 
below, and in Engstrom’s (2017) study. 
8.5.3   Informal team support, and feeling ‘safe’ 
A number of participants identified the importance of a team culture that 
encouraged supportive relationships, for example:  
We're only human, you know, and we're nothing without a good team around 
us, I'll definitely say that, you know, when your colleagues really – you need to 
support your colleagues with cases like this. Erm, otherwise it could be very 
lonely I think (SW8) (v. exp. in care procs/under 3 yrs qual). 
Six participants described themselves as ‘lucky’ because their team or their manager 
was supportive, implying that this was not a ‘given’: 
We're quite lucky in our team, you know – I've worked in different teams. . 
.We are quite a small team, erm but we can sit and bounce ideas off each 
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other, or we can you know – one of us gets slightly stressed out. . . there's 
always someone there to bring you back down to earth again, or even if it was 
just to crack a joke for five minutes to make you laugh. . . And actually some 
teams don't have that . . .and that's a really hard place to work – and to be 
able to make decisions. . .Where it feels unsafe and it feels that you've got no 
one to talk to and things like that, you do then start doubting your own 
decisions, because there's no one there to back you up, or there's no one 
there to say oh you know I agree with you or I don't agree – cos everyone's so 
kind of engrossed in what they're doing (Focus Group 1). 
Here humour is used, as in the study by Winter et al (2018). But this also illustrates 
the importance of the kind of ‘organisational containment’ described by Ruch (2007a) 
and cited by Ferguson (2011) and the impact when this is not present, to the point, in 
the words of the participant above, ‘it feels unsafe’ and self-doubt grows. The team 
can act as a container through providing an attentive relationship as described by 
Bion (1962) enabling individuals to feel safe enough to digest and reflect upon 
unmanageable feelings (Ruch 2007a) – or to draw from attachment theory the team 
can function as a ‘secure base’ (Biggart et al 2017; Engstrom 2017). 
The importance of enabling workers to feel sufficiently safe to be honest and open 
was also recognised by a team manager: 
You've got to feel safe in doing that – you've got to know that if you do raise 
those views, you're not going to be ridiculed, or thought of as not being 
professional, or your values are not true, erm, you got to have faith and trust 
that you can do it in a safe environment (Focus Group 1). 
8.5.4   The nature of the building and physical work environment  
Many comments (arising from Focus Group 1 and five individual interviews) implied 
that the nature of the building was an important enabler or barrier to the kind of 
team support discussed above, typified by the following: 
I've some very good work colleagues that sit in the same room as me. We've 
been together for 2 years, the same 4 of us. . .But I think we're lucky in the 
fact that – I mean this is a lovely building to work in, there's 2 teams of 6 
children's social workers. So my manager. . .her office is opposite mine, and so 




Yes, I think the whole team knew about the time I was having and stuff. I think 
because we didn't have a stable manager we were all quite supportive as a 
team at the time. We were in a very small office together (SP3) (exp. in care 
procs). 
Yeah they might overhear you having a conversation on the phone or 
something like that, so there's always someone on hand to have a chat with 
you if you're finding something particularly difficult, which is helpful, just to 
offload in that sense, or to get another worker's kind of perspective (SP8). 
The last of the above extracts also illustrates the point made in chapter 6 that 
offloading when finding something emotionally difficult can lead to hearing another 
worker’s perspective – but here it is also linked to being in the same room and the 
potential for another person to offer support, as opposed to it being left to the 
worker to seek it, which not all may do. Being able to sit in the same room, or area of 
a room, with team mates was important in getting to know each other’s cases and 
building trust. Smaller rooms or buildings figured strongly in the interviews as 
environments that supported close team working, including for the team above (in 
8.5.3) who discussed the importance of supportive trusting relationships, where 
individuals felt safe to share their views and emotions with those around them. 
Perhaps a smaller room feels more containing. This links to ideas of place. Rooms and 
other features of buildings exist in spatial relationships with each other. Distance and 
proximity are related to access and exposure (Logan 2012). For example, the 
participant above whose office was opposite the manager’s alluded more than once 
to this fact as enabling her to receive more frequent ad hoc supervision. Physical 
space guides movement and interaction and takes on social and symbolic meaning. 
Emotions such as excitement, caution and anxiety are created through social 
interaction within spaces, and buildings can be understood as ‘performative events’ 
through the way they are used and experienced by people within them (Jeyasingham 
2016).  
Jeyasingham’s (2016) ethnographic study of social workers’ practices and experiences 
in office spaces is relevant. This compared the experience of two teams. In one, in an 
older small building, views and feelings were expressed and the team was able to 
maintain shared values and understandings, and a shared sense of responsibility, 
urgency at times. In contrast, the other team was in a large open plan ‘agile’ working 
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environment, and while the social workers still sat close to their colleagues, it was 
seen as noisy, less cohesive and with a potential for dangerous practice. There 
seemed a solitariness and exposed openness at the same time, with interactions 
potentially observed by people they did not know, and Jeyasingham questions 
whether this arrangement potentially leads to ‘more inhibited bodies in 
environments that, while no less busy, are sapped of a sense of shared urgency’ 
(p216). Helm (2017) also found the nature of the office space was important in 
enabling informal discussion either through proximity or the availability of private 
spaces.  
The idea of hotdesking also brought only negative comments from participants in the 
interviews, consistent with the discussion above, for example: 
We were meant to be hot-desking but that stopped a long time ago. . .We 
hated hot-desking. . .And this encouraging people to work from home, erm, 
no – we have to talk to each other because our cases are ongoing – we talk all 
the time about – this is just – she's got – what shall I do – we do this all the 
time – doing it today, you know. How can you do that if you're working from 
home?. . .I think it's dangerous to have that, because you start to make 
decisions on your own (SP6) (exp. in care procs). 
The importance of having an allocated desk is also identified in Engstrom’s (2017) 
study and by Ingram (2013), and is discussed by Ferguson (2011: 197), as ‘a fixed 
location within a community of colleagues where you know from day to day who 
your neighbours are’, and enabling the kind of secure base and relationships that 
workers can come back to and gain ‘the support they need on an hour-by-hour, day-
by-day basis’. In the above extract it is also associated with safer decision making.   
8.5.5   Reflection at the time or later? 
One of the interview questions related to whether participants reflected, or would 
find it helpful to reflect, during the care proceedings process (ie working with the 
family, coming to the decision and involvement in the hearings), or afterwards.  This 
generated a great deal of data. A pattern emerged, on the one hand that more 
chance to reflect at the time would be helpful, especially when very difficult actions 
needed to be undertaken, such as removing children, but on the other hand that 
actually during the very difficult activities it could also be important not to reflect too 
much as the awareness of the emotions and anxieties might make it more difficult to 
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keep going. For example, as seen earlier, when suddenly having to remove the 
newborn baby the social worker had to go into ‘automatic’ and felt the emotions 
later. Another participant described herself as being ‘caught up in the motions of it’ 
during the care proceedings, which was what she needed at the time, but afterwards 
when reflecting back felt ‘it was almost like a huge sigh of relief’.  
Several practitioners could see both positives and negatives in reflecting at the time, 
and perhaps it was about finding the right timing or safe spaces to reflect or off-load, 
while also recognising the need to keep going at certain points, using a spatial 
analogy of a sense of being inside or outside a situation, or stepping back/away: 
I think practically as well when you're trying and you're so engrossed in a case. 
. .you're not gonna want to kind of come out of that and you're gonna want to 
be focused. . .but I can also see the positives from having it during and at the 
end as well (SP9) (v. exp. in care procs). 
I think there were times probably when I was away from it, or when I was 
doing the paperwork or something, that I would feel overwhelmingly sad, but 
I think that you perhaps can’t concentrate on that – because you’ve got to be 
doing, and it’s not your only case. So you don’t have time to appreciate it. 
Whereas I think when you step away, and you can look back at it from a 
distance, then you know (SW1). 
For most there seemed a clear pattern that reflection after the event could be more 
considered, and involve thinking in more depth about what was happening and why, 
and what could have been done differently and learned. Kirkman and Melrose (2014) 
make the point that feedback on outcomes is important for teams to reflect on and 
discuss the quality of decision making. However, in this study, transfer of cases to 
other teams and confidentiality issues meant participants may not learn of outcomes. 
Another common point was that often there was not time or opportunity afterwards: 
it's almost as though – that's done, we kind of draw a line on it, and now 
those proceedings have been finished, here's another set to kind of carry on 
with (SW2). 
Things change dramatically when you've done your care proceedings, and you 
kind of move on – to your next set of proceedings. . .we get a case, it finishes, 
we move on to the next one. There's no breathing space there (SW8) (v. exp. 
in care procs/under 3 yrs qual).  
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Thus reflection can be resisted by the organisation through its processes and 
relentless turnover of work, as well as internal processes in the worker such as the 
pressure to keep strong and in control in emotionally challenging situations, relief 
that it is over, and internal pressures to ‘do’ rather than ‘think’ (Ruch 2007b). Sicora 
(2017: 495) also observes it is hard for people to consider if a mistake may have been 
made, as ‘[b]eing wrong is an emotional experience’ involving feelings of shame and 
failure. 
8.5.6   Structured team discussion 
Three participants spoke of having structured case discussions within the team. These 
are mentioned in chapter 6 as helpful to move forward a ‘stuck’ case. There are 
models of case discussion, for example Ruch (2007b) and O’Sullivan (2018), that 
encourage participants’ engagement with the emotional aspects of the work; 
Dempsey and Halton (2017) also studied peer support groups which allowed 
practitioners to reflect on tensions and uncertainties and focus on professional 
development. However, the participants in the current study did not associate 
structured team discussions with discussing the emotional aspects of the work. This 
may be partly because they seemed to interpret dealing with the emotional aspects 
of the work as providing support with and relief from emotions that arose during the 
work, rather than trying to understand them or consider the unconscious impacts of 
emotions. Gaining relief, reassurance and ‘venting’ were associated with informal 
discussions, these being seen as safer. This was recognised by a team manager (TM1) 
who felt that it was better for individuals to be able to talk about feelings informally 
than in more formal group discussions where there was also the stress of 
‘performing’ in front of colleagues. She explained that she would not ask a social 
worker to talk about a case that might evoke a lot of feelings they may not feel 
comfortable to express in front of others. 
Taylor et al (2008) noticed in their focus groups that discussions marked by defensive 
projection of anxiety (for instance anger towards Guardians) were closely followed by 
thoughtful and analytic passages, as if the focus groups provided reflective space 
enabling anxiety to be contained. Interestingly, in the experienced focus group in the 
current study, it was after a sequence of strong negative feelings being expressed 
about courts and poor previous decisions that had led to harm, that the group turned 
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to a very different discussion about professional confidence and how social workers 
could present themselves as experts. In the other focus group there appeared an 
alternating pattern of expression of feeling and analytical discussion. Both studies 
therefore appear to indicate benefits of the group discussions that took place during 
the research which include a focus on emotional dimensions of the work. 
8.6   Conclusion 
Practitioners spoke about a range of emotions, at times felt very powerfully, and as in 
previous chapters there has been a clearly discernible dialogical relationship between 
emotion, ethical thinking and judgement. Further evidence has been presented of the 
importance of relationships in social work; these can be challenging, but also link with 
commitment and the ethics of care. As also considered in chapter 6, interaction with 
colleagues can occur as a result of emotion, and this was seen as helping to manage 
emotion but also potentially providing access to others’ viewpoints and keeping 
decisions safer. However, while the importance of hearing others’ viewpoints was 
acknowledged, there appeared limited conscious focus on making use of use these 
discussions to analyse the impacts of emotions or bring to self-awareness the moral 
constructions they might signal.  
This chapter has also provided further insights into the experience of practitioners 
working with the courts, and the emotions associated with this: the feelings of 
sadness, anxiety, frustration and anger that could arise, as well as feeling powerless, 
unfairly judged, not valued and at the mercy of judges. The relationships arising in the 
court world seemed to provide a focus for powerful negative feelings, possibly – 
drawing from Menzies (1960) and Taylor et al (2008) – indicating the operation of 
defences such as projection, against the unbearable levels of anxiety, pain and 
responsibility involved. 
Team support, relationships, suitable physical environments and reflective spaces 
were very important to practitioners in the study. These all point to the importance 
of a ‘containing’ organisational culture that understands the role of emotion and 
reflective discussion. However, while practitioners clearly valued reflection and 
discussion either to process and manage emotion, or to discuss ideas and how to 
move a case forward, there was not so much explicit linking of the two in people’s 
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minds. There also seemed to be a split in use of the supervisor role between formal 
case management and informal support.  Informal peer support was highly valued. As 
Ingram (2015b) points out, editing out emotion from formal supervision implies that 
emotion is not seen as a valid form of evidence and marginalises the reflexive 
appraisal of events in supervision, which will impact on the effectiveness of decision 
making and practice with service users. It also illustrates the ‘significant challenge to 
hold thinking and feeling, process and task together’ (Turney and Ruch 2018: 134). 
It did seem that some aspects of emotion were seen by participants as an important 
part of practice, for example within their relationships with children and family 
members, and in some ways important to hold onto as part of being human. But 
apart from the role of ‘gut feelings’ in alerting to a potential issue, as discussed in 
chapter 6, emotion was not presented as a useful element to consider in formal case 
discussion or decision making processes, with disturbing emotions seen more as side 
effects, well-being issues or potential distractions to be managed. This may not 
change unless a greater understanding of the role of emotion is available to 
practitioners and managers, especially in the face of powerful work pressures and 
organisational processes that act as a barrier to thinking and feeling.  
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9 Chapter 9: Discussion 
9.1  Introduction 
This study aimed to answer the following questions through qualitative analysis of 
data from nineteen individual interviews and two focus group meetings with social 
workers, senior practitioners and team managers: 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the ethical dimensions of decision 
making in care proceedings? 
• How do social workers perceive and experience the emotional dimensions of this? 
• How do they experience the interplay between emotions and ethical thinking in 
the process of coming to judgements and decisions in care proceedings? 
• How can social workers be best supported in these processes? 
As argued in earlier chapters (for example 1.2 and 4.5) there is a gap in research in 
this area. While some previous studies exist on decision making in care proceedings 
and child protection, they have not focused primarily on either ethics or emotions. In 
general, ethics and emotions are not brought together in social work literature on 
decision making. This study is unique in specifically bringing together both ethical and 
emotional dimensions, and considering their role and interaction in practitioners’ 
perceptions and experiences of decision making in care proceedings. It has also been 
undertaken within a more recent care proceedings context than previous studies. 
9.2  The key themes that emerged 
The preceding three chapters have set out the main themes arising from this study. 
From these, three broader, overarching themes have taken shape: the dialogical 
relationships between emotion, ethics and judgement; the interface between the 
court world and the social work world; and the importance of ‘space’ and 
organisational factors in enabling workers to contain or manage the emotional 
aspects of the work. These are summarised and discussed in this chapter, followed 
by comments on the nature of social work expertise. 
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9.2.1   Head and heart: a dialogical relationship 
The data indicate that ethics and emotions are embedded and inseparably connected 
throughout the decision making process for practitioners in care proceedings. This 
also links with the relational, embodied and interactive nature both of social work 
practice with parents and children, and of the decision making process itself.  
However, as stated in chapter 6, participants tended to present the actual decision 
making process as one of logical thinking and reasoning set within organisational 
procedures. There was limited explicit recognition of intuition within the reasoning 
process itself, or unconscious elements, or a role for emotion in the decision process 
(though there was clear awareness of emotion in other ways). 
An extensive range of ethical dimensions was manifest in the data. This is not 
surprising, as one of my questions asked participants what ethical dimensions they 
thought were present in the case they described. It was clear that these ethical 
considerations permeated the processes of coming to judgements and making 
decisions at both a conscious and less explicit level. Many points were made that 
broadly related to considering the rights of parents or children: the enormity of 
separating children from parents especially of permanently severing ties between 
them; difficult decisions about placement of siblings; tensions between different 
perceptions of the best interests of the child and what is good enough parenting; 
constructions of children and adolescents as deserving, or sacrificed, or ‘let down’; 
the importance of the child’s voice, or concerns about the child being ‘lost’ or 
invisible; and tensions between children’s and adults’ needs. Ethical dimensions in 
relation to professional integrity, guiding values and what is seen as good or right 
practice were also discussed. These included considerations of the importance of not 
doing harm; being fair, unbiased and providing a full opportunity; wondering if they 
had done enough to support a family or were making the ‘right’ decision; what 
constituted good practice, and views of integrity and honesty. Another broad 
category of points mentioned by participants linked to social justice: concerns over 
disadvantaged parents, use of power over parents who are victims themselves, and 
the role of social class and culture. While injustices to individuals were frequently 
considered, which I have listed under ‘rights’, less attention was given to the role of 
broader macro-level social injustices, inequalities and oppression. Overall, these 
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ethical dimensions encompassed a range of ethical issues, problems and dilemmas, 
as usefully defined by Banks and Williams (2005). 
In the findings chapters I have made references to some of the ethical theories I 
surveyed in chapter 3, such as deontology, consequentialism, the ethics of care and 
elements of recognition and narrative. Virtue ethics can also be seen in participants’ 
concern for integrity, honesty, fairness and other virtues. I had hoped to see more 
direct evidence in participants’ thinking of the whole range of the theories and 
perspectives I surveyed – though some elements of hermeneutic and dialogic 
approaches were present implicitly in the data relating to relationships and 
interaction. In taking an inductive approach to analysis I was not analysing the data in 
relation to preconceived themes. There is scope, therefore, for future research with a 
focus on exploring participants’ views or experiences through the lenses of specific 
ethical theories. 
It appeared that there were particular kinds of constructions or ‘rules of thumb’ used 
(also reflecting findings of other studies such as Hackett and Taylor 2014, Whittaker 
2014, 2018; Platt and Turney 2014) that were seen to justify decisions for legal 
intervention. These linked to ideas of a parent’s accountability, conscious choice, 
non-engagement with services, inability to change, or prioritisation of their own 
needs and other relationships over the needs of the child – some of which have moral 
overtones.  
Relevant to this is the influence of wider social, ideological, organisational and legal 
contextual factors in shaping the ‘rules of thumb’ used.  The neoliberal emphasis on 
risk and the impact of austerity and shrinking resources have resulted in risk being a 
key determinant of intervention, and therefore the necessity of a deficit model being 
used to justify decisions. This is compounded by the same organisation having 
responsibility for both investigating and supporting vulnerable families (Haight et al 
2017). Devine (2015) argues that services are provided under s.17 of the Children Act 
1989 to some who do not want them in order to prevent escalation to s.47, which 
means that parental non-compliance with services that are meant to be supportive 
and consensual may lead to escalation of the case; there is thus a coercive element in 
assessment and the use of s.17 while parents do not have the same rights as in 
criminal law. This also links to the adversarial, rather than inquisitorial, model of the 
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courts (Wellbourne 2016), and the nature of the evidence needed in order to 
convince the court of the need for an order under s.31 (CA1989). So, as Urek (2005) 
shows, social workers may need to construct and present parents in particular ways 
in order to justify intervention. Thus the adversarial model, as well as neoliberalism, 
contributes to parents being related to as ‘means’ rather than ‘ends’. 
In the interviews there was sometimes a difference between some almost formulaic 
accounts of the reasons for justifying a decision and the way the same individuals 
talked about their relationships with and feelings about parents, which were often 
very nuanced and ‘human’. This suggests that some of the language used to present 
parents’ deficits may be shaped by institutional demands and the adversarial model, 
rather than social workers’ personal approaches.  For example, studies by Keddell 
(2011), Mason (2012) and Whittaker (2014) demonstrate the difference in culture 
between statutory services and organisations with a primarily supportive focus in 
working with families. 
Noticeable in the participants’ discussions of ethical dimensions were links between 
ethical thinking and emotions. Many examples have been quoted in the findings 
chapters (as well as further examples not quoted), where participants’ talk about the 
situation or decision included their feelings about it. In fact when participants spoke 
of something being ‘challenging’ or ‘difficult’ this often referred to a situation which 
was difficult both emotionally and ethically, and it was often not made explicit 
whether the ‘difficult’ aspect was the uncomfortable emotion or the ethical tension 
involved. Likewise, ethical dimensions were evident in participants’ discussion about 
the emotions they identified. It was noticeable that when talking about emotion, they 
added a thought or explanation about it. The findings seem to reflect that emotions 
reveal our values and moral priorities as suggested by Pizarro (2000) and Keinemans 
(2015).   
In the data there was a clear pattern of sadness or upset feelings being closely linked 
to ethical dimensions, consistent with sadness being associated with greater depth of 
ethical thinking (Small and Lerner 2008). Some very strong sad feelings were evoked 
by the thought of parents and their children, or siblings, never being able to see each 
other again and the harm or other impact this may have. These sad feelings also 
seemed to be associated with an awareness of a shared humanity, being ‘a human 
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being’ engaged in splitting apart basic family relationships between other human 
beings, which in itself felt wrong, even if it clearly seemed the ‘right’ decision in other 
ways. These feelings were heightened when participants made connections with their 
own family relationships and histories.  
Strong feelings of anxiety or frustration or anger were sometimes associated with 
thinking about harm that had occurred or could potentially occur, but were also 
linked to a wider range of situations. These included feeling thwarted by the courts in 
their attempts to practise ethically, or unfairly accused of being biased, or feeling 
personally responsible for making the ‘right’ decision that was going to have a 
massive impact on a child’s life, or a personal risk to themselves such as being under 
the spotlight and having their practice or evidence criticised – examples of ‘moral 
injury’ (Haight et al 2017), as well as indicating some possible projection of anxiety 
and responsibility (Menzies 1960; Taylor et al 2008).  
It seemed that the more ethical tensions the decision invoked, the more it was felt 
emotionally. However, there was also a dialogical relationship in that it also seemed 
that high emotional content led to a stronger sense or expression of the ethical issue. 
For example, there were instances when emotions aroused by seeing a parent or 
child, or sympathising with them through making a connection with the participant’s 
own family or history, seemed to heighten participants’ awareness of the benefit or 
harm in the situation – which in turn increased the emotional impact. There were 
also many examples of emotions appearing to deepen participants’ commitment to 
work with, or do their best for, a child or parent or other family member, consistent 
with emotion being a motivator or leading to commitment to a moral action (Pfister 
and Bohm 2008; Pizarro 2000). On the other hand, there were also indications that 
emotion may arise out of the commitment to an attentive relationship (Noddings 
2013).  
Social and moral constructions also seemed to lead to certain types of emotion, for 
example seeing someone as a victim or a child as deserving better led to sympathy, in 
contrast with a parent apparently choosing not to parent or prioritise the child’s 
needs, which could be seen as justifying going to court. 
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It seems therefore that emotion both impacts on ethical thinking but is also 
influenced by moral judgements and ethical thinking. When coupling their 
identification of emotion with an explanation for it, participants seemed to be 
aligning their feelings and ethical thinking. Pizarro’s (2000) argument may be 
relevant, that where there is a conflict between people’s moral beliefs and their felt 
empathy for someone, individuals either adjust their belief systems in response to 
empathy through cognitive strategies such as perspective taking, or may regulate or 
suppress their empathic responses, for example through focusing on differences. It 
seemed in interviews that practitioners wanted to feel right about their decisions, 
and it is possible that some aspects are potentially too painful to explore, for example 
to consider whether a ‘wrong’ decision may have been made to separate parent and 
child unnecessarily – and in these instances there was a justifying thought, such as 
not losing sleep worrying if a child was removed unnecessarily because at least the 
child was safe, or practitioners not being able to reflect after decisions because they 
needed to pick up a new case.  
9.2.1.1 Relationships and embodied interaction 
The above discussion connects with the embodied, interactional and relational 
nature of social work. As discussed in the literature review, home visits, meetings and 
forming relationships with children and families are a central part of the work (eg 
Ferguson 2011), even for practitioners who are not explicitly aiming to undertake 
‘relationship-based’ practice, and emotions are integral to this.  Chapter 8 shows the 
range of emotional impacts on practitioners of seeing, being with, working with and 
getting to know the children, parents and family members. For participants in the 
study, knowing and closely working with individuals over time in many cases seemed 
to generate care, compassion and commitment to them. Frustration and sometimes 
anger or anguish could be felt when they felt a child had been let down, or a child 
and parent were being permanently separated. Pleasure and delight arose from 
seeing positive changes. Strong feelings of personal commitment were expressed, 
such as being ‘passionate’ in standing up for a child, ‘desperate’ for a mother to 
prove herself, ‘exhausted’ but still giving all. In chapter 7 I have linked these to an 
ethic of care (Tronto 1993; Noddings 2013). This ethic of care can be seen in the way 
social workers talked about children and families they worked with, but also in 
237 
 
concern of senior staff towards less experienced staff who were having a hard time 
during care proceedings, and additionally in the expectations the social workers had 
of parents in caring for their children. Chapter 6 shows that there seemed to be a 
tension between the social workers’ focus on the care the child was receiving from 
the parent, and the courts’ contrasting emphasis on incidents. The ethics of care thus 
appeared a guiding and motivating factor for practitioners, and one process through 
which emotions fed into their ethical thinking, as well as being generated by an 
ethical commitment to the other. 
Relationship building could therefore be seen as leading to more ethical practice. 
There were examples in the study of parents valuing the relationship with the social 
worker, although this was sometimes linked with wanting to see the social worker as 
a friend. Empathic relating has been shown to reduce resistance (Forrester et al 2008, 
2012; Keddell 2011; Mason 2012); this and building trust could potentially make a 
difference to the outcome of a case, in leading to more information being shared, or 
a person engaging in work towards change; and trust also needs to be established to 
enable a child’s voice to be heard (Tait and Wasu 2012). But building relationships 
could also be costly and painful, when they led to ‘recognition’ of a parent, or 
sympathy with or anxiety for a parent or child, or in combining care and authority, as 
illustrated by data in chapter 8. 
Embodied interaction also facilitates the capacity to visualise and imagine a parent or 
child, in contrast with a written description.  Nussbaum (2001) observes that 
emotions typically have a connection to imagination, and being able to picture a 
person or event vividly makes a difference to the amount of emotion and compassion 
felt towards the person. As one participant vividly stated, ‘you can read about them 
on paper but it’s not who they really are’. Ferguson (2011) brings to life the physical, 
embodied, mobile, atmospheric and emotional aspects of social work practice, the 
places in which social work takes place such as homes, cars and offices, and the 
tastes, smells, perceptions and visceral impacts that shape or inhibit movement and 
interaction. Interviews from the current study show the impact of person to person 
interaction and observation in shaping perception and judgement (see chapter 6).  
It could be said that a form of knowledge is created in these interactions, a co-
constructed, embodied and fluid form of knowledge. This knowledge could take the 
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form of building up or changing understandings and perceptions; talk could clarify 
confused or complex information, or give shape to hitherto unexpressed and 
inchoate thoughts or new ways of looking at something; or the impact of empathy 
and trust could enable an individual (child, parent or social worker) to reveal more 
information, which then would increase understanding, and could also lead to action 
and the potential generation of new knowledge. Broadhurst and Mason (2014) 
demonstrate the richness of contextual detail available through the embodied ‘co-
presence’ of face to face encounters, where all the senses are involved; here, 
understanding is gained through all the senses, knowledge can be felt, and non-
verbal communication used to convey warmth and encouragement and build trust. 
Park (2006) identifies ‘relational knowledge’ as a distinct form of knowledge 
(compared to ‘representational’ and ‘reflective’ knowledge).  He points out that 
talking invites connection between people, and the ‘knowing’ of the other that arises 
from this ‘is inherently not just an intellectual exercise, but an affect-laden action. 
That is, when we know relationally, we mobilize our feelings and our minds’. This 
relational knowledge is associated with listening, understanding (emotionally as well 
as cognitively), and commitment (Park 2006: 88). These ideas also resonate with 
Buber’s explorations of ‘I-Thou’ and ‘I-It’ relationships (see 3.2.11). Reason and 
Bradbury (2006: 9-10) identify ways of knowing that ‘start from a relationship 
between self and other, through participation and intuition’, in which knowing is seen 
as ‘the everyday practices of acting in relationship and creating meaning in our lives’, 
and ‘sensitivity and attunement in the moment of relationship’ are important.. 
Relationship and embodied interaction (and their emotional components), then, can 
lead to greater knowledge and understanding.  
However, the impact of embodiment on judgement may also be potentially negative, 
for example the impact of disgust (Ferguson 2011; Schnall et al 2013). Relational 
closeness leading to going the extra mile for some individuals may also mean that 
others are seen as less deserving and treated less favourably. This potential danger of 
partiality is pointed out by Tronto (1993) in relation to the ethics of care, and by 
Pizarro (2000) regarding the impact of having empathy for some individuals and not 
others and thus reducing equality of justice for all. In contrast is Levinas’s perspective 
that ethics should precede knowledge and that we should relate to others without 
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understanding and judging them, because to conceptualise the other is to treat her 
or him as an extension of our own categories.   
9.2.1.2 Constructive Dissonance 
This study also indicates that another significant aspect of the relationship between 
emotions and ethical thinking and action is the impact of dissonance and its 
constructive role in leading to questioning, discussion and new perspectives in 
thinking and action.  
It was clear from a number of participants in the study that one way they sought 
relief from, or tried to manage, the emotional aspects of the work, was talking with 
others. This could take the form of ‘venting’, or seeking the support of others, after a 
difficult experience that had stirred up emotions of sadness, distress, frustration, 
anxiety or uncertainty. A pattern that was evident in the data was that talking with 
others, whether through informal or structured discussion, consultation or joint 
working, was also associated with gaining access to other people’s thoughts and 
ideas, which could then provide new insights or help the individual to think 
differently. It was notable that in some cases this discussion only took place because 
the participant was emotionally affected, and in these instances the conscious aim of 
seeking this dialogue appeared to be to gain relief from the emotion rather than look 
into the case more thoroughly. But there were also situations where a feeling of 
discomfort would consciously lead an individual to seek discussion.  For example, 
there were many comments about ‘gut feelings’ leading to awareness that something 
was ‘wrong’ and needed to be thought about, discussed or looked into further. 
Participants also mentioned that less experienced workers needed more support, 
discussion and consultation if they did not know what to do or felt unsure, a situation 
that was also linked with feelings of anxiety. In these situations there was a pattern of 
uncomfortable emotions leading to discussion.  
In other instances a social worker might consult through feeling stuck or because the 
decision was unclear and difficult. Joint visits were used as a way of supporting an 
inexperienced worker’s learning. Structured team discussions were seen as useful for 
looking at a case that seemed stuck. Thus, as well as obvious emotions of discomfort, 
there were also examples of uncertainty or ‘not knowing’, as in not being able to 
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understand a parent’s responses, or tensions between different factors or outcomes 
and not knowing the best conclusion, that would lead to individuals seeking 
discussion with others, whether in supervision or with team colleagues.  
The experience of dissonance, whether emotional or cognitive, is therefore an 
important and potentially positive factor. In Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance, experiencing a situation which conflicts strongly with prior expectations 
will disturb and challenge a person to generate new thinking. Mezirow (1990: 14) also 
identifies how an eye-opening discussion may be one of the means through which a 
‘disorientating dilemma’ challenges our presuppositions and leads to ‘perspective 
transformation’. This requires imagination and openness: ‘Imagination is central to 
understanding the unknown; it is the way we examine alternative interpretations of 
our experience by “trying on” another’s point of view. The more reflective and open 
we are to the perspectives of others, the richer our imagination of alternative 
contexts for understanding will be’ (Mezirow 2000: 20).  
In the interview data, situations that seemed straightforward, or when a practitioner 
knew what to do through experience, or when there was no emotional conflict, did 
not appear to lead to consultation and discussion. This seems logical; however, there 
were instances in the data of a participant feeling sure of a recommendation, but 
experiencing a change of mind following involvement by someone else, then leading 
to a significant change in plan such as keeping a child within the family rather than 
pursuing foster care, for example SW8 and the male relative (6.3.5), and participants’ 
comments about the impact of the Signs of Safety model in making them think 
differently and respond to risk differently. Changes of plan could also arise when a 
case transferred teams, or plans were challenged in court, again illustrating the 
impact of the involvement of different viewpoints. In these cases dissonance had not 
necessarily been present initially, and the original decision makers had not 
questioned the appropriateness of the plans, until challenged in some way. Helm and 
Roesch Marsh (2017: 1369) also point out the potential for organisational change or 
instability to ‘create opportunities for change and the ‘emergence’ of new ways of 
thinking and acting’.  
Given these examples from the data, and the insights from writers such as Munro 
(2008) about the danger of confirmation bias and other heuristics, there is therefore 
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an argument that it is the apparently straightforward that may also need to be 
discussed as well – to problematize the seemingly unproblematic – rather than 
assuming that the experienced practitioner’s confidence from knowing what to do 
means there is less need to discuss. Higgins (2018) draws attention to the danger of 
‘automatic thinking’ that is present in contemporary child and family social work, 
based on uncritical following of rules and principles and an absence of ‘inner 
dialogue’, the presence of which can lead to dialogue with others. Data from the 
current study show that experiences of dissonance and ‘not knowing’ were 
constructive as they were likely to lead to discussion and interaction with challenges 
and different viewpoints, and therefore the potential for more ethical thinking and 
action. Dissonance and ‘not knowing’ will be discussed further below in relation to 
organisational structures and processes. 
To conclude this section, the findings of this study are consistent with Nussbaum’s 
(2001: 1) view that:  
Instead of viewing morality as a system of principles to be grasped by the 
detached intellect, and emotions as motivations that either support or 
subvert our choice to act according to principle, we will have to consider 
emotions as part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning. 
There are evident drawbacks associated with emotion, some of which were raised in 
this study. It can potentially lead to partiality and unconscious preferences. It can also 
result in stress, and literature also points to the dangers of unrecognised and 
unprocessed emotion in leading to avoidance and ‘not seeing’ (eg Cooper 2005; 
Ferguson 2017), and burnout (Zapf 2002; Biggart et al 2016). However, the findings of 
this study indicate that emotions are an important part of the ethical reasoning 
process. For example they appeared to heighten sensitivity to the presence of an 
ethical issue such as the impact of a process on a parent or child, or bring a deeper 
understanding or recognition of a parent, and motivation and commitment to resolve 
an issue for the benefit of individuals involved. Emotions and ethical perceptions and 
thinking seemed to impact on each other in a dialogical relationship, both influencing, 
and influenced by, judgements and moral constructions, and all of these were 
therefore integral to the decision making process for significant decisions in care 
proceedings. Emotions can also lead to questioning and further discussion, leading to 
greater awareness of ethical dimensions and more nuanced ethical thinking and 
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decision making. Additionally, through their significant role in empathy, compassion, 
recognition, relationship and the ethics of care, as well as creation of a more 
participatory knowledge, they are part of processes that can potentially lead practice 
to become more ethical, committed, and less oppressive towards children and their 
families.  
9.2.2   The interface between the court world and the social work world 
In the interviews the differences between court processes and experiences on the 
one hand, and social work practice on the other, appeared so fundamental that in 
thinking about them I have used the idea of different ‘worlds’.  
Some aspects of going to court were experienced as alien and hostile. Discussion 
about court in the interviews was largely negative, although one participant did refer 
to court work as her favourite part of the job. The overall negative perception 
conveyed may have been partly because of the questions I asked, as for example one 
of my questions was about what they found the most challenging aspects of care 
proceedings, and I did not ask what they found positive. However, there was often a 
sense of social workers feeling beleaguered from the pressures, demands and attacks 
they faced through the court process. The attacks and demands were often felt to be 
unfair, undermining and sometimes demeaning. Practitioners were hemmed in by 
pressures not only from the courts but also from the families they worked with, the 
volume of their other work, and organisational constraints such as management 
decisions about resources.  
There was some evidence of pushing back. One senior practitioner mentioned doing 
a presentation with her service manager to magistrates to explain aspects from the 
social work perspective and hear the magistrates’ expectations.  Another participant 
commented on the need for social workers to take responsibility for presenting good 
quality evidence to enable judges and magistrates to make appropriate decisions, 
and members of the experienced focus group spoke of the need to have professional 
confidence, be assertive, to challenge and present themselves as experts; they also 
discussed telling the local authority lawyers to file the evidence rather than 
continuing to ask the social worker to make changes. One participant also spoke of 
‘managing the other professionals’, in a discussion of the difficulty of how to respond 
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when being criticised by the judge. Practitioners also talked of learning they gained 
from experience and reflection, and ways they were adapting and anticipating, for 
example through creating PAMS-like assessments where it was difficult to obtain 
agreement for one to be commissioned. More often, however, the emphasis in the 
data was more about individually coping with the frustrations, anxieties and other 
negative impacts, or feeling powerless and having to accommodate to the moods and 
demands of the judges and the guardians.   
The impact of the courts on social work practice was also significant. In some ways 
the court world acted to shape social work practice, decisions and plans with the 
families.  As discussed earlier, the adversarial model necessitates a deficit focus in 
statutory social work. Social workers have to collect and present extensive negative 
evidence about parents to meet the threshold for an order (Burns et al 2018). 
Decisions to take participants’ cases to court were guided by whether the 
appropriate type of evidence was available to succeed in court. This could be seen in 
some respects as having to work in the ‘shadow of the law’ (Masson 2017), or 
perhaps more specifically, in the ‘shadow of the courts’. Additionally, in order to gain 
control (through gaining parental responsibility), it was necessary first to lose control 
to the court, as found by practitioners in Dickens’ (2006) study. The set timescales 
and processes of the PLO provided the framework for the completion of assessments 
and plans. Case law and the dispositions of individual judges appeared instrumental 
in shaping the potential options to be considered, as well as the outcome of the 
proceedings. 
The physical spaces and aspects of the work in each ‘world’ are completely different. 
As mentioned above, social work with children and families involves relationships, 
embodied interaction, a fluidity of movement and continually changing and unfolding 
situations. The forms of knowledge created in the moments of embodied interaction 
and dialogue, ephemeral, imprecise, growing and changing, are very different in 
nature from the form of knowledge required by the courts. Practitioners were 
sometimes unsure how to translate this knowledge into written evidence, for 
example unsure what was really wanted by the courts, or how to represent the 
child’s voice or what the child’s life was like, especially within a limited word count – 
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as in the words of the practitioner in chapter 6 struggling to put the child’s ‘world on 
a piece of paper’. 
In contrast to the spaces of social work practice, physically the courts are formal 
ordered spaces. Participants referred to the set seating arrangements in the court 
room, and being ‘on the stand’ to give evidence. Participants in the study did not 
mention clothing, but another feature of courts is the formal or smart dress 
expected; linking to the concept of embodied cognition is an idea of ‘enclothed 
cognition’ put forward by Adam and Galinsky (2012), relating to the psychological 
influence that clothes have on a wearer in terms of the symbolic meaning of the 
clothes and the physical experience of wearing them.  In the interviews, courts were 
also potentially mysterious spaces, especially for families: participants talked of 
lawyers disappearing into rooms for important discussions, periods of waiting while 
nothing seems to be happening before a flurry of activity, and spaces where people 
on different sides mix together and a family member was unsure whether or not she 
was allowed to speak to the social worker.  
This space belongs to the lawyers. The game-like nature of the court process is 
referred to by Beckett et al (2007). Participants expressed discomfort with the 
adversarial nature of proceedings and shifting from a focus on working with a parent 
to fighting against them. They were frustrated at losing but also found it sad and 
uncomfortable to see parents struggling on the witness stand (see chapter 8). The 
whole process was about the child, but it felt as if the child was ‘lost’ and not present, 
as also expressed in the serious case review for Daniel Pelka: ‘despite Daniel being 
the focus of concern for all of the practitioners, in reality he was rarely the focus of 
their interventions’ (Coventry LSCB 2013: 71). Family members could also be at a 
disadvantage, through potentially finding the processes foreign and opaque and the 
evidence incomprehensible.  
There are also significant ideological differences between the two worlds. Macdonald 
(2017) draws attention to the influence of deeply embedded beliefs and ideologies in 
court decisions in her article regarding the need to preserve contact with fathers 
where domestic violence had taken place – in that both children’s perspectives and 
safeguarding concerns were ‘overshadowed by a dominant presumption of the 
overall benefits of contact with fathers’ (p.1). She points out how the ‘best interests 
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of the child’ is not a neutral concept, and ‘a socially and politically constructed 
concept of welfare as an indeterminate, but universal principle’ may be applied, with 
the generalisation of all children as a homogeneous group, to ‘produce rigid and 
often inaccurate, outcome predictions for individual children’ (p.4).  
From the data in this study it seems that social work and the courts can be seen as 
holding different worldviews, in terms of dominant presumptions (such as how rights, 
legislation, priorities and the best interests of the child are interpreted), and views of 
knowledge. As argued above, social work practice includes ways of knowing that are 
relational, embodied, holistic, evolving and co-constructed. These are reflective of 
the ways of knowing involved in a ‘participatory worldview’, which Reason and 
Bradbury (2006) set in contrast with rational and empirical orthodox Western views 
of knowledge – which are more representative of the positivist nature of evidence 
and expert knowledge valued in the courts. Social work organisations may again have 
their own worldview involving the prioritisation of risk management and targets.  
While many negative impacts of the tensions between these worldviews were 
identified in the data, there are also potential positives. Similarly to the potential for 
dissonance to lead to dialogue, as discussed above, when these worldviews and 
frames of reference clash there is a potential for ‘ethical space’ to be created, as 
suggested at the end of chapter 3. In the data there were instances where a change 
of plan caused by the imposition of a different perspective by the court was later 
viewed as positive. The engagement of contrasting perspectives can stimulate ethical 
thinking, with the potential to create more positive outcomes.  In another way, 
comparing different objects or situations in qualitative research may enable the 
properties of the original object to be seen and understood more clearly (Strauss and 
Corbin 2008). Gadamer’s (2004) concept of bringing together different horizons (see 
3.2.10) may also be helpful here, with the potential for encounter with another 
horizon to challenge our own perspectives and preconceptions, and for a dialogue 
which involves seeking to understand the other, to lead to positive change.  
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9.2.3   The organisation as manager or container, and the importance of space 
9.2.3.1 The ‘management’ or ‘containment’ of anxiety and other emotions 
Menzies (1960) concludes that ‘the success and viability of a social institution are 
intimately connected with the techniques it uses to contain anxiety’ (p78). A negative 
effect of anxiety, whether from not knowing what to do, or fear of an aggressive 
parent, or excessive workload, is that it has an impact on the ability to think, and can 
lead to a focus on doing rather than thinking (Ruch 2007b). As discussed in chapter 4, 
too much uncontained anxiety prevents workers from being able to think clearly and 
hold the child in mind (Ferguson 2011: 198), and failure to engage with anxiety and 
painful emotions generated in work with abused children may lead to ‘not seeing’ the 
abuse and trauma being experienced by a child (Cooper 2005).  
However, it appears from the data in this study that anxiety could function both 
negatively and positively. Burton and Revell (2017) also note that the experience of 
tension from anxious thoughts or discomfort is an important element in ‘professional 
curiosity’. Sadness and fear, as low certainty emotions, are linked with deeper and 
more holistic thinking and ethical decision making than high certainty emotions such 
as anger, happiness and disgust (Small and Lerner 2008; Kligyte et al 2013; Lerner et 
al 2015). In the current study, while too much anxiety was unhelpful, there were 
indications that a certain level of anxiety was constructive, when contained. This is 
because, as discussed above, awareness of anxiety, uncertainty or other emotions 
that are uncomfortable or difficult to tolerate, led to discussion. Discussion provided 
support, reassurance and relief enabling the worker to reduce or tolerate the anxiety, 
but it also brought the opportunity to practise ‘methodical doubt’ (Helm 2017); 
experience the input of different viewpoints; the scrutiny of ‘another pair of eyes’ 
(see also Whittaker 2014); and the opportunity for new ideas and potential changes 
of direction.   
In relation to the need for openness and imagination, it is also important to be 
mindful that groups and teams may not necessarily provide the level of challenge, 
dissent or multiple viewpoints to enable new thinking to occur. For example, workers 
may seek to speak to those they are familiar and comfortable with (Helm 2017). 
Groups may apply the same biases in decision-making as individuals (Gambrill 2005, 
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cited in Roesch-Marsh 2012) and as Munro (2008) points out, may be subject to 
‘groupthink’ (Janis 1982). Also, groups and teams may be a microcosm of divisions in 
society, influenced by and reinforcing dominant social and power structures 
(O’Sullivan 2011: 72).  
For the purpose of this study, a distinction could be made between ‘managing’ and 
‘containing’ anxiety. Supervision which is focused on tasks and activities may reduce 
some anxiety but because it does not reflect on what is happening at an emotional 
level will fail to contain anxiety in the sense of containment used by Bion (1962), and 
will not engage with the deeper dynamics, uncertainties and possibilities of a case, 
leading to the possible negative consequences mentioned above. In the interviews 
there was clear recognition that workers may need support to deal with disturbing 
feelings, but in the sense of providing relief and managing their impact rather than 
containing and exploring them. Support that is focused on allowing colleagues to 
‘vent’ and gain relief from their feelings will not necessarily provide the level of 
challenge needed to re-examine and engage with the deeper dynamics and ethical 
dimensions of a case and the presence of any moral assumptions.  
It also appeared that reflecting during an emotionally challenging phase of a case 
may be difficult for practitioners, not only because of lack of time but also because 
they felt the emotional impact might affect their ability to get on with the work. 
Many of their situations required emotional labour and the suppression or 
management of particular feelings (Hochschild 1983). However, time to reflect after 
the event was often limited by the need to focus on other work. Thus there were 
internal, pragmatic and organisational barriers to this kind of reflection. 
Chapter 4 (4.2.6) discussed that a containing work environment is needed that 
enables workers to work sensitively with families (Howe 2010), and it is important 
that their own support needs are met (Horwath 2016). As pointed out by participants 
in this study, workers need to feel safe to talk about their emotions, and many 
comments were made about the importance of team or colleague support. Ruch 
(2007b) argues that a commitment is needed from senior managers to facilitate 
‘thoughtful work environments’ (p.379), and ‘for emotionally informed thinking to 
flourish, an ongoing forum is required, which offers a safe space, capable of nurturing 
appropriate types of professional vulnerability and dependency’ (p.375-376). 
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However, being able to admit vulnerability and dependency may go against common 
organisational cultures which encourage ‘heroism and secrecy’: a patriarchal valuing 
of being strong and courageous, together with an avoidance of disclosing the 
emotional aspects of practice. Such a culture marginalises empathy and intuition in 
decision making as well as ignoring workers’ fears and aspirations, and the same 
patterns of interaction are then mirrored in the practitioners’ interaction with service 
users (Charles and Butler 2004). Moreover, as practice in this area of work is marked 
by uncertainty and complexity, the ability to hold an open-minded, ‘not knowing’ – or 
what Blom (2009) calls ‘un-knowing’ – position is vital but may be at odds with an 
organisational environment prizing targets, control, efficiency and flow of 
information. As Munro (2011) points out, in situations of uncertainty it can also feel 
less risky to practitioners to be compliant and follow rules rather than take 
responsibility for exercising judgement. 
The ability to ‘not know’, in the sense of staying with uncertainty, can be seen as the 
more ethical approach. Cornish (2011: 144) refers to this ability as ‘negative 
capability’, a bringing together of ‘open-mindedness, receptivity and humility’ which 
is consistent with social justice and ethical, person-centred working. This is similar to 
the ‘epistemic humility’ advocated by Higgins (2018). Daniel (2005: 60), cited in 
Turney (2012: 155), advocates that uncertainty is conceptualised ‘as a rigorous, 
intellectually robust and ethical position, rather than a sign of weakness or 
equivocation’.  
Participants in the study identified the benefits of regular formal team discussions to 
unpick a case and possible interventions, but these discussions were not overtly 
focused on recognising emotional dynamics or ethical dimensions. While, as shown 
above, at times discussion provided both support with the emotional impacts and 
new insights into the case, it was not actively sought as bringing together these two 
aspects at the same time. However, various models and approaches have been 
suggested from different fields of literature which do bring together emotional and 
cognitive processes in case discussion.  
Ruch’s (2007b) case discussion model requires ‘emotional listening’, encouraging 
participants’ emotional engagement with the case material, and involving ‘a repeated 
experience of tolerating uncertainty and maintaining an open mind, a position of ‘not 
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knowing’’ (p377). To ‘emotional listening’ Ferguson (2011) also adds the importance 
of ‘embodied listening’, focusing on how workers have felt in their bodies and 
experienced the tactile realities, smells and atmospheres of practice, and the impact 
these may have had. Cognitive Interviewing, which incorporates detailed recall of 
visual details and feelings involved in a situation, is developed by Turney and Ruch 
(2016) into a model for clinical supervision in social work, ‘the Cognitive and Affective 
Supervisory Approach’ (CASA).  
Beyond the social work field we could also draw from the examples considered in 
chapter 4 which propose models of case discussion that use emotion as part of the 
process. Molewijk et al (2011) in the field of bioethics suggest that identifying and 
considering the emotions involved in a case helps to clarify moral assumptions at 
work, as well as stimulating deeper insights and personal learning. Keinemans (2015) 
draws on Molewijk et al and other examples to underline the role of emotions in 
revealing the value systems of professionals and signalling moral constructions that 
are present, as well as being an important motivator to action. She argues the 
importance of social workers bringing these aspects to self-awareness through 
reflecting on their emotions, suggesting a number of tools and models for use 
individually or with others. In situations of moral decision making Lacewing (2005) 
argues the need to be able to involve awareness of felt emotion in the deliberation 
process itself, with this emotional self-awareness being a necessary part of 
understanding the impact of emotions on our thinking. Le Coz and Tassy (2006), 
suggest that doctors should reflect after decision making on the emotions involved 
and their impact on ethical thinking, also using their imagination, memories and 
creative thinking to explore other emotions that could have increased their 
receptivity to other ethical viewpoints. This use of imagination is also advocated (as 
mentioned earlier) by Mezirow (2000) in perspective transformation; by Haidt (2001; 
2010) in his social intuitionist model, arguing that visual imagery and the triggering of 
new intuitions has greater power than logical argument in enabling people to see a 
situation differently; and by Witkin (2014) in the sense of creatively envisioning new 
possibilities as part of the path from questioning and problematizing to 
transformation.   
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These examples spring from a range of professions, but running through them is the 
idea that transformation can arise from uncertainty, dissonance, awareness of 
emotion, dialogue or seeing things differently, sometimes through using intuition and 
imagination, but also that often the involvement of other people or an external 
pressure or challenge is needed: it is difficult to achieve through individual thinking 
alone. For these to be adopted effectively, however, an organisational shift may be 
required away from views of emotion as signalling weakness or need, or a distraction 
to be managed, to a view of emotion as necessarily present because of the nature of 
the work, and a potentially helpful resource that in appropriate ways may be 
contained, reflected on and used.  
9.2.3.2 The importance of ‘space’ 
The comments of the participants and the literature mentioned above together point 
to the importance of the availability of safe and containing reflective space, or 
spaces, of a kind that enables practitioners on the one hand to contain and tolerate 
(rather than eliminate or ‘manage’) anxiety, frustration or distressing emotions, and 
on the other hand to provide forums for discussion and consideration of different 
(and dissenting) viewpoints. These processes may help practitioners to hold a ‘not 
knowing’ stance and resist being drawn into anxiety-driven problem solving and 
action, or in the words of Taylor and White (2006: 937) being propelled ‘towards 
early and certain judgements when a position of ‘respectful uncertainty’ might be 
more appropriate’. Foster (2010) also found that, among other elements, 
opportunities for staff to experience ‘mental space’ supported them in making 
imaginative and creative relationships with service users, and she cites Winnicott’s 
ideas on creativity and ‘potential space’. The idea of ‘ethical space’ being created 
when two different cultures meet has been mentioned above and in chapter 3.  
In the interview data a variety of physical and temporal spaces could be discerned. 
Informal and formal interactional spaces existed within supervision and team or 
group discussions, joint working and friendships. The relevance of temporal space 
could be seen in points raised about the absence of time to reflect after a care 
proceedings case because the moment one is completed the practitioner will be 
allocated another. Physical aspects of space involved buildings, which are also social 
and embodied spaces, dynamic and imbued with social meanings and practices. 
251 
 
There were clear messages in the data about the importance to participants of being 
able to sit near others they knew and could talk to, and how certain buildings and 
spaces were valued, in contrast to situations of hotdesking. Cars were mentioned in 
connection with reflecting and dealing with emotional aspects of the work. In a sense 
the body could also be seen as a space or place in relation to reflection, in listening to 
music and doing household chores (see previous chapter), or as Ferguson (2011) 
highlights, in its mobility, senses and physical responses to emotions and 
atmospheres. These all interacted with individual, team, organisational and 
management cultures, practices and identities.  
These spaces, then, whether physical, temporal, interactive or reflective, potentially 
enable social workers to reflect on and contain the emotional aspects of the work, 
and also combine to create mental, emotional and ethical space where ideas are 
challenged or developed, knowledge is created or co-constructed and shared, 
workers are less ‘bureaucratically preoccupied’ (Ferguson 2017), and practice can 
become more ethical. I suggest they could also be used to bring together the 
individual and the structural, enabling the individual to examine and interrogate the 
impact of organisational and wider structural and societal factors on practice, making 
the boundaries between them more fluid and permeable to change. 
9.2.4   The nature of social work expertise 
A related area, not directly addressed in the research, but aspects of which feature in 
the findings of this study, is the nature of social work expertise. 
In his View from the President’s Chambers (3) of 2013, Sir James Munby, President of 
the Family Division, stated ‘Social workers are experts’. He went on to explain that ‘in 
recent years too many social workers have come to feel undervalued, disempowered 
and de-skilled’. With the introduction of the revised PLO and elimination of 
unnecessary reliance on other experts, his hope was that this would ‘re-position 
social workers as trusted professionals playing the central role in care proceedings’ 
(p.3).  
The dominant perspective of practitioners in this study was still of being 
‘undervalued, disempowered and de-skilled’, and not trusted as experts. In many 
cases this was linked to an assumption that they were biased against parents. 
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However, a lack of clarity about how to define social work expertise may also be a 
contributing factor. Trevithick (2008: 1212) identifies that ‘social work practice is a 
highly skilled activity and one that calls for an extensive knowledge base and 
considerable intellectual abilities’. She argues that the social work knowledge base 
includes three interweaving areas: theoretical knowledge; factual knowledge 
(including research); and practice/practical/personal knowledge; also recognising 
within this framework the important role of service user knowledge. Munro (2011: 
88ff) also brings together three areas in her understanding of expertise: (i) 
‘relationship skills’ –  including communication and the ability to combine care and 
control; (ii) ‘reasoning and emotions in relationship-based practice’ –  involving skills 
in using logical and intuitive understanding and emotion; and (iii) expertise in ‘using 
evidence’ – from observation, evidence from the family/situation and critically 
appraised research. Social work is both art and science (Blom 2009; Cornish 2017); 
and as this study shows, also needs to include the capacity to translate knowledge 
created in embodied, relational interactional contexts into succinct, evidence-based 
documents.  
Expertise is often associated with experience, and also with the use of intuition. This 
study involved practitioners with a wide range of levels of experience of care 
proceedings. Commonly cited are the stages of professional development drawn up 
by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986): novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient and 
expert. In their model, decision making at each stage is seen as analytical until the 
expert stage when it becomes intuitive, based on learning from experience. However, 
in relation to this final stage, Fook, Ryan and Hawkins (2000) differentiate between 
‘experienced’ and ‘expert’ practice. Experienced practice may be routinized and 
intuitive through being internalised, and may be effective in well-defined situations 
where patterns can be quickly recognised. The expert practitioner, however, is seen 
as one who is able to identify new and unique aspects, devise new categories of 
experience, and perceive and respond accordingly, sometimes taking risks, open to 
new ideas, and able to think creatively. As expressed by Gadamer in Truth and 
Method, being experienced is not about knowing ‘better than anyone else’, but 
rather ‘a person who is called experienced has become so not only through 
experiences but is also open to new experiences. . . who, because of the many 
experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly 
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well-equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them’ (cited in Rossiter 
1996: 149). 
Kinsella and Pitman (2012: 170-1) also warn that knowledge derived from experience 
can lead to either of two outcomes, to ‘a reflective practice of judgement based on a 
quest for wise practice and directed toward doing what is best; alternatively, to a 
practice grounded in fear, of doing what is safest from a self-interested and 
protectionist perspective . . . doing only that for which one might be held 
accountable’. The view of several participants was that with more experience they 
felt more able to challenge plans they did not agree with. Phronesis, developed 
through practice and experience, and often translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or 
‘practical rationality’, is a relevant concept. Aristotle conceived of phronesis as an 
intellectual virtue that implied ethics, involving practical judgement informed by 
reflection, with an orientation towards action (Kinsella and Pitman 2012). This 
encompasses the kind of situated ethical sensitivity and reasoning required in the 
complicated, messy and uncertain situations facing social workers in care 
proceedings, which, as argued in this study, are permeated by both complex ethical 
and powerful emotional dimensions.  
In this study I collected information on the number of care proceedings the 
participants had undertaken, as well as their age group and whether they were under 
or over three years qualified at the time of the interview. I was interested to 
understand the role of participants’ level of experience. In the event, however, it was 
difficult to draw many clear conclusions. This may be partly because the number of 
care proceedings each had undertaken was not always related to their level of post-
qualifying experience or social worker/senior practitioner status. Age also appeared 
to be a factor affecting levels of confidence.  
Section 6.2.4.2 discusses participants’ own views about the differences that 
experience made to their decision making, such as increased confidence, knowledge 
and understanding, speed, and willingness to challenge others’ views. There was 
nothing obvious in the data to counteract these points, and in general the 
experienced practitioners conveyed a greater sense of coming to judgements 
themselves and drawing on their own previous experience.   
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All participants identified a range of ethical issues, but in terms of the nature of the 
issues raised, or amount of ethical tension or conflict experienced by the practitioner 
it was difficult to discern patterns relating to their levels of experience. It appeared 
that some individuals thought and reasoned in more detail than others, irrespective 
of experience or age.  
The exception was Focus Group 2, which had a markedly different feel. This group’s 
discussion contained frustration about courts, judges, lawyers, expectations, funding, 
timescales and previous poor decisions, but limited reference to internal conflict or 
uncertainty. Strong protectiveness towards the child was conveyed alongside a more 
negative and detached view of parents. As discussed in section 8.3, this was a group 
of experienced practitioners and managers seen as having expertise, in the presence 
of a principal social worker. It is not clear exactly what part the culture of the 
organisation may have played in this discussion, but this underlines the importance, 
as discussed earlier, of understanding how far organisational cultures may encourage 
‘heroism and secrecy’ and devalue certain emotions, and addressing the negative 
effects of this. 
In the interviews the first time of undertaking care proceedings or giving evidence 
aroused more anxiety, while anger and frustration at courts or judges was more 
marked in more experienced participants. Other than this, and excluding focus group 
2, I could not see any other clearly discernible patterns of experience levels or age 
affecting either the participants’ willingness to talk about emotions in the interviews, 
or their levels of awareness or the strengths of emotions aroused by the work, and 
participants at all levels valued informal support and consultation. This indicates that 
while more experienced practitioners may be expected to manage their emotions 
more fully (and may have developed ways of doing so), they may still experience the 
same levels of emotion as less experienced colleagues.  
Care proceedings work is infused with ethical dimensions, not least the enormity of 
making decisions to separate parents and children. Humane practice in this field 
takes us to the heart of what it is to be a human being relating to other human beings 
at what could be the lowest point in their lives, that of potentially losing a child.  It 
needs to involve the carrying out, with clarity and authority, of statutory roles to 
safeguard children, intertwined with a focus on rights, social justice and professional 
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integrity as set out in the BASW (2014) code of ethics, at the same time as care, 
compassion, and a concern to connect with, more fully know but not misrepresent 
the other. Here, elements of the full range of ethical perspectives outlined in chapter 
3 become relevant.  
Engaging with these ethical dimensions of care proceedings decisions is potentially 
very painful and challenging, as has been glimpsed in some of the accounts in this 
study. In light of the interaction of emotions, ethical thinking and judgement seen in 
this study, it needs to be recognised that when practitioners seek to practise ethically 
in this field they will experience painful emotions, uncertainty and conflict, and will 
need to be supported in dealing with these. The data in this study and the literature 
discussed above indicate that expertise, and ethical and ‘humane’ practice, involves a 
capacity to hold together a number of tensions: support and authority, recognition 
and judging, and knowing and not-knowing, keeping the focus on the child while also 
‘recognising’ and supporting parents, and all the time working with anxiety and 
painful, disturbing emotions – a combination which is highly challenging to achieve. 
The backdrop for this is one of mounting pressures from austerity and rising referrals, 
a halved timescale for care proceedings, curtailment of expert witnesses, 
expectations for a higher quality of social work evidence, and potentially competing 
pressures both to avoid leaving children in harmful situations but also to support 
families to keep children out of care (Dickens and Masson 2016). 
In addition to those pressures, then, this study has touched on two barriers to 
‘humane’ practice. One is the painful nature of humane practice, as discussed above 
– for example in the ‘recognition’ of a mother with strengths and vulnerabilities, as a 
human being losing her child, and as an end rather than a means, as illustrated in the 
interview data in chapter 8. It may at times be too painful, and cause too much 
dissonance, for someone involved in the decision to ‘see’ a parent in this way. The 
other is the impact of the prevailing adversarial model and the resulting deficit model 
(Burns et al 2018), where the emphasis is on collecting evidence of blame or 
incapacity, and social workers have to use language in a way that will present a 
convincing case (Urek 2005).    
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A discussion that individualises humane practice, expertise, phronesis, or the ability 
to work with uncertainty, also runs the risk of individualising blame, in a climate 
where limited use of these qualities could be rooted in organisational cultures, 
structures and social forces in a neo-liberal world, as much as the capacity or 
potential capacity of an individual. Burton and Revell (2017) argue that the individual 
context cannot be detached from the organisational context. This includes how well 
social workers are supported with the emotional dimensions of child protection work, 
as these and complex organisational demands and adversarial and defensive 
conditions are barriers to professional curiosity. 
The findings of the current study underline the importance to practitioners of 
containment of the emotional impacts of their work, dissonance and dialogue, 
supportive spaces for discussion, and the role of discussion in decision making, and 
there is scope for bringing these together further. I suggest the emphasis needs to 
shift from linking these with the individual practitioner’s level of expertise or ‘need’ 
for support, to linking them with the challenging nature and ethical and emotional 
complexity of decision making in care proceedings, which means it is the case, 
situation or decision that ‘needs’ to be discussed, rather than the practitioner who 
needs to discuss it.  
9.3  Limitations of the study 
This study has focused on a limited number of practitioners in one region and may 
not reflect the practice or the experience of practitioners in other local authorities, 
and those working with different or more diverse populations. The complexity of the 
topic has also meant that a wide range of themes has emerged. A more restricted 
topic, or interviews focused solely on one aspect, might have enabled a deeper 
exploration of some issues. The indeterminacy of qualitative data and interpretation 
has also been discussed in chapter 5. Some aspects of the decision making process 
and the precise and complex nature of the interaction of emotions and ethics are 
unconscious, and not clearly accessible through post-hoc interviews. However, I 
believe it has still been possible to gain a greater understanding of this interplay and 
its complexity and importance.  
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This has been a learning journey for me into the research process. I wanted to let the 
participants speak, and there has not been enough space for all of their words that I 
wanted to include. But, as indicated in places earlier, their words may not always be 
completely their own and may be shaped to some extent by organisational and legal 
cultures, discourses and processes, and the need to argue a case according to 
particular ‘institutional narratives’. I have been moved by their accounts and their 
care for families they worked with, and I have felt a responsibility not to misrepresent 
them. I have become conscious that this kind of research can bring more 
understanding but also a danger of misunderstanding, and there may be a very fine 
line between the two. The analysis has involved a constant movement of stepping 
into, away from, and back to the data, trying to keep faith with the data. However, it 
may have been helpful to have had some ongoing conversation with participants to 
check out my views of the findings, and perhaps a more participative research design 
would have allowed this. As explained in chapter 5, I had initially hoped to undertake 
some follow up interviews but this was not possible within the timescale available. 
Chapter 5 discusses the limitations in how far I was able to carry out a grounded 
theory approach as opposed to a thematic analysis. 
If I were to complete a similar project again I would also build in more reflective 
spaces with others to discuss ideas, thoughts and feelings during the research than I 
have done, especially given the importance of peer support, dialogue and reflective 
discussion noted in the findings of this study.   
9.4  Further research 
A number of the participants in the study seemed to find it helpful to have the 
opportunity to think about and talk in depth about ethical and emotional aspects of a 
case in the interviews. As discussed above, in practice they found ways of gaining 
support with managing emotion or talking through difficult aspects of a case, but did 
not focus specifically on understanding the role of emotions or ethical dimensions or 
how they might interact to impact on decision making. This study indicates that there 
is a need for more research that explicitly brings together the ethical and emotional 
dimensions of social work practice to gain a deeper understanding of their interaction 
in decision making, or in particular areas of practice, such as relationships with 
parents in child protection. This understanding is all the more important in the 
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current social, political, legal and organisational context of practice, given the 
potential dangers of bureaucratic, unthinking, emotionally detached and procedural 
practice (eg Ruch 2007b; Howe 2010; Munro 2011; Ferguson 2017). 
Further research (possibly including contemporaneous elements) on the role and 
impact of different forms of discussion, both during and after the decision making 
process, would illuminate the processes involved and identify the most effective ways 
to support practitioners with working with the emotional and ethical dimensions of 
decision making in care proceedings and child protection, within the existing 
pressures of statutory organisations. This research could involve a participatory 
model, perhaps following an action research approach, or working with a group or 





10 Chapter 10: Conclusion 
This study makes a significant contribution to knowledge through bringing together 
ethics and emotions in a new way in relation to social work decision making in this 
field. It has also considered the role of emotion in decision making in a broader way 
than previous social work research, including the positive or neutral roles played by 
emotion as well as its potential dangers.  
Exploring social workers’ perceptions and experience of decision making in care 
proceedings has revealed that emotions, ethical thinking and judgement are 
embedded and inseparably connected throughout the process. The study has 
generated rich insights into the complex interaction of thoughts, feelings, 
experiences and processes involved for practitioners in coming to significant 
decisions in a range of care proceedings cases. One clear message is that involvement 
in decision making in care proceedings generates powerful emotions for 
practitioners, and these emotions are infused with and intensified by the ethical 
dimensions of practice and decision making with families – and working with courts – 
in care proceedings.  As this study demonstrates the close relationship between 
emotions, ethical thinking and judgement in decision making and associated 
processes, one implication is that decision making in this field cannot be seen as 
distinct from its context, ethical and value perspectives, and the emotional, 
embodied and interactional aspects of social work: these all play an integral role and 
it is potentially dangerous to exclude or ignore them. Understanding the interplay of 
emotions, ethics and judgement is therefore necessary in working towards effective 
and ethical decisions.  
Another important consideration is the extent to which the impacts of emotions and 
associated ethical conflicts are recognised and worked with in practice, and how far 
practitioners are supported in this by their employing organisations. The study 
revealed ambivalence and uncertainty beyond viewing emotion as a well-being issue 
or as something to be controlled or managed to prevent it impeding good practice 




The previous chapter identified and discussed three key areas of findings:  
• The close interacting relationship of emotions, ethical thinking and judgement 
in decision making, and their role in the relationships and embodied 
interaction involved, as well as the potentially constructive role of dissonance; 
• The interface of the court ‘world’ and the social work ’world’; and 
• The importance of ‘spaces’ and the role of the organisation in either 
‘managing’ or ‘containing’ emotion. 
From these I have formulated a conceptual framework which is set out below. The 
findings of this study have important implications for practice at all levels. This 
framework may be used to bring greater understanding of the processes and 
influences involved, and to identify effective ways of supporting practitioners and 
developing organisational systems. 
10.1  Conceptual framework for understanding the role and interaction of 
emotions and ethics in care proceedings (and related) decision making  
The basis of this framework is that the three elements of emotions, ethical thinking 
and judgement impact on each other in a range of ways, consciously and 
unconsciously.  This interacting relationship between emotions, ethical thinking and 
judgement takes place within, and to some extent mediates the relationship 
between, processes – such as the individual, collective and organisational processes 
associated with framing, assessing, analysing, coming to a shared view and making 
decisions – and relationships, the embodied, interactional and relational elements of 
social work practice and decision making (see Figure 1).  
The processes depicted in this framework are also enacted at the following levels: 
individual, team, organisational, court, and the wider national and global context. 
These levels influence and intersect with each other (Figure 2). Representing these 
five levels as a diagram of nested circles demonstrates the ecological nature of care 





Figure 1: Interacting elements involved in coming to social work decisions in care proceedings 
 
 





• Individual level  
The interaction of emotions, ethical thinking and judgement is clearly seen in 
individuals’ intuitive and analytical thinking processes and reflections, including 
heuristic processes. Individuals’ own values, experiences, personal circumstances 
and family histories all play a part. Workers’ relationships with the children, 
parents and family members they are working with are both affected by the 
emotions, ethical thinking and judgements brought by the workers themselves, 
but also in turn impact on these, potentially leading to changes in perception.  
 
• Team level 
This level includes supervision, both formal and informal, formal team meetings 
and case discussions, and the many informal and supportive interactions between 
individuals and their colleagues. Supervisory and group decision making are often 
seen as potentially more objective than individual decision making; however, as 
seen in the literature (eg Munro 2008), discussions of two or more people are 
open to the same heuristics (in which emotion may play a part), and ‘groupthink’ 
can deepen this, leading to more extreme decisions. Time and bureaucratic 
pressures, team cultures, practices, relationships and attitudes towards the 
provision of reflective space will also have an influence on how far individuals are 
able to discuss the emotions and ethical tensions and dilemmas impacting on 
them.  
 
• Organisational level  
Social work organisations have clear decision making routes and hierarchies. 
Organisational checks and balances are in place with the aim of ensuring the 
appropriateness of decisions and to minimise mistakes. However, as with team 
processes above, these will not be immune to the operation of heuristics and 
value perspectives and their emotional elements when guiding decisions around 
risk (risks to the organisation as well as to service users), need and limited 
resources.  While unconscious bias is often seen as an individual issue, this study 
indicates that the influence of value perspectives operates at all levels, including 
the impacts of organisational discourses and cultures.  
Organisations may change policy directions (for example towards or away from 
adoption or early intervention) without attention to the (sometimes significant) 
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shifts in ethical thinking and emotional responses required from the workers 
expected to implement them.  
 
Organisational decision making processes also involve interactions and 
relationships. Organisations may prioritise the management of emotion through 
cultures of heroism and secrecy (Charles and Butler 2004), and control social 
workers through the use of shame (Gibson 2019). A culture shift would be needed 
for emotion to be valued and for emotional ‘containment’, in the sense described 
by Bion (1962), to be encouraged. Time constraints, resources and bureaucratic 
demands need to be balanced with support and the provision of spaces (physical, 
temporal or interactional) where reflection and emotional processing can take 
place.  
 
• Court level 
This research has highlighted the challenges for social workers of working at the 
interface between the two very different worlds of the courts and social work, 
where at times contrasting world-views and value perspectives appeared to 
operate, and closer understanding of each other would be valuable. The practices 
of the courts, together with the wording of legislation, the adversarial model, and 
perceptions of the evidence needed to convince courts, cast a long shadow over 
practice in statutory children’s services. To some extent approaches to parents 
and decisions about the direction of cases could be seen as being taken ‘in the 
shadow of the law’, or of the courts. The demands of court work over social 
workers’ time also affect their work with other families as well as the families in 
proceedings. Significant and powerful emotions were generated by the 
experiences of decision making and working with courts, including sadness at the 
impact on parents, deep anxieties and frustrations, and the challenges of dealing 
with ethical conflicts and dilemmas. Again, this points to the importance of 
support and reflective opportunities to enable practitioners to contain and work 
with these emotions and ethical tensions. 
 
• Wider national and global context 
Social work practice cannot be severed from its social, economic and political 
context. Shifting social policy directions (for example regarding adoption), 
neoliberalism and austerity affect both service users and local authority practice 
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both directly and indirectly. Moral perspectives and powerful collective emotions 
can be seen in social and political attitudes towards the poor and other 
marginalised groups, and ‘poor parenting’, as well as towards social work and 
social workers (Warner 2015). The extent to which these impact on approaches to 
families in proceedings is an area for social workers to reflect on, as well as how 
far ethical social work practice should involve a greater focus on poverty and a 
more politically proactive stance against austerity and neoliberal policies and 
attitudes. 
10.2  Recommendations 
Individuals and teams 
• Rather than only seeing emotions as a distraction, source of bias or a well-being 
issue, emotions, including discomfort and dissonance, should be viewed a 
resource for practice (Ruch 2007b) and embraced, contained and used, rather 
than ‘managed’ or suppressed. This study indicates that emotions are part of the 
thinking process and their role should not be ignored, especially if practitioners 
are seeking to practise ethically. For example, sadness appears to have a positive 
role in increasing depth of thought. Discomfort and dissonance are constructive 
when leading to reflection, discussion and interaction with the perspectives of 
others. Examination of emotions aroused by a situation could also potentially 
bring greater understanding of values and assumptions involved (including those 
that could lead a child to become ‘invisible’).  
• Discussion of emotion should be incorporated into formal as well as informal 
discussions and supervision. These could use my framework above as a basis, and 
could draw from existing models that include discussion of both emotions and 
ethics, as suggested in literature considered in previous chapters.  
 
• Discussion of ethical dimensions should also be encouraged. As these were linked 
to emotions, discussion could help deal with the emotional residue of dealing 
with dilemmas and challenging situations, as well as identifying moral 
assumptions. An area that seemed less visible to participants in the study was 
that of wider social and structural factors, inequalities and oppressions; 
therefore, the questions involved in ethical discussions could include these 
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considerations, as well as poverty-aware and shame-sensitive practice, 
incorporating all three forms of recognition in relationships with families. 
• In a pressured work environment informal discussions of emotional and ethical 
dimensions need not necessarily take up more time than time currently used in 
discussion: it is a matter of focusing the discussion differently, using different 
questions to each other, so that support is not only seen as helping people ‘vent,’ 
or ‘manage’ emotions, but also in using emotions as a resource to gain a greater 
understanding of a case or situation. 
• Rather than locating and emphasising the skills and needs of the individual 
practitioner in being competent, curious, expert, or needing support, shift the 
emphasis to the nature of the case. Some cases need to be discussed, however 
expert the practitioner. Also, sometimes it is important to problematize the 
seemingly straightforward. 
Organisational level 
• It is essential that employing organisations recognise the powerful impact and 
role of emotion in practice and decision making in child protection and care 
proceedings, and the nature of the interaction between ethical thinking and 
judgement.  This means organisations acknowledging and containing powerful 
and conflicting emotions as an inevitable and important part of the work rather 
than seeking to dismiss, marginalise or individualise them. All the above 
approaches outlined in the ‘individuals and teams’ section above need to be 
embraced and implemented at organisational level, moving the focus from the 
individual to the system. 
 
• This may involve cultural change, to shift the emphasis towards the role of the 
organisation as container and enabler – and avoiding organisational practices that 
constrict and inhibit through cultures of ‘heroism and secrecy’ (Charles and 
Butler2004) or shame (Gibson 2019). Workers also need support with the ethical 
and emotional dimensions of responding to changes in policy and practice. A 
deliberate focus on organisational containment, rather than management, of 
anxiety and other emotions, and on trying to understand the emotional dynamics 
in specific cases and of child protection in general, can help guard against 
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practitioners becoming ‘bureaucratically preoccupied’, children becoming 
‘invisible’, or parents unrecognised. 
 
• Consistent seating arrangements and groupings were perceived as significantly 
more helpful than hotdesking. Attention needs to be given to facilitating 
emotionally safe and supportive physical environments. 
 
• Attention could be given to promoting greater understanding between social 
workers and court professionals. As suggested by Dickens and Masson (2016) this 
could include sharing their disciplinary knowledge and agreeing standards of 
practice.  
Policy level 
• For these changes to take place effectively their importance needs to be 
acknowledged and embraced at national policy level. Social workers, academics 
and social work organisations have a political role in making more prominent the 
ethical and emotional dimensions and complexities of professional judgement 
and decision making, the nature of relationships in child protection and care 
proceedings practice, and the roles played by poverty and austerity. Child and 
family social work is becoming increasingly defined by government. It is important 
for social workers and academics to seek further opportunities for activities and 
research towards increasing professional understanding, the promotion of 
humane practice, and enabling the social work profession to have a stronger 
independent voice in its role in representing both service users and social 
workers. For example, Featherstone et al (2018) suggest various possibilities 
involving dialogue, collaboration, research and political pressure to move from a 
deficit model of child protection with its current focus on preventing child 
tragedies, towards a holistic social model. 
 
10.3  To conclude: benefits of the research  
This study will be of benefit to practitioners through bringing a deeper awareness and 
understanding of the emotional and ethical dimensions of decision making in care 
proceedings and related fields. It validates practitioners, giving voice to their concerns, 
perceptions and experiences; it may also enable them to push for the kinds of support 
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needed. The study opens up ways of using emotions as a resource, including building 
on the constructive aspects of dissonance and sad and disturbing emotions, rather 
than limiting the focus to trying to manage these. The conceptual framework 
developed above may be used to identify where improvements could be made, or 
where processes or supports could be introduced or strengthened at each level. It can 
also be used by an individual practitioner or team to analyse and gain greater 
understanding of an individual case. The framework and findings of the study can be 
used by managers to identify ways they can best support practitioners and create a 
culture shift in attitudes to emotion, and in social work education to facilitate learning 
and critical reflection. 
The framework could also be used to explore aspects of expertise and experience; 
how far experience should or not lead to greater autonomy; and how to learn from 
experience and find ways of working with emotions and protecting the self without 
withdrawing from families. Exploring the ethical and emotional dimensions identified 
in this study could help social workers hold on to social work as a profession with its 
own value base as well as being a specific job in a particular setting, carrying out the 
law and working within the constraints of statutory practice without necessarily being 
defined by these.  
Most importantly, this study will also be of potential benefit to families in or at the 
edge of proceedings if it enables practitioners to think about the way they relate to or 
depict parents and family members, and attend to the impact of unconscious intuitive 
processes, emotions, ethical thinking and judgements. Its ultimate aim is to contribute 
to the ‘recognition’ of families, and the practitioners working with them, and the 
promotion of humane, relationship-based and socially just practice.   
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APPENDIX 1:  Participants  
 
There were 31 participants altogether.  
Information was also collected about gender, age group and ethnicity but is not specified 
here for each participant to preserve anonymity. 27 identified themselves as White 
British, and 28 as female and 3 male. 
 
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS 
Designation in text Role Experience (3+ or 
under 3 years) 
Number of care 
proceedings 
undertaken so far 
SW1 Ex-LA social worker 3+ (not recorded) 
SW2 Social worker Under 3 4 
SW3 Social worker Under 3 4 
SW4 Social worker 3+ 3 
SW5 Social worker Under 3 (not recorded) 
SW6 Social worker Under 3 12 
SW7 Social worker Under 3 1 
SW8 Social worker Under 3 10-15 
SP1 Ex-LA senior practitioner 3+ (not recorded) 
SP2 Ex-LA senior practitioner 3+ (not recorded) 
SP3 Senior practitioner 3+ 6 
SP4 Senior practitioner 3+ 3 
SP5 Senior practitioner 3+ 3 
SP6 Senior practitioner 3+ 8 
SP7 Senior practitioner Under 3 4 
SP8 Senior practitioner 3+ (not recorded) 
SP9 Senior practitioner 3+ 20+ 
SP10 Senior practitioner 3+ 6 






FOCUS GROUP 1 
Designation in text Role Experience (3+ or 
under 3 years) 
Number of care 
proceedings 
undertaken so far 
Focus Group 1 Social worker 3+ 7 
Focus Group 1 Social worker 3+ 10+ 
Focus Group 1 Social worker Under 3 1 
Focus Group 1 Team manager 3+ 50+ 
 
 
FOCUS GROUP 2 
Designation in text Role Experience (3+ or 
under 3 years) 
Number of care 
proceedings 
undertaken so far 
Focus Group 2 Senior practitioner 3+ 5 
Focus Group 2 Senior practitioner 3+ 10+ 
Focus Group 2 Senior practitioner 3+ c.10 
Focus Group 2 Senior practitioner 3+ c.20 
Focus Group 2 Team manager 3+ 50+ 
Focus Group 2 Team manager 3+ 30-40 
Focus Group 2 Practice development 
officer 
3+ 20+ 





APPENDIX 2:  Individual interview questions 
 
• Please think of a care proceedings case you have worked with where coming to a 
judgement or decision was difficult or worrying in some way (either in the process of 
doing it or because of the result). During the interview I will ask you to talk about this 
case, but will also ask some questions about your experiences in general. 
 
o Please talk for a few minutes about the case. What made it difficult? 
(please state how long ago this was and how much care proceedings 
experience you had had at the time) 
 
 
• What ethical dimensions do you think there were in the decisions involved and the 
process of coming to them? 
 
 
• Regarding a key judgement and decision in this case, can you explain the process of 
how you came to it.  
o How quickly did you form a judgement? Did this change and if so why? 
o What made you choose this option?  
o What made it seem like the right or best option? 
o Was there a key moment you can point to when you felt clear this was right? 
 
 
• Which emotions were you aware of in yourself and how strong (or not) were they -  
o In the process, before you reached the decision?  
o When working with the family / child? 
o Afterwards?  




• Did your emotions make you aware of an ethical issue or dilemma? (if so what?) 
 
 
• Were there any values or principles that you normally hold to, that were difficult to 
follow?   
 
 
• One thing I’m looking at is how people use intuition and conscious thinking and what 
part intuition might play – how did you find this? 
o Do you ever have gut feelings about something?  
 
• Did any factors relating to ethnicity, culture, class, age, gender, sexuality or disability 
play a part in your experience of this case? And of the emotions and thinking 





• What impact did the nature of your relationships and interactions with family 
members have on you?  
 
 
• Were you aware of the impact of any physical factors such as physical appearance of 
the home, family members, etc? 
 
 
• What part did your previous experience play in coming to this judgement/decision? 
 
 
• How typical was this case example in comparison with other experiences you have 
had of planning and decision making in care proceedings? 
 
 
• Has your approach to such decisions, or the way you experience them, changed over 
time and in relation to the amount of experience you have?  
o Or changed because of changes in policy and organisational expectations? 
 
 
• Have you ever used any decision making model or guide? If so how helpful was this? 
 
 
• What support and/or supervision did you receive and how did this help? 
 
 
• Would you have found it helpful to have had more opportunity to reflect on, or 
support with, managing the emotional or ethical aspects of this situation, or other 
care proceedings you have worked with?  If so why? What support would have been 
helpful and when? (at the time/later?) 
 
 
• In your view what are the most challenging aspects of the care proceedings process? 
 
 
• What differences have recent developments (eg the 26 week timescale) made to 
your experience of the ethical and emotional aspects of coming to judgements and 








• What are the most challenging aspects of decision making in care proceedings? 
 
• Do you see these decisions as ethical? – in what ways?  
 
• How much thought do you give to the ethical dimensions of decisions at the 
time? And afterwards? 
 
• What emotions have you experienced in relation to the decision making 
processes, and working with families during proceedings? 
 
• What leads you to feel sure you are making the right judgement/decision? 
 
• What helps you / would help you to manage the emotional aspects of the 
process? 
 





APPENDIX 4:  Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
This is a PhD research project and the researcher is Anne Kelly, Senior Lecturer in Social 
Work at the University of Kent. The researcher has previous experience of care 
proceedings work as a qualified, registered social worker. 
 
Topic:  
How do social workers perceive, experience and manage the ethical and emotional 
aspects of decision making in child care proceedings? 
 
Why study this? 
Making plans and decisions about children’s futures can be very challenging and may 
involve ethical dilemmas. The process may also have an emotional impact on 
practitioners. Recent changes such as the 26 week timescale will also have an impact. 
This research aims to find out from social workers about their experiences of these 
aspects of undertaking care proceedings, and what support they find helpful, or would 
find helpful, in this area of work. 
 
How can you participate? 
Individual interviews will take place with social workers who have undertaken care 
proceedings work.  
Some focus group discussions will also be arranged. These could take place as part of a 
team meeting. 
 
What will the individual interviews involve? 
The individual interview will last about 45 minutes to an hour. It will be audio-taped and 
later transcribed. You will be asked some questions about your experiences of coming to 
decisions and recommendations in care proceedings cases.  
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the research at 
any time without any questions being asked. 
 
How will confidentiality be ensured? 
Personal/identifying information will kept separate from the transcripts of interviews, 
focus groups and any other recordings or comments made available to the researcher. All 
information will be held securely on a password protected computer. Following 
completion of the project all personal identifying data about participants will be 
destroyed, but fully anonymised transcripts may be kept for future use in publications. 
Examples of actual wording from the interviews may be quoted, fully anonymised, in 
publications.  
 
Will I benefit from participating? 
300 
 
You may find it beneficial to have an opportunity to reflect on these events and 
processes in relation to your own professional development. One of the aims of this 
study is to identify how practitioners can best be supported to manage the emotional 
impact of this kind of work, and to make recommendations for practice. 
 
Has ethical approval been gained?  
Ethical approval has been given by the University of Kent, [name of local authority] and 
[name of local authority]. 
 
If you would like further information on the project or its findings, please contact: 
Anne Kelly 
School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research 
Gillingham Building  
University of Kent 
Chatham Maritime 












APPENDIX 5:  Consent Form 
 
A study of how social workers perceive, experience and manage the ethical and 
emotional aspects of decisions making in care proceedings 
Researcher: Anne Kelly 
 
• I confirm that I have read the participant information sheet and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions 
 
• I understand that I will not be identified in any report, and no information that 
could identify anyone will be used 
 
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason 
 
• I agree to take part in the above study 
 
• I agree for the interview to be audio-recorded 
 
 
Name of participant: 
________________________________________________________ 
 















APPENDIX 6:   Information sheet  
 
 
I would be grateful if you could complete the following questions so that I can compile 
information about the research sample: 
 
Your initials: ……………………………………………………………  
 
Date of interview: ………………………………………………….. 
 
Post title (please tick):  
…….. Social worker 
…….. Senior practitioner 
…….. Team manager 
…….. Other (please specify):  
 
Level of experience:  
……… Qualified less than 3 years 
……… Qualified 3 years and over 




Age group (please tick): 
……… under 30     ……… 30-39  ………. 40-49  ……… 50 + 
 
Ethnicity: ……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
